

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

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SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. and  
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO. LTD.,  
Petitioner

and

APPLE INC.,  
Petitioner,

v.

SMARTFLASH LLC,  
Patent Owner.

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Case CBM2014-00193<sup>1</sup>

Patent 8,061,598 B2

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**PATENT OWNER'S NOTICE OF APPEAL**

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<sup>1</sup> CBM2015-00120 (Patent 8,061,598 B2) was consolidated with this proceeding.

Notice is hereby given, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 90.2(a), that Patent Owner Smartflash LLC hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the *Final Written Decision* entered on March 30, 2016 (Paper 45), the *Decision Denying Request for Rehearing* entered June 10, 2016 (Paper 47) and from all underlying orders, decisions, rulings and opinions regarding U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598 (“the ’598 Patent”) including the *Decision - Institution of Covered Business Method Patent Review* entered on April 2, 2015 (Paper 7).

For the limited purpose of providing the Director with the information requested in 37 C.F.R. § 90.2(a)(3)(ii), Patent Owner anticipates that the issues on appeal may include the following, as well as any underlying findings, determinations, rulings, decisions, opinions, or other related issues:

- Whether the Board erred in finding that claim 7 of the ’598 Patent is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101;
- Whether the Board erred in denying Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude (Paper 31); and
- Whether the Board erred in finding that the subject matter of the ’598 Patent is directed to activities that are financial in nature and in instituting Covered Business Method review of the ’598 Patent.

Copies of this Notice of Appeal are being filed simultaneously with the Director, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

Any required fee may be charged to Deposit Account No. 501860.

Dated: August 9, 2016

/ Michael R. Casey /

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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that this PATENT OWNER'S NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board using the E2E System and was served, by agreement of the parties, by emailing copies to counsel for the Petitioner as follows:

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The undersigned hereby further certifies that on August 9, 2016 this PATENT OWNER'S NOTICE OF APPEAL (and its three attached decisions) were filed with the Federal Circuit via CM/ECF (along with one courtesy copy by hand delivery) and two (2) copies were served on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office via in-hand delivery as follows:

Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office  
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Dated: August 9, 2016

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Case CBM2014-00193<sup>1</sup>  
Patent 8,061,598 B2

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Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU,  
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS,  
*Administrative Patent Judges.*

CLEMENTS, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

DECISION  
Denying Patent Owner's Request for Rehearing  
*37 C.F.R. § 42.71*

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<sup>1</sup> CBM2015-00120 (Patent 8,061,598 B2) has been consolidated with this proceeding.

## INTRODUCTION

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (“Samsung”),<sup>2</sup> filed a Corrected Petition to institute covered business method patent review of claim 7 of U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’598 patent”) pursuant to § 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).<sup>3</sup> Paper 2 (“Pet.”). On April 2, 2015, we instituted a covered business method patent review (Paper 7, “Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) based upon Samsung’s assertion that claim 7 (“the challenged claim”) is directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Inst. Dec. 19.

On April 30, 2015, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) filed a Petition to institute covered business method patent review of the same claim of the ’598 patent based on the same ground. *Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC*, Case CBM2015-00120 (Paper 2, “Apple Pet.”). Apple simultaneously filed a “Motion for Joinder” of its newly filed case with Samsung’s previously instituted case. CBM2015-00120 (Paper 3, “Apple Mot.”). On August 6, 2015, we granted Apple’s Petition and consolidated the two proceedings. Paper 29; *Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC*, Case CBM2015-00120, (Paper 13).

Subsequent to institution, Smartflash LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 20, “PO Resp.”) and Samsung and Apple (collectively, “Petitioner”) filed a Reply (Paper 28, “Pet. Reply”) to Patent Owner’s Response.

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<sup>2</sup> Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, a petitioner at the time of filing, merged with and into Samsung Electronics America, Inc. as of January 1, 2015. Paper 6.

<sup>3</sup> Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 296–07 (2011).

In our Final Decision, we determined that Petitioner had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 7 of the '598 patent is unpatentable. Paper 45 ("Final Dec."), 27.

Patent Owner requests rehearing of the Final Decision. Paper 46 ("Request" or "Req. Reh'g"). Having considered Patent Owner's Request, we decline to modify our Final Decision.

#### STANDARD OF REVIEW

In covered business method review, the petitioner has the burden of showing unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 326(e). The standard of review for rehearing requests is set forth in 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d), which states:

The burden of showing a decision should be modified lies with the party challenging the decision. The request must specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.

#### ANALYSIS

Patent Owner's Request is based on a disagreement with our determination that claim 7 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Req. Reh'g 1. In its Request, Patent Owner presents arguments directed to alleged similarities between the challenged claim and those at issue in *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Req. Reh'g 5–10) and alleged differences between the challenged claim and those at issue in *Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l.*, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (*id.* at 10–15).

As noted above, our rules require that the requesting party “specifically identify all matters the party believes the Board

misapprehended or overlooked, and the place where each matter was previously addressed in a motion, an opposition, or a reply.” 37 C.F.R. 42.71(d) (emphasis added). In its Request, however, Patent Owner does not identify any specific matter that we misapprehended or overlooked. Rather, the only citation to Patent Owner’s previous arguments are general citations, without explanation as to how we misapprehended or overlooked any particular matter in the record. For example, with respect to Patent Owner’s arguments regarding *DDR Holdings*, Patent Owner simply notes that “the issue of whether the claim was similar to those in *DDR Holdings* was previously addressed. *See* PO Resp. 1, 10–12.” Request 6 n.3. Similarly, in Patent Owner’s arguments regarding *Alice*, Patent Owner simply notes that “the issue of whether Claim 7 is directed to an abstract idea was previously addressed. *See* PO Resp. 9–20; *see also* Tr. 46:21–47:11” (*id.* at 10 n.5) and “the issue of whether the claim contains ‘additional features’ beyond an abstract idea was previously addressed. *See* PO Resp. 11–12” (*id.* at 12 n.7). These generic citations to large portions of the record do not identify, with any particularity, specific arguments that we may have misapprehended or overlooked.

Rather than providing a proper request for rehearing, addressing particular matters that we previously misapprehended or overlooked, Patent Owner’s Request provides new briefing by expounding on argument already made. Patent Owner cannot simply allege that an “issue” (e.g., whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea) was previously addressed, generally, and proceed to present new argument on that issue in a request for rehearing. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.71.



Patent Owner's arguments are either new or were addressed in our Final Decision. For example, Patent Owner's argument that the challenged claims are not directed to an abstract idea (Req. Reh'g 10–12) is new, and therefore, improper in a request for rehearing, because Patent Owner did not argue the first step of the analysis articulated in *Mayo* and *Alice* in its Patent Owner Response (*see* PO Resp. *passim* (arguing only the second step of the *Mayo* and *Alice* test)). To the extent portions of the Request are supported by Patent Owner's argument in the general citations to the record, we considered those arguments in our Final Decision, as even Patent Owner acknowledges. *See, e.g.*, Req. Reh'g 6 (citing Final Dec. 14) (“The Board rejected Patent Owner's reliance on *DDR Holdings* (at 14), holding that Claim 7 was not ‘rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.’”). For example, Patent Owner's arguments about inventive concept (Req. Reh'g 5–6, 12–15) were addressed at pages 9–12 and 16–17 of our Final Decision, Patent Owner's arguments about preemption (Req. Reh'g. 6) were addressed at pages 17–20 of our Final Decision, and Patent Owner's arguments about *DDR Holdings* (Req. Reh'g. 6–9) were addressed at pages 12–16 of our Final Decision. Mere disagreement with our Final Decision also is not a proper basis for rehearing.

Accordingly, Patent Owner's Request does not apprise us of sufficient reason to modify our Final Decision.

ORDER

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED that Patent Owner's Request is *denied*.

CBM2014-00193  
Patent 8,061,598 B2

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Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU,  
JEREMY M. PLENZLER, and MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS,  
*Administrative Patent Judges.*

CLEMENTS, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

FINAL WRITTEN DECISION  
*35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73*

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<sup>1</sup> CBM2015-00120 (Patent 8,061,598 B2) was consolidated with this proceeding.

