Method for using dynamic Public Key Infrastructure to send and receive encrypted messages between software applications

• US 10,135,618 B2
• Filed: 03/25/2016
• Issued: 11/20/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 03/25/2016
• Status: Expired due to Fees

• Current Assignee: Pham Holdings, Inc., Synergex Group, Inc. (Synergex Corp.), Wayne Taylor
• Original Assignee: Pham Holdings, Inc., Synergex Group, Inc. (Synergex Corp.), Wayne Taylor
• Inventors: Pham, Thien Van
• Primary Examiner(s): Su, Sarah
• Application Number:
  US15/081,447
• Publication Number:
  US 20170279608A1
• Time in Patent Office: 970 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/546 Message passing systems or structures, e.g. queues
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/101 Access control lists [ACL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/08 Access security
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/128 Anti-malware arrangements, e.g. protection against SMS fraud or mobile malware

Abstract

Method for using dynamic Public Key Infrastructure to send and receive encrypted messages between software applications.

Claims

1. A method for using dynamic Public Key Infrastructure to send and receive encrypted messages between software applications comprising:

(a) generating a sender'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair for a sender application and a receiver'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair for a receiver application, wherein the sender'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair comprises a sender'"'"'s public key and a sender'"'"'s private key and wherein the receiver'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair comprises a receiver'"'"'s public key and a receiver'"'"'s private key, and sharing the sender'"'"'s public key with the receiver application and the receiver'"'"'s public key with the sender application;

(b) building a first message with a format of

[IP Address];

[Command];

[Message];

(c) encrypting the first message with the recipient'"'"'s PKI receiver'"'"'s public key to produce an encrypted first message;

(d) generating a new sender'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair, wherein the new sender'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair comprises a new sender'"'"'s public key and a new sender'"'"'s private key;

(e) sending the encrypted first message and the new sender'"'"'s public key to the receiver application;

(f) decrypting the encrypted first message using the receiver'"'"'s private key to produce a decrypted first message having a [Command];

(g) validating the [Command] of the decrypted first message to determine if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is a valid [Command] that is known in advance;

(h) if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is determined to not be a valid [Command], black listing an IP address of the sender application, sending a first fraud alert message to a first mobile phone, and sending a first fraud alert email to a first email address;

(i) if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is determined to be a valid [Command], building an acknowledgement message with a format of

[IP Address];

[Command];

[Message];

(j) encrypting the acknowledgement message with the new sender'"'"'s public key to produce an encrypted acknowledgment message;

(k) generating a new receiver'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair, wherein the new receiver'"'"'s PKI public and private key pair comprises a new receiver'"'"'s public key and a new receiver'"'"'s private key;

(l) sending the encrypted acknowledgment message and the new receiver'"'"'s public key to the sender application;

(m) decrypting the encrypted acknowledgment message using the new sender'"'"'s private key to produce a decrypted acknowledgment message having a [Command];

(n) validating the [Command] of the decrypted acknowledgment message to determine if it is a valid [Command] that is known in advance; and

(o) if the [Command] of the decrypted acknowledgment message is determined to not be a valid [Command], black listing an IP address of the receiver application, sending a second fraud alert message to a second mobile phone, and sending a second fraud alert email to a second email address.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein in the format of the first message, [Command] is text, and [Message] is text or binary data.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein in the format of the acknowledgment message, [Command] is text and [Message] is text or binary data.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the first fraud alert message is sent to the first mobile phone if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is an unknown [Command].

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the first fraud alert email is sent to the first email address if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is an unknown [Command].

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the IP Address of the sender application is black listed if the [Command] of the decrypted first message is an unknown [Command].