Enforcing data security in a cleanroom data processing environment

• US 10,212,169 B2
• Filed: 08/19/2016
• Issued: 02/19/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 03/30/2016
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Oracle International Corporation (Oracle Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Oracle International Corporation (Oracle Corporation)
• Inventors: Plichta, Jeremy Ryszard, Baird, Andrew V, Siggs, Roger, DiMichel, Kevin Scott, Cuthbertson, Robert J, Mitchell, David Michael
• Primary Examiner(s): Hirl, Joseph P
• Assistant Examiner(s): Gundry, Stephen T
• Application Number:
  US15/242,284
• Publication Number:
  US 20170289107A1
• Time in Patent Office: 914 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6218 to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6245 Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/04 for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/083 using passwords cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/102 Entity profiles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/308 retaining data, e.g. retaining successful, unsuccessful communication attempts, internet access, or e-mail, internet telephony, intercept related information or call content

Abstract

Techniques for enforcing data security in a cleanroom data processing environment are described herein. In one or more embodiments, a virtual private cloud environment stores a first set of data provided by a first user account and a second set of data provided by a second user account, where the first user account is associated with a first set of one or more security credentials and the second user account is associated with a second set of security credentials and where the first user account is prevented from accessing at least the second set of data and the second user account is prevented from accessing at least the first set of data. In response to receiving, from the first user account or the second user account, a request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment, at least the first set of data and the second set of data are deleted.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

storing, within a virtual private cloud environment, a first set of data provided by a first user account of the virtual private cloud environment and a second set of data provided by a second user account of the virtual private cloud environment, the first user account associated with a first set of one or more security credentials and the second user account associated with a second set of one or more security credentials;

wherein the first user account is prevented from accessing at least the second set of data that is stored in the virtual private cloud environment and the second user account is prevented from accessing at least the first set of data that is stored in the virtual private cloud environment;

receiving, from the first user account, a request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment; and

in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment from the first user account, unilaterally deleting at least the first set of data provided by the first user account and the second set of data provided by the second user account.

2. The method of claim 1, further comprising in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment, deleting one or more storage buckets, software resources, subnets, routes, security groups, or queues that are deployed within the virtual private cloud environment.

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

maintaining a set of audit logs that track data accesses within the virtual private cloud environment; and

wherein the set of audit logs are not deleted in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment.

4. The method of claim 1,

wherein at least the first user account may destroy the virtual private cloud environment without authorization from the second user account;

and

wherein at least the second user account may destroy the virtual private cloud environment without authorization from the first user account.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

registering a first set of one or more authentication tokens for the first user account and registering a second set of one or more authentication tokens for the second user account; and

prior to deleting at least the first set of data and the second set of data, authenticating the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment using the first set of one or more authentication tokens or the second set of one or more authentication tokens.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

preventing access to resources deployed within the virtual private cloud environment unless a plurality of authentication factors have been validated; and

wherein the first user account manages a first authentication factor of the plurality of authentication factors and the second user account manages a second authentication factor of the plurality of authentication factors.

7. The method of claim 6,

wherein the first authentication factor is a multi-factor authentication device managed by the first user account;

wherein the second authentication factor is a password managed by the second user account; and

wherein the plurality of authentication factors are validated in response to receiving the password and an authentication token generated by the multi-factor authentication device.

8. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

generating a new instance of the virtual private cloud environment through a shared administrator session; and

wherein the first set of data and the second set of data are reloaded into the new instance of the virtual private cloud environment.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment is sent in response to detecting a breach in security within the virtual private cloud environment.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the first set of data and the second set of data are stored in a set of one or more simple storage service (S3) storage buckets.

11. One or more non-transitory computer readable media storing instructions, which, when executed by one or more hardware processors, cause operations comprising:

storing, within a virtual private cloud environment, a first set of data provided by a first user account of the virtual private cloud environment and a second set of data provided by a second user account of the virtual private cloud environment, the first user account associated with a first set of one or more security credentials and the second user account associated with a second set of one or more security credentials;

wherein the first user account is prevented from accessing at least the second set of data that is stored in the virtual private cloud environment and the second user account is prevented from accessing at least the first set of data that is stored in the virtual private cloud environment;

receiving, from the first user account, a request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment; and

in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment from the first user account, unilaterally deleting at least the first set of data provided by the first user account and the second set of data provided by the second user account.

12. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the instructions further cause operations comprising in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment, deleting one or more storage buckets, software resources, subnets, routes, security groups, or queues that are deployed within the virtual private cloud environment.

13. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the instructions further cause operations comprising:

maintaining a set of audit logs that track data accesses within the virtual private cloud environment; and

wherein the set of audit logs are not deleted in response to the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment.

14. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11,

wherein at least the first user account may destroy the virtual private cloud environment without authorization from the second user account;

and

wherein at least the second user account may destroy the virtual private cloud environment without authorization from the first user account.

15. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the instructions further cause operations comprising:

registering a first set of one or more authentication tokens for the first user account and registering a second set of one or more authentication tokens for the second user account; and

prior to deleting at least the first set of data and the second set of data, authenticating the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment using the first set of one or more authentication tokens or the second set of one or more authentication tokens.

16. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the instructions further cause operations comprising:

preventing access to resources deployed within the virtual private cloud environment unless a plurality of authentication factors have been validated; and

wherein the first user account manages a first authentication factor of the plurality of authentication factors and the second user account manages a second authentication factor of the plurality of authentication factors.

17. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 16,

wherein the first authentication factor is a multi-factor authentication device managed by the first user account;

wherein the second authentication factor is a password managed by the second user account; and

wherein the plurality of authentication factors are validated in response to receiving the password and an authentication token generated by the multi-factor authentication device.

18. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the instructions further cause operations comprising:

generating a new instance of the virtual private cloud environment through a shared administrator session; and

wherein the first set of data and the second set of data are reloaded into the new instance of the virtual private cloud environment.

19. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the request to destroy the virtual private cloud environment is sent in response to detecting a breach in security within the virtual private cloud environment.

20. The one or more non-transitory computer readable media of claim 11, wherein the first set of data and the second set of data are stored in a set of one or more simple storage service (S3) storage buckets.