## INTRODUCTION

### *A. Background*

Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., and Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC (“Samsung”),<sup>2</sup> filed a Corrected Petition to institute covered business method patent review of claim 7 (the “challenged claim”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598 B2 (Ex. 1001, “the ’598 patent”) pursuant to § 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Paper 2 (“Pet.”). On April 2, 2015, we instituted a covered business method patent review (Paper 7, “Institution Decision” or “Inst. Dec.”) based upon Samsung’s assertion that claim 7 (“the challenged claim”) is directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Inst. Dec. 19.

On April 30, 2015, Apple Inc. (“Apple”) filed a Petition to institute covered business method patent review of the same claim of the ’598 patent based on the same ground. *Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC*, Case CBM2015-00120 (Paper 2, “Apple Pet.”). Apple simultaneously filed a “Motion for Joinder” of its newly filed case with Samsung’s previously instituted case. CBM2015-00120 (Paper 3, “Apple Mot.”). On August 6, 2015, we granted Apple’s Petition and consolidated the two proceedings.<sup>3</sup> Paper 29; *Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC*, Case CBM2015-00120, (Paper 13).

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<sup>2</sup> Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC, a petitioner at the time of filing, merged with and into Samsung Electronics America, Inc. as of January 1, 2015. Paper 6.

<sup>3</sup> For purposes of this decision, we will cite only to Samsung’s Petition.

Subsequent to institution, Smartflash LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Patent Owner Response (Paper 20, “PO Resp.”) and Petitioner filed a Reply (Paper 31, “Pet. Reply”) to Patent Owner’s Response.

An oral hearing was held on November 9, 2015, and a transcript of the hearing is included in the record. Paper 43 (“Tr.”).

This Final Written Decision is issued pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 328(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.73. For the reasons that follow, we determine that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that claim 7 of the ’598 patent is directed to patent ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

*B. Related Matters and Estoppel*

In a previous covered business method patent review, CBM2014-00108, we issued a Final Written Decision determining claim 26 of the ’598 patent unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. *Apple Inc. v. Smartflash LLC*, Case CBM2014-00108, (PTAB Sept. 25, 2015) (Paper 50).

*C. The ’598 Patent*

The ’598 patent relates to “a portable data carrier for storing and paying for data and to computer systems for providing access to data to be stored,” and the “corresponding methods and computer programs.” *Ex. 1001*, 1:21–25. Owners of proprietary data, especially audio recordings, have an urgent need to address the prevalence of “data pirates” who make proprietary data available over the Internet without authorization. *Id.* at 1:29–55. The ’598 patent describes providing portable data storage together with a means for conditioning access to that data upon validated payment. *Id.* at 1:59–2:11. This combination allows data owners to make their data available over the Internet with less fear of piracy. *Id.* at 2:11–15.

As described, the portable data storage device is connected to a terminal for Internet access. *Id.* at 1:59–67. The terminal reads payment information, validates that information, and downloads data into the portable storage device from the data supplier. *Id.* The data on the portable storage device can be retrieved and output from a mobile device. *Id.* at 2:1–5. The ’598 patent makes clear that the actual implementation of these components is not critical and may be implemented in many ways. *See, e.g., id.* at 25:49–52 (“The skilled person will understand that many variants to the system are possible and the invention is not limited to the described embodiments . . .”).

*D. Challenged Claim*

Petitioner<sup>4</sup> challenges claim 7 of the ’598 patent. Claim 7 depends from claim 1, which is not explicitly challenged in this proceeding. Claims 1 and 7 recite the following:

1. A portable data carrier comprising:
  - an interface for reading and writing data from and to the portable data carrier;
  - content data memory, coupled to the interface, for storing one or more content data items on the carrier;
  - use rule memory to store one or more use rules for said one or more content data items;
  - a program store storing code implementable by a processor;
  - and a processor coupled to the content data memory, the use rule memory, the interface and to the program store for implementing code in the program store,wherein the code comprises code for storing at least one content data item in the content data memory and at least one use rule in the use rule memory.

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<sup>4</sup> We refer to Samsung and Apple collectively as “Petitioner.”

Ex. 1001, 25:54–67.

7. A portable data carrier as claimed in claim 1, further comprising payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.

*Id.* at 26:25–28.

## ANALYSIS

### A. *Claim Construction*

In a covered business method patent review, claim terms are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification in which they appear and the understanding of others skilled in the relevant art. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b). Applying that standard, we interpret the claim terms of the '598 patent according to their ordinary and customary meaning in the context of the patent's written description. *See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*, 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For purposes of this Decision, we need not construe expressly any claim term.

### B. *Statutory Subject Matter*

Petitioner challenges claim 7 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 20–32. According to Petitioner, the challenged claim is directed to an abstract idea without additional elements that transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of that idea. *Id.* Petitioner submits a declaration from Jeffrey A. Bloom, Ph.D. in support of its Petition.<sup>5</sup> Ex. 1003. Patent Owner argues that the subject matter claimed

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<sup>5</sup> In its Response, Patent Owner argues that this declaration should be given little or no weight. PO Resp. 3–4. Because Patent Owner has filed a Motion to Exclude that includes a request to exclude Dr. Bloom's Declaration in its entirety, or in the alternative, portions of the declaration based on essentially the same argument, we address Patent Owner's argument as part of our analysis of the motion to exclude, below.

by claim 7 is statutory because it is “rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” that of “data content piracy on the Internet.” PO Resp. 1 (quoting *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

*1. Abstract Idea*

Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we must first identify whether an invention fits within one of the four statutorily provided categories of patent-eligibility: “processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.” *Ulramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 772 F.3d 709, 713–714 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, the challenged claim recites a “machine,” i.e., a “portable data carrier,” under § 101. Section 101, however, “contains an important implicit exception [to subject matter eligibility]: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” *Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l.*, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (citing *Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). In *Alice*, the Supreme Court reiterated the framework set forth previously in *Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.*, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” *Id.*

According to the Federal Circuit, “determining whether the section 101 exception for abstract ideas applies involves distinguishing between



patents that *claim the building blocks of human ingenuity*—and therefore risk broad pre-emption of basic ideas—and patents that integrate those building blocks into something more, enough to transform them into specific patent-eligible inventions.” *Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.*, 793 F.3d 1306, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (emphasis added); *accord id.* at 1333–34 (“It is a *building block*, a *basic conceptual framework* for organizing information . . . .” (emphasis added)). This is similar to the Supreme Court’s formulation in *Bilski v. Kappos*, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (emphasis added), noting that the concept of risk hedging is “a *fundamental economic practice* long prevalent in our system of commerce.” *See also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 765 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that patent claims related to “long-familiar commercial transactions” and relationships (i.e., business methods), no matter how “narrow” or “particular,” are directed to abstract ideas as a matter of law). As a further example, the “concept of ‘offer based pricing’ is similar to other ‘fundamental economic concepts’ found to be abstract ideas by the Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit].” *OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

Petitioner argues that the challenged claim is directed to the abstract idea of “enabling limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” Pet. 23. Although Patent Owner does not concede, in its brief, that the challenged claim is directed to an abstract idea, it does not persuasively explain how the claimed subject matter escapes this classification. PO Resp. 9–20; *see also* Paper 43 (transcript of oral hearing) 46:21–47:11 (Patent Owner arguing that the subject matter of the claim is not an abstract idea, but conceding this argument was not made in the briefs).

We are persuaded that the challenged claim is drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. Specifically, the challenged claim is directed to performing the fundamental economic practice of conditioning and controlling access to content based on payment. For example, claim 7 recites “payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.” Furthermore, as discussed above, the ’598 patent discusses addressing recording industry concerns of data pirates offering unauthorized access to widely available compressed audio recordings. Ex. 1001, 1:20–55. The Specification explains that these pirates obtain data either by unauthorized or legitimate means and then make the data available over the Internet without authorization. *Id.* The Specification further explains that once data has been published on the Internet, it is difficult to police access to and use of it by Internet users who may not even realize that it is pirated. *Id.* The ’598 patent proposes to solve this problem by restricting access to data on a portable data carrier based upon payment validation. *Id.* at 1:59–2:4. The ’598 patent makes clear that the crux of the claimed subject matter is restricting access to stored data based on supplier-defined access rules and validation of payment. *Id.* at 1:59–2:15.

