System and method for creation, deployment and management of augmented attacker map

• US 10,142,367 B2
• Filed: 10/02/2017
• Issued: 11/27/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 06/08/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: illusive networks LTD.
• Original Assignee: illusive networks LTD.
• Inventors: Touboul, Shlomo, Levin, Hanan, Roubach, Stephane, Mischari, Assaf, Ben David, Itai, Avraham, Itay, Ozer, Adi, Kazaz, Chen, Israeli, Ofer, Vingurt, Olga, Gareh, Liad, Grimberg, Israel, Cohen, Cobby, Sultan, Sharon, Kubovsky, Matan
• Primary Examiner(s): Truong, Thanhnga B
• Application Number:
  US15/722,351
• Publication Number:
  US 20180027017A1
• Time in Patent Office: 421 Days
• Field of Search: 726 22- 26, 726 11, 709228, 709220, 709224, 709206, 455410, 714 43
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/55 Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/554 involving event detection and direct action
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/56 Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/577 Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
• CPC Class Codes: G06N 20/00 Machine learning
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/146 Tracing the source of attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/102 Entity profiles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1416 Event detection, e.g. attack signature detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1425 Traffic logging, e.g. anomaly detection
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1433 Vulnerability analysis
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1491 using deception as countermeasure, e.g. honeypots, honeynets, decoys or entrapment
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227

Abstract

A system for network surveillance to detect attackers, including a deception management server within a network of resources, including a deployment module managing and planting one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more of the resources in the network, wherein an attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource that may be used to access a second resource, and one or more decoy servers accessible from resources in the network, each decoy server including an alert module that issues an alert when a specific resource in the network accesses the decoy server via one or more of the decoy attack vectors planted in the specific resource by the deployment module, and a delay module, delaying access to data on the decoy server while a resource accesses the decoy server.

Claims

1. A system for network surveillance to detect attackers, comprising:

a deception management server within a network of resources, comprising a deployment module managing and planting one or more decoy lateral attack vectors in one or more of the resources in the network, wherein a lateral attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource in the network that may be used to access a second resource in the network; and

one or more decoy servers accessible from resources in the network, each decoy server comprising;

an alert module that issues an alert when a specific resource in the network accesses the decoy server via one or more of the decoy lateral attack vectors planted in the specific resource by said deployment module; and

a delay module, purposely delaying incoming connections to the decoy server while a resource accesses the decoy server, in order to allow additional time to monitor activity on the decoy server.

2. The system of claim 1 wherein said alert module causes a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource in the network when a specific decoy server is being accessed by a specific resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched in the destination resource, identifies a process running within the specific resource that is accessing the specific decoy server, logs the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report, and transmits the forensic report to said deception management server.

3. The system of claim 2 wherein said deception management server further comprises a notification module, transmitting to a notification server a notification that the specific resource in the network accessed the specific decoy server, and information in the forensic report provided by the forensic application, in response to said deception management server receiving the forensic report.

4. The system of claim 1, further comprising an event monitor, recognizing an attempt by a first resource in the network to access a second resource in the network via the decoy attack vectors planted by said deployment module in the first resource, and causing, in response to the recognizing, a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched in the destination resource, identifies a process running within the first resource that is accessing the second resource, logs the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report, and transmits the forensic report to said deception management server.

5. The system of claim 4 wherein said deception management server further comprises a notification module transmitting a notification that the first resource attempted to access the second resource, and information in the forensic report provided by the forensic application, in response to said deception management server receiving a forensic report from the forensic application running on the destination computer.

6. The system of claim 1 wherein said deception management server further comprises a database of lateral attack vectors, and wherein the one or more decoy lateral attack vectors planted by said deployment processor are lateral attack vectors in said database of lateral attack vectors.

7. The system of claim 6, wherein the lateral attack vectors in said database of lateral attack vectors include at least one member of (i) username and password, (ii) username and authentication ticket, (iii) FTP server address, username and password, (iv) database server address, username and password, and (v) SSH server address, username and password.

8. The system of claim 6 further comprising an update server transmitting, from time to time, updated lateral attack vectors to said database of lateral attack vectors.

