Apparatus for hardware accelerated runtime integrity measurement

• US 10,146,571 B2
• Filed: 06/07/2016
• Issued: 12/04/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 12/29/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Original Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Inventors: Hiremane, Radhakrishna R K, Keshavamurthy, Anil S.
• Primary Examiner(s): Rigol, Yaima
• Application Number:
  US15/175,874
• Publication Number:
  US 20170024238A1
• Time in Patent Office: 910 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/07 Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/0712 in a virtual computing platform, e.g. logically partitioned systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/0766 Error or fault reporting or storing
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1416 by checking the object accessibility, e.g. type of access defined by the memory independently of subject rights G06F12/1458 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45583 Memory management, e.g. access or allocation
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45591 Monitoring or debugging support
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/54 by adding security routines or objects to programs
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/577 Assessing vulnerabilities and evaluating computer system security
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2212/1052 Security improvement
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45541 Bare-metal, i.e. hypervisor runs directly on hardware
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45558 Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects

Abstract

Techniques are described for providing processor-based dedicated fixed function hardware to perform runtime integrity measurements for detecting attacks on system supervisory software, such as a hypervisor or native Operating System (OS). The dedicated fixed function hardware is provided with memory addresses of the system supervisory software for monitoring. After obtaining the memory addresses and other information required to facilitate integrity monitoring, the dedicated fixed function hardware activates a lock-out to prevent reception of any additional information, such as information from a corrupted version of the system supervisory software. The dedicated fixed function hardware then automatically performs periodic integrity measurements of the system supervisory software. Upon detection of an integrity failure, the dedicated fixed function hardware uses out-of-band signaling to report that an integrity failure has occurred.

The dedicated fixed function hardware provides for runtime integrity verification of a platform in a secure manner without impacting the performance of the platform.

Claims

1. A processor comprising:

fixed-function hardware to;

obtain memory addresses that point to at least a portion of a supervisory software component,

activate a lock-out to prevent obtaining further memory addresses by the fixed-function hardware,

activate a timer to periodically trigger a run-time integrity measurement of the supervisory software component, and

perform the run-time integrity measurement of the supervisory software component.

2. The processor of claim 1, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to report a run-time integrity failure of the supervisory software component.

3. The processor of claim 1, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to obtain the memory addresses during a load-time of the supervisory software component.

4. The processor of claim 1, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to:

obtain a first hash value of the supervisory software component from a store;

calculate a hash value of contents of memory at the memory addresses; and

compare the hash value to the first hash value.

5. The processor of claim 4, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to detect a run-time integrity failure of the supervisory software component when there is a mis-match between the hash value and the first hash value.

6. The processor of claim 4, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to report a failure indication when there is a mis-match between the hash value and the first hash value.

7. The processor of claim 1, wherein the supervisory software component is at least one of:

a hypervisor or a virtual machine monitor (VMM);

an operating system;

system software used to configure hardware;

or

system software used to supervise hardware.

8. The processor of claim 1, wherein the fixed-function hardware is to store the memory addresses to point to at least one of a static text segment or a static data segment of the supervisory software component.

9. A method comprising:

obtaining memory addresses of system software by a fixed-function hardware component of a processor;

activating a lock-out by the hardware component to prevent obtaining further memory addresses;

activating a dedicated timer of the hardware component to periodically trigger a run-time integrity measurement of the system software; and

performing the run-time integrity measurement of the supervisory software component.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising reporting a run-time integrity failure of the system software by the fixed-function hardware component.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the obtaining of the memory addresses is to occur in a first band that differs from a second band used for the reporting of the run-time integrity failure.

12. The method of claim 9, wherein the obtaining memory addresses of system software by the fixed-function hardware component comprises obtaining the memory addresses from a hypervisor or a virtual machine monitor (VMM) running on bare metal of the processor or a bare metal operating system natively running on the processor.

13. The method of claim 9, wherein the obtaining memory addresses of system software by the hardware component comprises obtaining the memory addresses that point to at least a portion of a hypervisor, a virtual machine monitor (VMM) or an operating system.

14. The method of claim 9, wherein the obtaining memory addresses occurs during a trusted boot of the system software.

15. The method of claim 9, further comprising:

calculating a hash value associated with the memory addresses by the fixed-function hardware component; and

comparing the hash value to first hash value associated with the system software, wherein the first hash value includes a hash of at least a portion of the system software.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein the at least a portion of the system software is to include at least one of a static text segment or a static data segment of the system software.

17. The method of claim 15, wherein the detecting the run-time integrity failure comprises detecting a mis-match between the hash value and the first hash value.

18. The method of claim 15, wherein the first hash value is obtained from a store by the fixed-function hardware component.