Although the Specification refers to data piracy on the Internet, the challenged claim is not limited to the Internet. The underlying concept of the challenged claim, particularly when viewed in light of the Specification, is conditioning and controlling access to content based upon payment. As discussed further below, this is a fundamental economic practice long in existence in commerce. *See Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 611.

We are, thus, persuaded, based on the Specification and the language of the challenged claim, that claim 7 is directed to an abstract idea. *See Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (holding that the concept of intermediated settlement at issue in *Alice* was an abstract idea); *Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc.*, 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding the abstract idea at the heart of a system claim to be “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event”).

## 2. *Inventive Concept*

“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (quoting *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). “This requires more than simply stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it’ or ‘apply it with a computer.’ Similarly, the prohibition on patenting an ineligible concept cannot be circumvented by limiting the use of an ineligible concept to a particular technological environment.” *Versata*, 793 F.3d at 1332 (citations omitted). Moreover, the mere recitation of generic computer components performing conventional functions is not enough. *See Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (“Nearly every computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’ capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission functions required by the method claims.”).

Petitioner argues “[t]he claims of the ’598 patent . . . cover nothing more than the basic financial idea of enabling limited use of paid for and/or licensed content using ‘conventional’ computer systems and components.” Pet. Reply 11 (quoting Ex. 1003 ¶ 126). Petitioner persuades us that claim 7 of the ’598 patent does not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that

the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; *see also Accenture Global Servs.*, 728 F.3d at 1344 (holding claims directed to the abstract idea of “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” to be unpatentable even when applied in a computer environment and within the insurance industry). Specifically, we agree with and adopt Petitioner’s rationale that the additional elements of the challenged claim are generic features of a computer that do not bring the challenged claim within § 101 patent eligibility. Pet. 23–27; Pet. Reply 11–19.

*a. Technical Elements*

Petitioner argues that the challenged claim is unpatentable because it is directed to an abstract idea and any technical elements it recites are repeatedly described by the ’598 patent itself as “both ‘conventional’ and as being used ‘in a conventional manner.’” Pet. 23 (citing Ex. 1001, 4:4–5, 16:46–49, 21:33–38). Patent Owner disagrees, arguing that the challenged claim is patentable because it “recite[s] specific ways of using distinct memories, data types, and use rules that amount to significantly more than the underlying abstract idea.” PO Resp. 11 (quoting Ex. 2049, 19). We agree with Petitioner for the following reasons.

The ’598 patent treats as well-known all potentially technical aspects of the challenged claim, which simply require generic computer components (e.g., interfaces, memory, program store, and processor). *See* Pet. Reply 13 (citing Ex. 1003 ¶ 24; Ex. 1001, 4:4–5, 16:46–53, 18:7–11). With respect to the “portable data carrier” recited in claim 1, for example, the Specification states it may be a generic device such as “a standard smart card.” Ex. 1001,

11:27–29; *see also id.* at 14:25–29 (“[I]ikewise data stores 136, 138 and 140 may comprise a single physical data store or may be distributed over a plurality of physical devices and may even be at physically remote locations from processors 128-134 and coupled to these processors via internet 142”), Fig. 6. With respect to the “payment validation system” recited in claim 7, the Specification states that it “may be part of the data supplier’s computer systems or it may be a separate e-payment system.” *Id.* at 8:63–65); *see also* 13:36–38 (“an e-payment system according to, for example, MONDEX, Proton, and/or Visa cash compliant standards”).

Further, the claimed computer code performs generic computer functions, such as storing, retrieving, receiving, reading, evaluating, and enabling access to. *See* Pet. 23–29; Pet. Reply 14–16. The recitation of these generic computer functions is insufficient to confer specificity. *See Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc.*, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed these functions.”).

Moreover, we are not persuaded that claim 7 “recite[s] specific ways of using distinct memories, data types, and use rules that amount to significantly more than” conditioning and controlling access to content based on payment. *See* PO Resp. 11. The challenged claim recites several memories, including “content data memory,” “use rule memory,” “a program store,” and “payment data memory,” and several data types, including “data,” “content data items,” “use rules,” “code,” “payment data,” and “use status data.” We are not persuaded that the recitation of these memories and data types, by itself, amounts to significantly more than the

underlying abstract idea. *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (“We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the [ineligible concept] itself.’”) (brackets in original). Patent Owner does not point to any inventive concept in the ’598 patent related to the way these memories or data types are constructed or used. In fact, the ’598 patent simply discloses these memories and data types with no description of the underlying implementation or programming that results in these data constructs. *See Content Extraction*, 776 F.3d at 1347 (“The concept of data collection, recognition, and storage is undisputedly well-known. Indeed, humans have always performed these functions.”).

In addition, because the recited elements can be implemented on a general purpose computer, the challenged claim does not cover a “particular machine.” Pet. 29–31; *see Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 604–05 (stating that machine-or-transformation test remains “a useful and important clue” for determining whether an invention is patent eligible). And the challenged claim does not transform an article into a different state of thing. Pet. 31–32.

Thus, we determine, the potentially technical elements of the claim are nothing more than “generic computer implementations” and perform functions that are “purely conventional.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2358–59; *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.

*b. DDR Holdings*

Relying on the Federal Circuit’s decision in *DDR Holdings*, Patent Owner asserts that the challenged claim is directed to statutory subject matter because the claimed solution is “necessarily rooted in computer

technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” PO Resp. 1 (quoting *DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.*, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Patent Owner contends that the challenged claim is “directed to a particular device that can download and store digital content into a data carrier along with at least one use rule,” and that

By using a system that combines on the data carrier the digital content, at least one use rule, payment data, and “code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system,” access control to the digital content can be continuously enforced prior to access to the digital content, allowing subsequent use (e.g., playback) of the digital content to be portable and disconnected, and additional content can be obtained.

*Id.* at 10.

Petitioner responds that the challenged claim is distinguishable from the claims in *DDR Holdings*. Pet. Reply 17–19. The *DDR Holdings* patent is directed at retaining website visitors when clicking on an advertisement hyperlink within a host website. 773 F.3d at 1257. Conventionally, clicking on an advertisement hyperlink would transport a visitor from the host’s website to a third party website. *Id.* The Federal Circuit distinguished this Internet-centric problem over “the ‘brick and mortar’ context” because “[t]here is . . . no possibility that by walking up to [a kiosk in a warehouse store], the customer will be suddenly and completely transported outside the warehouse store and relocated to a separate physical venue associated with the third party.” *Id.* at 1258. The Federal Circuit further determined that the *DDR Holdings* claims specify “how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a

hyperlink.” *Id.* The unconventional result in *DDR Holdings* is the website visitor is retained on the host website, but is still is able to purchase a product from a third-party merchant. *Id.* at 1257–58. The limitation referred to by the Federal Circuit in *DDR Holdings* recites “using the data retrieved, automatically generate and transmit to the web browser a second web page that displays: (A) information associated with the commerce object associated with the link that has been activated, and (B) the plurality of visually perceptible elements visually corresponding to the source page.” *Id.* at 1250. Importantly, the Federal Circuit identified this limitation as differentiating the *DDR Holdings* claims from those held to be unpatentable in *Ultramercial*, which “broadly and generically claim ‘use of the Internet’ to perform an abstract business practice (with insignificant added activity).” *Id.* at 1258.

We agree with Petitioner that the challenged claim is distinguishable from the claims at issue in *DDR Holdings*. As an initial matter, we are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that the challenged claim “[is] rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” that of “data content piracy on the Internet.” PO Resp. 1. Data piracy exists in contexts other than the Internet. *See* Pet. Reply 16–17 (identifying other contexts in which data piracy is a problem). For example, data piracy was a problem with compact discs. *See* Ex. 1001, 5:9–12 (“where the data carrier stores . . . music, the purchase outright option may be equivalent to the purchase of a compact disc (CD), preferably with some form of content copy protection such as digital watermarking”). Further, whatever the problem, the solution provided by the challenged claim is not rooted in specific computer



technology, but is based on conditioning and controlling access to content only when payment is validated. *See* Pet. Reply 16–19.

