Production method, RFID transponder, authentication method, reader device and computer program product

• US 10,007,815 B2
• Filed: 06/21/2013
• Issued: 06/26/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 06/21/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: NXP B.V. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Original Assignee: NXP B.V. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Inventors: Barbaric, Tvrtko, de Jong, Hans, Arts, Ad, Bukovjan, Peter
• Primary Examiner(s): Holloway, III, Edwin
• Application Number:
  US13/924,356
• Publication Number:
  US 20130342311A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,831 Days
• Field of Search: 340 58
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/0723 the record carrier comprising an arrangement for non-contact communication, e.g. wireless communication circuits on transponder cards, non-contact smart cards or RFIDs
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/073 Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory protection against unauthorised use of computer memory G06F12/14
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10009 sensing by radiation using wavelengths larger than 0.1 mm, e.g. radio-waves or microwaves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/126 the source of the received data
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/108 Source integrity

Abstract

The exemplary embodiments of the invention realize an efficient prevention of massive infiltration of cloned RFID transponders into existing and new RFID systems. Furthermore, reader devices used for authentication of RFID transponders do not need to be on-line and do not need to be equipped with a Security Authentication Module (SAM). This simplifies authentication procedures and reduces costs. According to an exemplary embodiment of the invention a transponder-specific originality signature is stored by a transponder manufacturer on the transponder. The transponder-specific originality signature may, for example, be stored in the non-volatile memory (EEPROM) of the transponder during the fabrication of the transponder. This transponder-specific originality signature can be checked at any time in a convenient way, which provides an indication of originality of said transponder.

Claims

1. A method for producing an RFID transponder, the method comprising:

providing the RFID transponder with a transponder-specific identifier;

providing the RFID transponder with a signature usable for authentication of the transponder; and

generating said signature by signing at least a part of the transponder-specific identifier, wherein said signature is stored in a hidden memory of the RFID transponder, the hidden memory is configured to only be accessible by dedicated commands and prevents customers from altering the signature stored in the hidden memory, and a private key used for the signing remains stored in a secured environment at a transponder-manufacturer site.

2. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the signature is generated by signing at least a part of the transponder-specific identifier with a private key of a private-public key pair.

3. The method as claimed in claim 2, wherein the private-public key pair is based on any one of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, RSA cryptography, NTRU cryptography, and the Digital Signature Standard.

4. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the transponder-specific identifier comprises at least a part of an unique identification number of the RFID transponder.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein only a manufacturer of the RFID transponder has the private key.

6. A method for authenticating an RFID transponder, wherein the authentication is performed by:

reading a transponder-specific identifier or a part of the transponder-specific identifier from the RFID transponder;

reading a signature from the RFID transponder, said signature comprising the transponder-specific identifier or said part of the transponder-specific identifier in signed form and a private key used for the signing remains stored in a secured environment at a transponder-manufacturer site; and

verifying the signature and determining that the RFID transponder is authentic only if the signature is valid, wherein said signature is read from a hidden memory from the RFID transponder by means of a dedicated command and the hidden memory is configured to only be accessible by dedicated commands and prevents customers from altering the signature stored in the hidden memory.

7. The method as claimed in claim 6, further comprising:

generating the signature by signing the transponder-specific identifier or said part of the transponder-specific identifier with a private key of a private-public key pair; and

verifying the signature with the public key of said private-public key pair.

8. The method as claimed in claim 7, wherein the private-public key pair is based on any one of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, RSA cryptography, NTRU cryptography, and the Digital Signature Standard.

9. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the transponder-specific identifier comprises at least a part of an unique identification number of the RFID transponder.

10. The method of claim 7, wherein only a manufacturer of the RFID transponder has the private key.

11. A non-transitory medium comprising instructions which, when being executed by a processing unit, carry out or control respective steps of a method for authenticating an RFID transponder, the non-transitory medium comprising:

instructions for providing the RFID transponder with a transponder-specific identifier;

instructions for providing the RFID transponder with a signature usable for authentication of the RFID transponder; and

instructions for generating the signature by signing at least a part of the transponder-specific identifier, wherein the signature is stored in a hidden memory of the RFID transponder, the hidden memory is configured to only be accessible by dedicated commands and prevents customers from altering the signature stored in the hidden memory, and a private key used for the signing remains stored in a secured environment at a transponder-manufacturer site.