Methods and systems for bypassing authenticity checks for secure control modules

• US 10,038,565 B2
• Filed: 12/20/2012
• Issued: 07/31/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 12/20/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Original Assignee: GM Global Technology Operations LLC (General Motors Company)
• Inventors: Alrabady, Ansaf I., Baltes, Kevin M., Rosa, J. David, Forest, Thomas M., Wist, Alan D.
• Primary Examiner(s): Simitoski, Michael
• Application Number:
  US13/722,810
• Publication Number:
  US 20140181526A1
• Time in Patent Office: 2,049 Days
• Field of Search: 713155, 713161, 713168, 713169, 713170, 713176, 726 2, 726 9, 726 20, 380229, 380232, 380247, 380258
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/572 Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme

Abstract

Methods and systems are provided for bypassing an authenticity check for a secure control module. In one embodiment, a method includes: receiving authenticity data from a secure source, wherein the authenticity data includes a signature and an identifier that is unique to the control module; programming the control module with the authenticity data; and bypassing the authenticity check of a control program of the control module based on the authenticity data.

Claims

1. A method of bypassing an authenticity check for a secure control module, comprising:

receiving authenticity data from a secure source, wherein the authenticity data includes a signature and an identifier (ID) that is unique to the control module;

programming the control module with the authenticity data; and

selectively bypassing the authenticity check of a control program of the control module when the signature of the authenticity data is valid and when the ID of the authenticity data matches an identifier of the control module, wherein the control program includes instructions that when executed by a processor control one or more components of a vehicle,

wherein the authenticity check authenticates a digital signature of the control program.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising combining the authenticity data with at least one file of the control program, and wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises programming the control module with the at least one file and the authenticity data.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises storing the authenticity data as an authenticity application program in application memory.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising running the authenticity application program to erase a production boot program from boot memory and write a development boot program to boot memory.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the bypassing the authenticity check of the control program is performed by the development boot program.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the programming the control module with the authenticity data comprises storing the authenticity data in a designated memory location.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the bypassing the authenticity check of the control program comprises selectively bypassing the authenticity check of the control program when the authenticity data is stored in the designated memory location.

8. The method of claim 6, wherein the designated memory location is in calibration memory.

9. The method of claim 6, wherein the designated memory location is in a memory location that is not part of application memory and calibration memory.

10. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of a file header.

11. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of an application program.

12. The method of claim 1 wherein the authenticity data is programmed to the control module in the form of a security ticket.

13. A system for bypassing an authenticity check, comprising:

a secure control module that includes non-volatile memory and a processor; and

a control program that includes instructions that when executed by the processor control one or more components of a vehicle, and that includes authenticity data that is received from a secure source, that stores the authenticity data in the non-volatile memory, and that selectively bypasses the authenticity check of the control program when a signature of the authenticity data is valid and when an identifier (ID) of the authenticity data matches a unique identifier of the control module, wherein the authenticity check authenticates a digital signature of the control program.

14. The system of claim 13, wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, and calibration memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in application memory.

15. The system of claim 13, wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, and calibration memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in calibration memory.

16. The system of claim 13, wherein the non-volatile memory is partitioned into at least boot memory, application memory, calibration memory, and authenticity memory, and wherein the authenticity data is stored in the authenticity memory.