Even accepting Patent Owner’s assertion that the challenged claim addresses data piracy on the Internet (PO Resp. 1), we are not persuaded that it does so by achieving a result that overrides the routine and conventional use of the recited devices and functions. In fact, the differences between the challenged claim and the claims at issue in *DDR Holdings* are made clear by comparing the challenged claim of the ’598 patent to claim 19 of the patent at issue in *DDR Holdings*. For example, claim 7 of the ’598 patent recites “code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.” There is no language in this claim, in claim 1 from which it depends, or in the Specification, that demonstrates that the generic computer components—“code to provide the payment data” and “payment validation system”—function in an unconventional manner or employ sufficiently specific programming. Instead, unlike the claims in *DDR Holdings*, these limitations, like all the other limitations of the challenged claim, are “specified at a high level of generality,” which the Federal Circuit has found to be “insufficient to supply an ‘inventive concept.’” *Ulramercial, Inc.*, 772 F.3d at 716. They merely rely on conventional devices and computer processes operating in their “normal, expected manner.” *OIP Techs.*, 788 F.3d at 1363 (citing *DDR Holdings*, 773 F.3d at 1258–59).

On the other hand, the claims at issue in *Ulramercial*, like the challenged claim, were also directed to a method for distributing media products. Instead of conditioning and controlling access to data based on payment, as in the challenged claim, the *Ulramercial* claims condition and control access based on viewing an advertisement. 772 F.3d at 712. Similar

to the claims in *Ultramercial*, the majority of limitations in the challenged claim comprise this abstract concept of conditioning and controlling access to data. *See id.* at 715. Adding routine additional steps such as communicating with the data supplier, reading payment data, forwarding payment data, receiving payment validation data, retrieving data from the data supplier, writing data to a data carrier, and transmitting a portion of the payment validation data does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. *See id.* at 716 (“Adding routine additional steps such as updating an activity log, requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public access, and use of the Internet does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.”).

We are, therefore, persuaded that the challenged claim is closer to the claims at issue in *Ultramercial* than to those at issue in *DDR Holdings*.

*c. Patent Owner’s Alleged Inventive Concept*

To the extent Patent Owner argues the challenged claim includes an “inventive concept” because of the specific combination of elements in the challenged claim, we disagree. Specifically, Patent Owner refers to the following disclosure from the ’598 patent: “[b]y combining digital rights management with content data storage using a single carrier, the stored content data becomes mobile and can be accessed anywhere while retaining control over the stored data for the data content provider or data copyright owner.” PO Resp. 8 (quoting Ex. 1001, 5:29–33). Referring to this disclosure, Patent Owner argues that “[b]y using a system that combines on the data carrier the digital content, the use rules, and payment data, access control to the digital content can be continuously enforced prior to access to the digital content.” *Id.* Patent Owner concludes that “[b]y comparison,

unlike a system as claimed, when a DVD was physically rented for a rental period, there was no mechanism associated with the DVD to purchase additional content.” *Id.* at 8–9.

The concept of storing two different types of information in the same place or on the same device is an age old practice. For example, storing names and phone numbers (two different types of information) in the same place, such as a book, or on a storage device, such as a memory device was known. That Patent Owner alleges two specific types of information—content and the conditions for providing access to the content—are stored in the same place or on the same storage device does not alter our determination. The concept was known and Patent Owner has not persuaded us that applying the concept to these two specific types of information results in the claim reciting an inventive concept. Furthermore, the prior art discloses products that could store both the content and conditions for providing access to the content. *See, e.g.*, Pet. 35 (citing Ex. 1006, 11:25–27 (“The application embeds a digital code in every copy of the Content that defines the allowable number of secondary copies and play backs.”), 37–38 (citing Ex. 1004, Abstract (describing a transportable unit storing both content and a control processor for controller access to that content))). Because the concept of combining the content and conditions for providing access to the content on the same device was known, it does not make the claim patent eligible under § 101.

*d. Preemption*

Petitioner argues that the challenged claim “preempts all effective uses of the abstract idea of enabling limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” Pet. 27. Patent Owner responds that the challenged claim does not

result in inappropriate preemption. PO Resp. 12–17. According to Patent Owner, the challenged claim does not attempt to preempt every application of the idea, but rather recites a “specific way . . . that incorporates elements from multiple sources in order to solve a problem faced by [servers] on the Internet.” *Id.* at 12–13 (citing *DDR Holdings*, 773 F.3d at 1259). Patent Owner also asserts that the existence of a large number of non-infringing alternatives shows that the challenged claim does not raise preemption concerns. *Id.* at 15, 17.

Patent Owner’s preemption argument does not alter our § 101 analysis. The Supreme Court has described the “pre-emption concern” as “undergird[ing] [its] § 101 jurisprudence.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. The concern “is a *relative* one: how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the inventor.” *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” *Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.*, 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Importantly, the preemption concern is addressed by the two-part test considered above. *See id.* After all, every patent “forecloses . . . future invention” to some extent, *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1292, and, conversely, every claim limitation beyond those that recite the abstract idea limits the scope of the preemption. *See Ariosa*, 788 F.3d at 1379 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of preemption is the basis for the judicial exception to patentability. . . . For this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the § 101 analysis.”).

The two-part test elucidated in *Alice* and *Mayo* does not require us to anticipate the number, feasibility, or adequacy of non-infringing alternatives

to gauge a patented invention's preemptive effect in order to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under § 101. *See* Pet. Reply 19–22 (arguing that Patent Owner's position regarding non-infringement and existence of non-infringing alternatives to the challenged claim are immaterial to the patent eligibility inquiry).

The relevant precedents simply direct us to ask whether the claim involves one of the patent-ineligible categories, and, if so, whether additional limitations contain an “inventive concept” that is “sufficient to ensure that the claim in practice amounts to ‘significantly more’ than a patent on an ineligible concept.” *DDR Holdings*, 773 F.3d at 1255. This is the basis for the rule that the unpatentability of abstract ideas “cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment,” despite the fact that doing so reduces the amount of innovation that would be preempted. *Diamond v. Diehr*, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981); *see also Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2358; *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1303; *Bilski*, 561 U.S. at 612; *Parker v. Flook*, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). The Federal Circuit spelled this out, stating that “[w]here a patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the *Mayo* framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” *Ariosa*, 788 F.3d at 1379.

As described above, after applying this two-part test, we are persuaded that Petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged claim is drawn to an abstract idea and does not add an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. The alleged existence of a large number of non-infringing, and, thus, non-preemptive

alternatives does not alter this conclusion because the question of preemption is inherent in, and resolved by, this inquiry.

*e. Patent Owner's Remaining Arguments*

Patent Owner also asserts that (1) Petitioner has already lost a Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity under § 101 in its related district court litigation with Patent Owner (PO Resp. 19); and (2) the Office is estopped from revisiting the issue of § 101, which was inherently reviewed during examination (*id.* at 20).

We are not persuaded by either argument. Patent Owner does not provide any authority that precludes us from deciding the issue of patent eligibility under § 101 in the context of the present AIA proceeding, even where a non-final district court ruling on § 101 exists. *See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int'l, Inc.*, 721 F.3d 1330, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Patent Owner also does not provide any authority for its assertion that “[t]he question of whether claim 7 is directed to statutory subject matter has already been adjudicated by the USPTO, and the USPTO is estopped from allowing the issue to be raised in the present proceeding.” PO Resp. 20.

*3. Conclusion*

For the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claim 7 of the '598 patent is unpatentable under § 101.

## MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE

### *A. Petitioner's Motion to Exclude*

Petitioner seeks to exclude portions of Exhibits 2056 and 2057, the cross-examination testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Bloom as submitted by Patent Owner. Paper 36, 3. As movant, Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's Motion to Exclude is *denied*.

Petitioner seeks to exclude Dr. Bloom's cross-examination testimony recorded in Exhibit 2056 at 179:1–20 and in Exhibit 2057 at 193:17–194:8 and 195:5–16 as (1) irrelevant under Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) 401 and 402 (Paper 36, 4–6); and (2) outside the scope of direct examination under FRE 611(b) (*id.* at 7–8). Petitioner argues that this testimony, all directed to the workings of a product offered by Dr. Bloom's employer, is “unrelated to the instant CBM proceeding” and “is of no consequence to the validity of the patent claims at issue.” *Id.* at 4. Petitioner adds that “[Petitioner], during its direct examination of Dr. Bloom, never opened [the] door to such questions.” *Id.* at 8.

