Double authentication system for electronically signed documents

• US 10,158,490 B2
• Filed: 08/17/2015
• Issued: 12/18/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 08/17/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: The Boeing Co.
• Original Assignee: The Boeing Co.
• Inventors: Schleiff, Martin
• Primary Examiner(s): Okeke, Izunna
• Assistant Examiner(s): Huang, Cheng-Feng
• Application Number:
  US14/827,685
• Publication Number:
  US 20170054561A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,219 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/409 Device specific authentication in transaction processing
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3231 Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using biometrical features in a packet data network H04L63/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC

Abstract

Disclosed is a double authentication system (“DAS”) for electronically signing a first data from a user having a smart card, where the smart card has a personal identification number (“PIN”). As an example, the DAS may include a client module, high assurance signing service (“HASS”) module, and hardware security module (“HSM”).

Claims

1. A double authentication system (“

DAS”

) for electronically signing a first data from a user, wherein the user has a smart card having a personal identification number (“

PIN”

), the DAS comprising;

a client module, wherein the client module is software located within a computer and the client module is in signal communication with the smart card;

a server having a high assurance signing service (“

HASS”

) module, wherein

the computer is remote from the server,

the HASS module is remote from and in signal communication with the client module, and

the HASS module is software that is capable of executing a plurality of instructions,

whereby the server is capable of receiving the first data from the user via the client module, and, in response, query the user for a confirmation that the first data is to be electronically signed; and

a hardware security module (“

HSM”

), wherein

the HSM is remote from the computer,

the HSM is in signal communication with the HASS module, has a private key, is configured to

receive a HSM package from the HASS module,

in response, produce a HSM encrypted hash value with the private key of the HSM, and

transmit the HSM encrypted hash value to the HASS module,

wherein the HASS module is further configured to

produce the HSM package from at least the first data,

produce a HSM signed package that includes the HSM package combined with the HSM encrypted hash value, and

transmit the HSM signed package to the client module,

wherein the client module is configured to

query the user for the PIN of the smart card,

in response, transmit the HSM signed package to the smart card for production of a smart card (“

SC”

) encrypted hash value,

receive the SC encrypted hash value, and

transmit the SC encrypted hash value to the HASS module, and

wherein the HASS module is configured to

receive the SC encrypted hash value and,

in response, produce a high assurance signed package (“

HAS package”

) that is passed to the user by way of the client module.

2. The DAS of claim 1, wherein the HSM package includes

a time-stamp,

an identity of the user, and

a public key of the HSM.

3. The DAS of claim 1, wherein the HASS module is configured to utilize a public key of the HSM to generate the HSM signed package.

4. The DAS of claim 1, wherein the first data originates at the client module.

5. The DAS of claim 4, wherein the HSM is also located within the server.

6. The DAS of claim 1, wherein the HAS package includes the HSM signed package and the SC encrypted hash value.

7. The DAS of claim 1, wherein the PIN is biometric data associated with the user.

8. A method of electronically signing a first data from a user with a double authentication system (“

DAS”

), wherein the user has a smart card having a personal identification number (“

PIN”

), the method comprising;

receiving the first data from the user at a high assurance signing service (“

HASS”

) module of the DAS, wherein the HASS module is located at a server and the first data originates at a client module located within a computer remote from the HASS module;

querying the user for a confirmation that the first data is to be electronically signed;

generating a hardware security module (“

HSM”

) package for transmission to a HSM;

generating a HSM encrypted hash value from the HSM package with a private key of the HSM;

generating a HSM signed package, wherein the HSM signed package includes the HSM package and the HSM encrypted hash value;

querying the user for the PIN of the smart card;

receiving a smart card (“

SC”

) encrypted hash value corresponding to the HSM signed package;

producing a high assurance signed package (“

HAS package”

) from the HSM signed package and SC encrypted hash value; and

passing the HAS package to the user by way of the client module,

wherein querying the user for a confirmation that the first data is to be electronically signed includes generating a first query for the user at the client module,

wherein querying the user for the PIN of the smart card includes generating a second query for the user for the PIN at the client module, and

wherein generating a HSM encrypted hash value from the HSM package with a private key of the HSM includes generating the HSM encrypted hash value at the HSM and passing the HSM encrypted hash value to the HASS module.

9. The method of claim 8, further including passing the HSM signed package to the smart card, wherein the smart card produces the SC encrypted hash value corresponding to the HSM signed package.

10. The method of claim 8, wherein the HSM is located at the server.

11. The method of claim 8, further including passing the HSM signed package to the client module.

12. The method of claim 8, further including passing the HSM signed package to the smart card, wherein the smart card produces the SC encrypted hash value corresponding to the HSM signed package.

13. The method of claim 8, wherein generating the HSM signed package includes generating the HSM signed package with a public key of the user combined with the HSM encrypted hash value and the HSM package.

14. The method of claim 8, wherein the HSM signed package includes:

a time-stamp,

an identity of the user, and

a public key of the HSM.

15. The method of claim 8, wherein the HAS package includes the HSM signed package and SC encrypted hash value.

16. The method of claim 8, wherein at the smart card further includes verifying a PIN for accessing the smart card.

17. A non-transitory computer readable medium containing machine readable instructions, that when executed perform a method of electronically signing a first data from a user with a double authentication system (“

DAS”

), wherein the user has a smart card having a personal identification number (“

PIN”

), comprising the steps of;

receiving the first data from the user at a high assurance signing service (“

HASS”

) module of the DAS, wherein the HASS module is located at a server and the first data originates at a client module within a computer that is remote from the server;

querying the user for a confirmation that the first data is to be electronically signed;

generating a hardware security module (“

HSM”

) package for transmission to a HSM;

generating a HSM encrypted hash value from the HSM package with a private key of the HSM;

generating a HSM signed package, wherein the HSM signed package includes the HSM package and the HSM encrypted hash value;

querying the user for the PIN of the smart card;

passing the HSM signed package to the smart card, wherein the smart card produces a smart card (“

SC”

) encrypted hash value corresponding to the HSM signed package;

receiving the smart card SC encrypted hash value; and

producing a high assurance signed package (“

HAS package”

) from the HSM signed package and SC encrypted hash value, wherein the HAS package includes the HSM signed package and SC encrypted hash value,

wherein querying the user for a confirmation that the first data is to be electronically signed includes generating a first query for the user at the client module,

wherein querying the user for the PIN of the smart card includes generating a second query for the user for the PIN at the client module, and

wherein generating a HSM encrypted hash value from the HSM package with a private key of the HSM includes generating the HSM encrypted hash value at the HSM and passing the HSM encrypted hash value to the HASS module.

18. The non-transitory computer readable medium of claim 17, further including passing the HSM signed package to the smart card, wherein the smart card produces the SC encrypted hash value corresponding to the HSM signed package.