Binding digitally signed requests to sessions

• US 10,142,111 B2
• Filed: 10/02/2017
• Issued: 11/27/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 12/12/2014
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Inventors: Behm, Bradley Jeffery, Roth, Gregory Branchek, Rubin, Gregory Alan
• Primary Examiner(s): Avery, Jeremiah L
• Application Number:
  US15/723,003
• Publication Number:
  US 20180026797A1
• Time in Patent Office: 421 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

A client establishes an cryptographically protected communications session and determines information usable to distinguish the session from other sessions. The client digitally signs the information using a cryptographic key that is independent of the session to enable a server to check whether the information matches the session that it established and whether the digital signature is correct. The server may perform mitigating operations if either or both of the information or the digital signature is/are invalid.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

receiving, over an established cryptographically protected communications session, a message and a digital signature;

verifying, based at least in part on the message, a cryptographic key obtained after establishment of the established cryptographically protected communications session, and the digital signature, whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session; and

indicating whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic key corresponds to a secret negotiated as part of a handshake process to establish the cryptographically protected communications session.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising performing one or more mitigating actions as a result of failing to verify that the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic key is obtained outside of a process for establishing the established cryptographically protected communications session.

5. A system, comprising:

one or more non-transitory machine-readable mediums having stored thereon a set of instructions, which as a result of being executed by one or more processors, cause the system to at least;

receive, over an established cryptographically protected communications session, a message and a digital signature;

verify, based at least in part on the message, a cryptographic key obtained after establishment of the established cryptographically protected communications session, and the digital signature, whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session; and

indicate whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session.

6. The system of claim 5, wherein verifying the message includes determining whether a digital signature generated using the cryptographic key matches the digital signature.

7. The system of claim 5, wherein the set of instructions further cause the system to determine information specific to the cryptographically protected communications session, the verification being based at least in part on the information specific to the cryptographically protected communications session.

8. The system of claim 7, wherein generating the information specific to the cryptographically protected communications session includes applying the cryptographic key to a parameter used to establish the cryptographically protected communications session.

9. The system of claim 5, the set of instructions further cause the system to generate a value specific to the cryptographically protected communications session, wherein the verification includes comparing a second value, received in association with the message, with the value specific to the cryptographically protected communications session.

10. The system of claim 9, wherein the value specific to the cryptographically protected communications session is generated based at least in part on a secret used to establish the cryptographically protected communications session.

11. The system of claim 5, the set of instructions further cause the system to:

based at least in part on verifying that the message was transmitted over the cryptographically protected communications session, generate a response to the message, the response including a digital signature generated using the cryptographic key.

12. The system of claim 5, wherein the verification includes determining whether information resulting from a process for establishing the cryptographically protected communications session matches a parameter associated with the message.

13. The system of claim 5, wherein processing the message is dependent upon successful verification that the message was transmitted over the cryptographically protected communications session.

14. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon executable instructions that, if executed by one or more processors of a computer system, cause the computer system to at least:

receive, over an established cryptographically protected communications session, a message and a digital signature;

verify, based at least in part on the message, a cryptographic key obtained after establishment of the established cryptographically protected communications session, and the digital signature, whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session; and

indicate whether the message was transmitted over the established cryptographically protected communications session.

15. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14, wherein establishment of the cryptographically protected communications session includes using a handshake protocol for a cryptographic protocol.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the cryptographic key is obtained outside of a handshake process establishing the cryptographically protected communications session.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 15, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that, if executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to perform one or more mitigating actions based on an indication that the message was received over a different cryptographically protected communications session.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 14, wherein the instructions further comprise instructions that, if executed by the one or more processors, cause the computer system to determine information usable to distinguish the established cryptographically protected communications session from a different cryptographically protected communications session.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 18, wherein the information usable to distinguish the established cryptographically protected communications session is determined based at least in part on a digital certificate used to establish the cryptographically protected communications session.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 18, wherein the verification includes determining whether the information usable to distinguish the established cryptographically protected communications session matches a parameter associated with the message.