We are not persuaded by Petitioner's argument. Patent Owner proffered this particular testimony not for purposes of showing validity of the patent claim at issue, but for purposes of challenging the credibility of Petitioner's expert. Although we were not persuaded by this evidence, we did consider it for the purpose of deciding an issue of credibility. We, therefore, decline to exclude this testimony under FRE 401, 402, or 611(b).

In addition, Petitioner seeks to exclude the excerpts of testimony from Exhibit 2057 as lacking proper foundation under FRE 701 and 702. *Id.* at 6–7. Petitioner argues that in these excerpts, “[Patent Owner] attempted to

solicit testimonies from Dr. Bloom as to whether ‘the SiriusXM Internet Radio product that allows off-line playback [is] a subscription-based product’” and that “[Patent Owner] further asserted that . . . ‘Dr. Bloom refused to testify about its operation alleging the information was confidential.’” *Id.* at 6 (citing PO Resp. 6). According to Petitioner, because “Dr. Bloom *has not* been advanced as an expert with regard to subscription-based business practice of a third-party company” and “no foundation has been laid with regard to Dr. Bloom’s personal knowledge of such subscription-based business practice,” this testimony should be excluded under FRE 701 and 702. *Id.* at 6–7.

We also are not persuaded by this argument. Petitioner does not explain, for example, why Rules 701 and 702 apply to the excerpts at issue. It is unclear that Dr. Bloom was being asked for his opinion, either expert or otherwise, with these questions. Instead, it appears that he was being questioned as a fact witness. Moreover, as explained by Petitioner, the cross-examination did not actually elicit *any* substantive responses, let alone opinion, from Dr. Bloom. *Id.* at 6. We, therefore, decline to exclude this testimony under FRE 701 or 702.

*B. Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude*

Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1003–1006, 1028, and 1039. Paper 31, 1. As movant, Patent Owner has the burden of proof to establish that it is entitled to the requested relief. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c). For the reasons stated below, Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude is *denied*.

*1. Exhibit 1003*

Patent Owner seeks to exclude the entirety of Dr. Bloom’s testimony in Exhibit 1003 and additionally seeks to exclude specific paragraphs under



various Board and Evidentiary rules. Paper 31, 1–9. First, Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1003 in its entirety as not disclosing the underlying facts or data on which the opinions contains are based as required by 37 C.F.R. § 42.54(a). *Id.* at 2. According to Patent Owner, this is because Dr. Bloom’s declaration “does not state the relative evidentiary weight (e.g., substantial evidence versus preponderance of the evidence) used by Dr. Bloom in arriving at his conclusions.” *Id.* at 2. Patent Owner also seeks to exclude this testimony under FRE 702 because “the Board cannot assess under FRE 702 whether Dr. Bloom’s opinion testimony is ‘based on sufficient facts or data,’ is ‘the product of reliable principles and methods,’ or if Dr. Bloom ‘reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’” *Id.* at 3–4.

Petitioner counters that consistent with the requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 42.65, “Dr. Bloom’s testimony discloses underlying facts and data on which his opinions were based.” Paper 38, 4. Petitioner also argues that experts are not required to recite the “preponderance of the evidence” standard expressly. *Id.* at 3–4 (citing IPR2013-00172, Paper 50 at 42). With respect to FRE 702, Petitioner notes that Patent Owner did not rely on FRE 702 to object to Dr. Bloom’s Declaration in its entirety and has, thus, waived this particular argument. *Id.* at 5. Moreover, Petitioner asserts that although Patent Owner had the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Bloom, it failed to question him as to any reliable principles and methods that he used to render his opinion. *Id.* at 4–5.

We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s arguments. Dr. Bloom has a Bachelor in Electrical Engineering, and a Masters and Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering. Ex. 1003 ¶¶ 15–17. He also has decades of

experience in relevant technologies. *Id.* ¶¶ 5–14. We are, therefore, not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument that he has not provided sufficient proof that he is an expert. And as Petitioner correctly points out, an expert is not required to recite the “preponderance of the evidence” standard expressly in order for the expert testimony to be accorded weight, much less admissibility. Accordingly, we decline to exclude this testimony under FRE 702.

Patent Owner also seeks to exclude paragraphs 23–112 of Exhibit 1003 as irrelevant and inadmissible under FRE 401 and 402 because they address grounds challenging the claims that were not instituted upon by the Board. Paper 31, 5–6. Because these paragraphs also support Petitioner’s assertions with respect to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that they are irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. Accordingly, we decline to exclude these paragraphs.

Patent Owner also seeks to exclude paragraphs 23–26 and 113–128 of Exhibit 1003 as lacking foundation and providing legal opinions on which the lay witness is not competent to testify. Paper 31, 6. According to Patent Owner, these paragraphs “relate to the strictly legal issue of statutory subject matter under § 101, an issue for which Dr. Bloom is not an expert” and should be excluded under FRE 401, 402, 62, 701, and 702. *Id.* Because these paragraphs also relate to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that they are irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. Accordingly, we decline to exclude these paragraphs.

Patent Owner also seeks to exclude paragraphs 129–137 of Exhibit 1003 under 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a) as impermissibly relating to legal concepts. Paper 31, 6–7. We understand that in these paragraphs, Dr. Bloom is not

giving expert testimony about the law, but simply indicating his understanding of the law as background foundation for the declaration. *See* Ex. 1003 ¶ 129. As such, we decline to exclude these paragraphs.

Patent Owner also seeks to exclude paragraphs 102–107, 122, 123–125, and 128 of Exhibit 1003 as inadmissible hearsay under FRE 801 and 802. Paper 31, 7–10. Petitioner responds to these objections by filing, as supplemental evidence, previously-served supporting documents comprising the underlying publications referred to by Dr. Bloom in these paragraphs. Paper 38, 9–11 (citing Ex. 1043). Patent Owner does not appear to object to the contents of this evidence, but merely the form in which it was filed—that each individual document was not filed as a separate exhibit, that the individual documents were not numbered sequentially, and that they were not filed with the first document in which each is cited. Paper 41, 4–5. To the extent that Exhibit 1043 does not comply with §§ 42.6 or 42.63, we waive those deficiencies, which relate not to the ultimate substance of this issue, but to procedural formalities. Moreover, because Patent Owner does not explain further why the actual contents of Exhibit 1043 do not overcome its hearsay objections, we decline to exclude these paragraphs under FRE 801 and 802.

## *2. Exhibits 1004–1006*

Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibits 1004–1006 as irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402 because, while cited, they were not instituted upon by the Board. Paper 31, 10–11.

Petitioner counters that all of these exhibits “speak to the well-known and conventional aspects of ‘appl[ying] generic computer technology towards the solution of a financial problem: enabling limited use of paid-

for/licensed content” and, thus, are relevant to the question of patent eligibility. Paper 38, 11.

Because these exhibits are evidence relied upon by Petitioner to support its assertions with respect to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that they are irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. Accordingly, we decline to exclude these exhibits.

### *3. Exhibit 1028*

Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1028, cited by both the Petition and the Bloom Declaration, as irrelevant and inadmissible under FRE 401 and 402. Paper 31, 11. According to Patent Owner, the document, which describes the planned establishment of credit facilities into retail establishments is not relevant to the technological solution embodied in the '598 patent. *Id.*

Petitioner responds that Exhibit 1028 is “directed to well-known historic credit operations in support of Dr. Bloom’s observation that the '598 Patent mimics such payment operations” and is, therefore, not irrelevant. Paper 38, 12.

Because Exhibit 1028 is relied upon by Petitioner to support its assertions with respect to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that it is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. Accordingly, we decline to exclude Exhibit 1028.

