Communication method and device

• US 10,015,669 B2
• Filed: 12/07/2016
• Issued: 07/03/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 08/31/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd.)
• Original Assignee: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei Investment & Holding Co., Ltd.)
• Inventors: He, Chengdong
• Primary Examiner(s): AVERY, JEREMIAH L
• Application Number:
  US15/372,093
• Publication Number:
  US 20170094506A1
• Time in Patent Office: 573 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/061 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0492 by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0876 based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/205 involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved negotiation of communication capabilities H04L69/24
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 69/24 Negotiation of communication capabilities
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/106 Packet or message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/122 Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 36/0038 of security context information
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/02 Processing of mobility data, e.g. registration information at HLR [Home Location Register] or VLR [Visitor Location Register]; Transfer of mobility data, e.g. between HLR, VLR or external networks

Abstract

A communication method includes receiving by a SGSN a context request message from a mobility management entity (MME), obtaining by the SGSN an authentication vector-related key, and calculating by the SGSN a root key according to the authentication vector-related key. In addition, the method further includes sending by the SGSN a context response message including the root key to the MME, wherein the MME derives a NAS protection key according to the root key.

Claims

1. A communication method, comprising:

receiving, by a service general packet radio service (GPRS) support node (SGSN), a context request message from a mobility management entity (MME);

obtaining, by the SGSN, an authentication vector-related key;

calculating, by the SGSN, a root key according to the authentication vector-related key; and

sending, by the SGSN, a context response message including the root key to the MME, wherein the MME derives a NAS protection key according to the root key.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the context request message includes a mobility management context request message.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the context response message includes a mobility management context response message.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the SGSN is in a second generation (2G) network.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an encryption key (Kc).

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the SGSN is in a third generation (3G) network.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an integrity key (IK).

8. The method of claim 6, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an encryption key (CK).

9. The method of claim 6, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an IK and a CK.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the NAS protection key includes a NAS integrity protection key Knas-int.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the NAS protection key includes a NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the NAS protection key includes a NAS integrity protection key Knas-int and a NAS confidentiality protection key Knas-enc.

13. A service general packet radio service (GPRS) support node (SGSN), comprising:

a receiver configured to receive a context request message from a mobility management entity (MME);

a processor configured to obtain an authentication vector-related key and calculate a root key according to the authentication vector-related key; and

a transmitter configured to send a context response message including the root key to the MME.

14. The SGSN of claim 13, wherein the context request message includes a mobility management context request message.

15. The SGSN of claim 13, wherein the context response message includes a mobility management context response message.

16. The SGSN of claim 13, wherein the SGSN is in a second generation (2G) network.

17. The SGSN of claim 16, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an encryption key (Kc).

18. The SGSN of claim 13, wherein the SGSN is in a third generation (3G) network.

19. The SGSN of claim 18, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an integrity key (IK).

20. The SGSN of claim 18, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an encryption key (CK).

21. The SGSN of claim 18, wherein the authentication vector-related key includes an IK and a CK.