9. The system of claim 6, wherein the resources in the network are grouped into multiple groups of resources, wherein said deception management server further comprises a database of policies that specify, for each group of resources on the network, one or more decoy lateral attack vectors to plant in that group of resources, from among the lateral attack vectors in said database of lateral attack vectors, and wherein said deployment processor plants the one or more decoy lateral attack vectors in the groups of resources in accordance with the database of policies.

10. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions, which, when executed by a processor of a management computer, cause the computer:

to plant one or more decoy lateral attack vectors in one or more resources in a network of computers, wherein a lateral attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource in the network that may be used to access a second resource in the network;

to recognize that a specific decoy server in the network is being accessed by a specific resource in the network via one or more of the decoy lateral attack vectors planted in the specific resource by said planting;

to purposely delay incoming connections to data on the specific decoy server while the specific resource accesses the decoy server, in order to allow additional time to monitor activity on the decoy server; and

to issue an alert in response to the recognizing.

11. The method of claim 10 wherein the processor further causes the computer to cause a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource in response to the recognizing, wherein the forensic application, when launched on the destination resource, is operative:

to identify a process running within the specific resource that is accessing the specific decoy server;

to log the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report; and

to transmit the forensic report to a deception management server.

12. The method of claim 10 wherein the processor further causes the computer:

to further recognize an attempt by a first resource in the network to access a second resource in the network via one or more of the decoy lateral attack vectors planted in the first resource; and

to cause a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a-destination resource, in response to the further recognizing, wherein the forensic application, when launched on the destination resource, is operative;

to identify a process running within the first resource that is attempting to access the second resource;

to log the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report; and

to transmit the forensic report to a deception management server.

13. The method of claim 10, wherein the decoy attack vectors include at least one member of (i) username and password, (ii) username and authentication ticket, (iii) FTP server address, username and password, (iv) database server address, username and password, and (v) SSH server address, username and password.

14. A system for network surveillance to detect attackers, comprising:

a deception management server within a network of resources, comprising a deployment module managing and planting one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more of the resources in the network, wherein an attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource that may be used to access a second resource; and

one or more decoy servers accessible from resources in the network, each decoy server comprising an alert module causing a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource in the network when a specific decoy server is being accessed by a specific resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched in the destination resource, identifies a process running within the specific resource that is accessing the specific decoy server, logs the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report, and transmits the forensic report to said deception management server.

15. A system for network surveillance to detect attackers, comprising:

a deception management server within a network of resources, comprising a deployment module managing and planting one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more of the resources in the network, wherein an attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource that may be used to access a second resource; and

an event monitor, recognizing an attempt by a first resource in the network to access a second resource in the network via the decoy attack vectors planted by said deployment module in the first resource, and causing, in response to the recognizing, a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched in the destination resource, identifies a process running within the first resource that is accessing the second resource, logs the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report, and transmits the forensic report to said deception management server.

16. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions, which, when executed by a processor of a management computer, cause the computer:

to plant one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more resources in a network of computers, wherein an attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource in the network that may be used to access a second resource in the network;

to recognize that a specific decoy server in the network is being accessed by a specific resource in the network via one or more of the decoy attack vectors planted in the specific resource;

to cause a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched on the destination resource, is operative;

to identify a process running within the specific resource that is accessing the specific decoy server;

to log the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report; and

to transmit the forensic report to a deception management server.

17. A non-transitory computer readable medium storing instructions, which, when executed by a processor of a management computer, cause the computer:

to plant one or more decoy attack vectors in one or more resources in a network of computers, wherein an attack vector is an object in memory or storage of a first resource in the network that may be used to access a second resource in the network;

to recognize an attempt by a first resource in the network to access a second resource in the network via one or more of the decoy attack vectors planted in the first resource; and

to cause a real-time forensic application to be transmitted to a destination resource, wherein the forensic application, when launched on the destination resource, is operative;

to identify a process running within the first resource that is attempting to access the second resource;

to log the activities performed by the thus-identified process in a forensic report; and

to transmit the forensic report to a deception management server.