### *4. Exhibit 1039*

Patent Owner seeks to exclude Exhibit 1039, cited by both the Petition and Petitioner’s Reply, as irrelevant and inadmissible under FRE 401 and 402. Paper 31, 12. According to Patent Owner, the document has an alleged publication after the effective filing date of the '598 patent. *Id.* Patent

Owner also argues that Exhibit 1039 should be excluded under FRE 901 because Petitioner has not produced evidence sufficient to support a finding that Exhibit 1039 is what the proponent claims it is.

Petitioner does not address Exhibit 1309 in its opposition to Patent Owner's Motion to Exclude. *See* Paper 38. Petitioner does, however, address the relevance of this document in its Pet. Reply (Paper 28), stating that Exhibit 1039 was replied upon, notwithstanding the publication date, "because the cited passages are consistent with and corroborate [Dr. Bloom's] expert understanding, and are relevant to his explanation of the fact that human beings, long before the '598 Patent's effective filing date, traditionally engaged in mental activities aimed at enabling limited use of paid for and/or licensed content." Pet. Reply 9.

Because Exhibit 1039 is relied upon by Petitioner to support its assertions with respect to the underlying factual issues related to patent eligibility, we are not persuaded that it is irrelevant under FRE 401 and 402. Accordingly, we decline to exclude Exhibit 1039.

#### ORDER

Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED that claim 7 of the '598 patent is determined to be *unpatentable*;

FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's motion to exclude is *denied*;

FURTHER ORDERED that Patent Owner's motion to exclude is *denied*;

FURTHER ORDERED that, because this is a final written decision, parties to the proceeding seeking judicial review of the decision must comply with the notice and service requirements of 37 C.F.R. § 90.2.

CBM2014-00193  
Patent 8,061,598 B2

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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

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BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD

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SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC. and  
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,  
Petitioner,

v.

SMARTFLASH LLC,  
Patent Owner.

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Case CBM2014-00193  
Patent 8,061,598 B2

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Before JENNIFER S. BISK, RAMA G. ELLURU, GREGG I. ANDERSON,  
MATTHEW R. CLEMENTS, and PETER P. CHEN,  
*Administrative Patent Judges.*

CLEMENTS, *Administrative Patent Judge.*

DECISION  
Institution of Covered Business Method Patent Review  
*37 C.F.R. § 42.208*

## INTRODUCTION

### *A. Background*

Samsung Electronics America, Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Petitioner”)<sup>1</sup> filed a Petition requesting covered business method patent review of claim 7 (the “challenged claim”) of U.S. Patent No. 8,061,598 (Ex. 1001, “the ’598 patent”) pursuant to § 18 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”).<sup>2</sup> Paper 2 (“Pet.”). Smartflash LLC (“Patent Owner”) filed a Preliminary Response. Paper 5 (“Prelim. Resp.”).

We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 324, which provides that a covered business method patent review may not be instituted “unless . . . it is more likely than not that at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.”

After considering the Petition and Preliminary Response, we determine that the ’598 patent is a covered business method patent and that Petitioner has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the challenged claim is unpatentable. Accordingly, we institute a covered business method patent review of claim 7 of the ’598 patent.

### *B. Asserted Grounds*

Petitioner contends that the challenged claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and/or 103 in view of Stefik ’235,<sup>3</sup> Stefik ’980,<sup>4</sup> and

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<sup>1</sup> Samsung Telecommunications America, LLC is listed as a real party-in-interest in the Petition, but merged with and into Samsung Electronics America, Inc., after the filing of the Petition. Paper 6, 1.

<sup>2</sup> Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 296–07 (2011)

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Patent No. 5,530,235 (Ex. 1013) (“Stefik ’235”)

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Patent No. 5,629,980 (Ex. 1014) (“Stefik ’980”)



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Gruse.<sup>5</sup> Pet. 3. Petitioner also provides a declaration from Jeffrey A. Bloom, Ph.D (“the Bloom Declaration”). Ex. 1003.

*C. Related Matters*

The parties indicate that the ’598 patent is the subject of the following district court cases: *Smartflash LLC v. Apple Inc.*, Case No. 6:13-cv-447 (E.D. Tex.); *Smartflash LLC v. Samsung Electronics Co.*, Case No. 6:13-cv-448 (E.D. Tex.). Pet. 1; Paper 4, 2-3. Patent Owner also indicates that the ’598 patent is the subject of a third district court case: *Smartflash LLC v. Google, Inc.*, Case No. 6:14-cv-435 (E.D. Tex.). Paper 4, 3. Related patents claiming priority back to a common series of applications currently are the subject of CBM2014-00102, CBM2014-00106, CBM2014-00108, and CBM2014-00112, filed by Apple Inc. *See* Paper 4, 2–3.

Petitioner filed a concurrent petition for covered business method patent review of the ’598 patent: CBM2014-00198 (“the 198 Petition”).<sup>6</sup> In addition, Petitioner filed eight other Petitions for covered business method patent review challenging claims of patents owned by Patent Owner and disclosing similar subject matter: CBM2014-00190; CBM2014-00192; CBM2014-00194; CBM2014-00196; CBM2014-00197; CBM2014-00199; CBM2014-00200; and CBM2014-00204.

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<sup>5</sup> PCT Publication No. WO 00/08909 (Ex. 1006) (“Gruse”)

<sup>6</sup> Patent Owner argues that the multiple petitions filed against the ’598 patent violate the page limit requirement of 37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(iii), but does not cite any authority to support its position. Prelim. Resp. 9–12. The page limit for a petition requesting covered business method patent review is 80 pages (37 C.F.R. § 42.24(a)(iii)), and each of this Petition and the 198 Petition meets that requirement.

*D. The '598 Patent*

The '598 patent relates to “a portable data carrier for storing and paying for data and to computer systems for providing access to data to be stored” and the “corresponding methods and computer programs.” Ex. 1001, 1:21–25. Owners of proprietary data, especially audio recordings, have an urgent need to address the prevalence of “data pirates” who make proprietary data available over the internet without authorization. *Id.* at 1:29–55. The '598 patent describes providing portable data storage together with a means for conditioning access to that data upon validated payment. *Id.* at 1:59–2:11. This combination allows data owners to make their data available over the internet without fear of data pirates. *Id.* at 2:11–15.

As described, the portable data storage device is connected to a terminal for internet access. *Id.* at 1:59–67. The terminal reads payment information, validates that information, and downloads data into the portable storage device from a data supplier. *Id.* The data on the portable storage device can be retrieved and output from a mobile device. *Id.* at 2:1–5. The '598 patent makes clear that the actual implementation of these components is not critical, and the alleged invention may be implemented in many ways. *See, e.g., id.* at 25:49–52 (“The skilled person will understand that many variants to the system are possible and the invention is not limited to the described embodiments.”).

*E. Challenged Claim*

Petitioner challenges claim 7 of the '598 patent. Claim 7 depends from claim 1. Claims 1 and 7 recite the following:

1. A portable data carrier comprising:
  - an interface for reading and writing data from and to the portable data carrier;
  - content data memory, coupled to the interface, for storing one or more content data items on the carrier;
  - use rule memory to store one or more use rules for said one or more content data items;
  - a program store storing code implementable by a processor;
  - and a processor coupled to the content data memory, the use rule memory, the interface and to the program store for implementing code in the program store,wherein the code comprises code for storing at least one content data item in the content data memory and at least one use rule in the use rule memory.

Ex. 1001, 25:54–67.

7. A portable data carrier as claimed in claim 1, further comprising payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.

*Id.* at 26:25–28.

## ANALYSIS

### *A. Claim Construction*

In a covered business method patent review, claim terms are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification in which they appear and the understanding of others skilled in the relevant art. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 42.300(b); *see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC*, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 448667, at \*7 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 4, 2015) (“We conclude that Congress implicitly adopted the broadest reasonable interpretation standard in enacting the AIA.”). Applying that standard, we interpret the claim terms of the ’598 patent according to their ordinary and customary meaning in the context of the patent’s written description. *See In re Translogic Tech., Inc.*,

504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). For purposes of this decision, we construe the claim term “use rule.”

The term “use rule” is recited in independent claim 1. Neither party proposes a construction of “use rule.” The ’598 patent describes “use rules” as “for controlling access to the stored content” (Ex. 1001, Abstract) and as “indicating permissible use of data stored on the carrier” (*id.* at 9:14-16). The ’598 patent also describes “evaluating the use status data using the use rules to determine whether access to the stored data is permitted.” *Id.* at 6:38-40; *see also id.* at 21:48-53 (“[E]ach content data item has an associated use rule to specify under what conditions a user of the smart Flash card is allowed access to the content data item.”). Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we construe “use rule” as “a rule specifying a condition under which access to content is permitted.”

#### *B. Covered Business Method Patent*

Section 18 of the AIA provides for the creation of a transitional program for reviewing covered business method patents. A “covered business method patent” is a patent that “claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” AIA § 18(d)(1); *see* 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a). A patent need have only one claim directed to a covered business method to be eligible for review. *See* Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and Technological Invention; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48,736 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“CBM Rules”) (Comment 8).

*1. Financial Product or Service*

Petitioner asserts that “the purported data carrier and payment validation system of claim 7 unquestionably are used for data processing in the practice, administration and management of financial products and services; specifically, for processing payments for data downloads.” Pet. 8. Based on this record, we agree with Petitioner that the subject matter recited by claim 7 is directed to activities that are financial in nature, namely data access conditioned on payment validation. Claim 7 recites “payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.” We are persuaded that payment validation is a financial activity, and conditioning data access based on payment validation amounts to a financial service. This is consistent with the Specification of the '598 patent, which confirms claim 7's connection to financial activities by stating that the invention “relates to a portable data carrier for storing and paying for data.” Ex. 1001, 1:21–23. The Specification also states repeatedly that the disclosed invention involves managing access to data based on payment validation. *See, e.g.*, Ex. 1001, 1:59–67; 6:60–64; 20:50–54.

Patent Owner disagrees that Claim 7 satisfies the financial-in-nature requirement of AIA § 18(d)(1), arguing that the section should be interpreted narrowly to cover only technology used specifically in the financial or banking industry. Prelim. Resp. 3–7. Patent Owner cites to various portions of the legislative history as support for its proposed interpretation. *Id.*

Although we agree with Patent Owner that the statutory language controls whether a patent is eligible for a covered business method patent review, we do not agree that the phrase “financial product or service” is as

limited as Patent Owner proposes. The AIA does not include as a prerequisite for covered business method patent review, a “nexus” to a “financial business,” but rather a “method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” AIA § 18(d)(1). Further, contrary to Patent Owner’s view of the legislative history, the legislative history indicates that the phrase “financial product or service” is *not* limited to the products or services of the “financial services industry,” and is to be interpreted broadly. CBM Rules, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,735-36. For example, the “legislative history explains that the definition of covered business method patent was drafted to encompass patents ‘claiming activities that are financial in nature, incidental to a financial activity or complementary to a financial activity.’” *Id.* (citing 157 Cong. Rec. S5432 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer)).

In addition, Patent Owner asserts that claim 7 is not directed to an apparatus or method that is financial in nature because claim 7 “omits the specifics of how payment is made.” Prelim. Resp. 7. We are not persuaded by this argument because § 18(d)(1) of the AIA does not include such a requirement, nor does Patent Owner point to any other authority that makes such a requirement. Prelim. Resp. 7. We determine that because payment is required by claim 7, as Patent Owner acknowledges, the financial in nature requirement of § 18(d)(1) is satisfied.

For the reasons stated above, and based on the particular facts of this proceeding, we conclude that the ’598 patent includes at least one claim that meets the financial in nature requirement of § 18(d)(1) of the AIA.

2. *Exclusion for Technological Inventions*

Petitioner asserts that claim 7 does not fall within § 18(d)(1)'s exclusion for “technological inventions.” Pet. 10–12. In particular, Petitioner argues that claim 7 does not recite a technological feature that is novel and unobvious, or solve a technical problem using a technical solution. *Id.* Patent Owner disagrees and argues that claim 7, as a whole, recites at least one technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art. Prelim. Resp. 8–9.

We are persuaded that claim 7 as a whole does not recite a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art. For example, claim 1, on which claim 7 depends, recites only limitations such as “interface,” “content data memory,” “use rule memory,” “program store,” “processor,” “code for storing,” and “code to provide” data, which are not novel and unobvious. Claim 7 also recites a “payment validation system.” The Specification, however, discloses that the required payment validation system may be one that is already in use or otherwise commercially available. For example, “[t]he payment validation system may be part of the data supplier’s computer systems or it may be a separate e-payment system.” Ex. 1001, 8:63–65; *see id.* at 13:35–47.

In addition, the ’598 patent makes clear that the asserted novelty of the invention is not in any specific improvement of software or hardware, but in the method of controlling access to data. For example, the ’598 patent states that “there is an urgent need to find a way to address the problem of data piracy” (*id.* at 1:52–55), while acknowledging that the “physical embodiment of the system is not critical and a skilled person will understand that the terminals, data processing systems and the like can all take a variety

of forms” (*id.* at 12:29–32). Thus, we determine that claim 7 is merely the recitation of a combination of known technologies, which indicates that it is not a patent for a technological invention. *See* Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,764 (Aug. 14, 2012).

Patent Owner also argues that claim 7 falls within § 18(d)(1)’s exclusion for “technological inventions” because it is directed toward solving the technological problem of “storing at least one content data item in the content data memory and at least one use rule in the use rule memory” with the technological solution of “code for storing at least one content data item in the content data memory and at least one use rule in the use rule memory.” Prelim. Resp. 8. We are not persuaded by this argument because, as Petitioner argues, the problem being solved by claim 7 is a business problem—data piracy. Pet. 11–12. For example, the Specification states that “[b]inding the data access and payment together allows the legitimate owners of the data to make the data available themselves over the internet without fear of loss of revenue, thus undermining the position of data pirates.” Ex. 1001, 2:11–15. Thus, based on the particular facts of this proceeding, we conclude that claim 7 does not recite a technological invention and is eligible for a covered business method patent review.

### *3. Conclusion*

In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the ’598 patent is a covered business method patent under AIA § 18(d)(1) and is eligible for review using the transitional covered business method patent program.

#### *C. 35 U.S.C. § 101*

Petitioner challenges claim 7 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Pet. 20–32. Petitioner asserts that the



challenged claim is directed to an abstract idea without additional elements that transform the claims into a patent-eligible application of that idea. *Id.* Specifically, Petitioner argues that the challenged claim is directed to the abstract idea of “enabling limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” Pet. 23.

Patent Owner argues that the challenged claim is directed to a more narrow invention than that asserted by Petitioner. Prelim. Resp. 12–13. Patent Owner specifically cites to the limitations “code for storing at least one content data item in the content data memory and at least one use rule in the use rule memory” and “code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system” as evidence that claim 7 “is not preemptory as asserted and is, at least for that reason, directed to statutory subject matter.” *Id.* Based on the analysis of the challenged claims using the two-step process set forth in *Alice Corp. Pty, Ltd. v. CLS Bank International*, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014), as discussed below, we agree with Samsung that claim 7 of the ’598 patent is more likely than not directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, we must first identify whether an invention fits within one of the four statutorily provided categories of patent-eligibility: “processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.” *Ulramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC*, 772 F.3d 709, 713–714 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Here, the challenged claim recites a “machine,” i.e., a “portable data carrier,” under § 101. Section 101, however, “contains an important implicit exception [to subject matter eligibility]: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (citing *Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.*, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

We are persuaded that the challenged claim is more likely than not drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea. In *Alice*, the Supreme Court reiterated the framework set forth previously in *Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.*, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” *Id.* If so, the second step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claim “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” *Id.* (quoting *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1291, 1297). In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—*i.e.*, an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” *Id.* (brackets in original) (quoting *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1294).

Petitioner contends that the challenged claim is directed to “the abstract idea of enabling limited use of paid-for/licensed content.” Pet. 23. As discussed above, the ’598 patent discusses addressing recording industry concerns of data pirates offering unauthorized access to widely available compressed audio recordings. Ex. 1001, 1:20–55. The ’598 patent proposes to solve this problem by restricting access to data on a portable data carrier based upon payment validation. Ex. 1001, 1:59–2:4. The ’598 patent makes clear that the heart of the claimed subject matter is restricting access to stored data based on supplier-defined access rules and validation of

payment. *Id.* at 1:59–2:15. We are persuaded, on this record, that the claimed “portable data carrier,” is directed to an abstract idea. *See Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (holding that the concept of intermediated settlement at issue in *Alice* was an abstract idea); *Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc.*, 728 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding the abstract idea at the heart of a system claim to be “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event”).

Turning to the second step of the analysis, we look for additional elements that can “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea. *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1297. On this record, we are not persuaded that claim 7 of the ’598 patent adds an inventive concept sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent on the abstract idea itself. *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; *see Accenture Global Servs.*, 728 F.3d at 1345 (holding claims directed to the abstract idea of “generating tasks [based on] rules . . . to be completed upon the occurrence of an event” to be unpatentable even when applied in a computer environment and within the insurance industry). The specification treats as well-known all potentially technical additions to the claim, including “interface,” “content data memory,” “use rule memory,” “program store,” “processor,” “code for storing,” and “code to provide” data. The linkage of existing hardware devices to existing payment validation processes and supplier-defined access rules appear to be “‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” *Alice*, 134 S. Ct. at 2359; *Mayo*, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.

Having considered the information provided in the Petition and the Preliminary Response, we are persuaded that Petitioner has demonstrated

that it is more likely than not that the challenged claim is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

*D. Obviousness over Gruse, Stefik '235 and Stefik '980*

Petitioner argues that claim 7 is unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Gruse and Stefik. Pet. 32–57.

The '598 patent claims priority to international PCT Application No. GB00104110 (“the '110 Appln”), filed on October 25, 2000, which claims priority to UK Application No. 9925227.2 (“the GB application”), filed on October 25, 1999. Ex. 1001, 1:6–16. Gruse was published February 24, 2000. Ex. 1006, 1.

Petitioner’s § 103 challenge is based on a combination that includes Gruse. Pet. 32–57. According to Petitioner, Gruse is prior art to the Challenged Claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)<sup>7</sup> because the date of its publication—February 24, 2000—is before the earliest filing date to which the Challenged Claims are entitled—October 25, 2000 (the filing date of '110 Appln.). Pet. 4, 20. Petitioner’s position is that the Challenged Claims lack written description support in the GB application. *Id.* at 15–20. *See Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc.*, 545 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008); *Ariad Pharms. v. Eli Lilly and Co.*, 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Petitioner contends the GB application does not provide written description support for independent claim 1 and dependent claim 7. Pet. 19–20. Without the benefit of the GB application, Gruse is prior art to the

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<sup>7</sup> The '598 patent was filed prior to the effective date of the AIA § 102 (March 16, 2013) and is governed by pre-AIA § 102(a). AIA § 3(n)(1).

challenged claims. Generally, Petitioner contends “the [GB application]’s<sup>8</sup> scant disclosure fails to support many limitations recited in the Challenged Claims.” *Id.* at 19. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the GB application does not support a limitation recited in claim 1, or a limitation recited in claim 7. *Id.* at 19–20.

The priority dispute between the parties focuses on whether the GB application sufficiently supports the following limitations: (1) “portable data carrier comprising . . . ; content data memory ... for storing one or more content data items on the carrier; use rule memory to store one or more use rules for said one or more content items...” (claim 1); and (2) “payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system” (claim 7). *Id.* at 19–20. Patent Owner argues that claims 1 and 7 are supported by the GB application because the features alleged to be missing are disclosed in the GB application. Prelim. Resp. 17–18.

With respect to the “content data memory” and “use rule memory” recited in claim 1, Patent Owner argues the limitations are supported by the following disclosure in the GB application:

In one embodiment the data storage means is powered by the retrieval device when it is connected to the device and retains a memory of the downloaded data when it is unpowered.

...

The data storage means and/or the retrieval device can be provided with access control means to prevent unauthorised access to the downloaded data. Alternatively, this access control means can be used to stop or provide only limited access of the user to the downloaded data in accordance with

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<sup>8</sup> Referred to herein as “the GB application.”

the amount paid. Thus, for example, a complete set of data information relating to a particular topic, a particular music track, or a particular software package might be downloaded, although access to part of the data set might thereafter be controlled by payments made by a user at a later stage. Thus, a user could pay to enable an extra level on a game or to enable further tracks of an album.

Prelim. Resp. 17–18 (quoting Ex. 1008, 3–4). We are persuaded that this disclosure provides adequate support for the disputed limitations.

Petitioner acknowledges that the GB application discloses that “access control information may be stored with the downloaded data or in separate storage area, for example in the payment validation means” (Ex. 1008, 4), but argues that the disclosed payment validation means is “away from the data carrier” and, therefore, “this description does not support storage of content data and use rules on the same data carrier.” Pet. 19–20. We disagree.

Claim 1 of the GB application, for example, indicates that the “payment validation means” is part of the “data storage means” that stores “downloaded data.” Ex. 1008, 9. The GB application also discloses that “[t]he combination of the payment validation means with the data storage means allows the access to the downloaded data which is to be stored by the data storage means, to be made conditional upon checked and validated payment being made for the data.” *Id.* at 8. In addition, the GB application discloses card 30—i.e., the “portable data carrier” recited in claim 1—that has one set of contacts for interfacing with a payment validation means and another set of contacts for interfacing with downloaded data. *Id.* at 12 (“On the card (30) are two sets of contacts, contacts (32) for interfacing with the payment validation means and contacts (34) for interfacing with the memory

for storing downloaded data.”). Based on the disclosure described above, we are persuaded that the GB application “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of claim 1’s “portable data carrier comprising . . . ; content data memory ... for storing one or more content data items on the carrier; use rule memory to store one or more use rules for said one or more content items....” *Ariad Pharms.*, 598 F.3d at 1351.

With respect to “payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system,” recited in claim 7, Petitioner has not sufficiently persuaded us that the GB application likewise does not provide adequate written description support. Specifically, the GB application disclose a card with a payment validation means accessible by means an interface separate from the interface for downloaded data. Ex. 1008, 12. The payment validation means stores payment data, such as electronic cash, and provides that payment data to a payment validation system. *Id.* at 8, 10. For example, the GB application discloses that

The payment validation means is, for example, means to validate payment with an external authority such as a bank or building society. The combination of the payment validation means with the data storage means allows the access to the downloaded data which is to be stored by the data storage means, to be made conditional upon checked and validated payment being made for the data

...

In one embodiment of the invention however, the payment validation means comprises e-cash - that is the payment validation means stores transaction value information on a cash value of transactions validatable by the data storage means. In simple terms, the data storage means can be a card which is

charged up to a desired cash value (if necessary limited to a maximum value) at a suitable terminal. This might be an internet access terminal but could, more simply, be a device to accept the data storage card and to receive and count money deposited by the user to charge the card, writing update cash value information onto the card.

Ex. 1008, 8.

The terminal can directly validate payment - for example in the case of a smart card charged with electronic cash it can deduct a cash value from the card.

*Id.* at 10. Based on the disclosure described above, we are persuaded that the GB application “reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession” of claim 7’s “payment data memory to store payment data and code to provide the payment data to a payment validation system.” *Ariad Pharms.*, 598 F.3d at 1351.

Therefore, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has shown sufficiently that challenged claim 7 is not entitled to the benefit of the GB application’s filing date. Because we are not persuaded that claim 7 is not entitled to a priority date of October 25, 1999, we are not persuaded that Gruse is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).

Accordingly, on this record, we are not persuaded that Petitioner has established that it is more likely than not that claim 7 is unpatentable as obvious over Gruse, Stefik ’235, and Stefik ’980.

#### CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the information presented in the Petition establishes that it is more likely than not that Petitioner would prevail in establishing the unpatentability of claim 7 of the ’598 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as discussed above.



The Board has not made a final determination on the patentability of the challenged claim.

ORDER

For the reasons given, it is:

ORDERED that a covered business method patent review is instituted on the sole ground that claim 7 is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101;

FURTHER ORDERED that the trial is limited to the ground identified above. No other grounds are authorized; and

FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 324(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.4, notice is hereby given of the institution of a trial; the trial commencing on the entry date of this Order.

CBM2014-00193  
Patent 8,061,598 B2

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