Preventing persistent storage of cryptographic information

• US 10,223,538 B1
• Filed: 11/12/2013
• Issued: 03/05/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 11/12/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Inventors: Cignetti, Todd Lawrence, Fitzgerald, Robert Eric, Doane, Andrew J., Brandwine, Eric Jason
• Primary Examiner(s): Edwards, Linglan E
• Application Number:
  US14/078,336
• Time in Patent Office: 1,939 Days
• Field of Search: 713165, 713193
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45562 Creating, deleting, cloning virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2009/45587 Isolation or security of virtual machine instances
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/53 by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6209 to a single file or object, e.g. in a secure envelope, encrypted and accessed using a key, or with access control rules appended to the object itself
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2149 Restricted operating environment
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 9/45558 Hypervisor-specific management and integration aspects

Abstract

Organizations maintain and generate large amounts of sensitive information using computer hardware resources and services of a service provider. Furthermore, there is a need to be able to delete large amounts of data securely and quickly by encrypting the data with a key and destroying the key. To ensure that information stored remotely is secure and capable of secure deletion, cryptographic keys used by the organization should be prevented from being persistently stored during serialization operations. A variety of methods may be used to protect access to keying material and prevent the keying material from being stored persistently.

Claims

1. One or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media collectively stored thereon instructions that, as a result of being executed by one or more processors of a system, cause the system to:

provide a second computer system using an image of a first computer system, the second computer system instantiated based at least in part on;

detecting a command to serialize the first computer system, the first computer system including computer system memory containing a plaintext representation of a cryptographic key;

generating and storing metadata associated with the cryptographic key, said metadata comprising functions registered by the first computing system, including operations to be performed for restoring the cryptographic key; and

executing the command by at least writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key, the image usable to instantiate the first computer system without access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key;

perform at least one cryptographic operation based at least in part of the registered functions and operations to be performed for restoring the cryptographic key in the metadata, to cause the second computer system to operate with access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key; and

store the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key to memory of the second computer system.

2. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, wherein writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes deleting the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key before writing the image of the first computer system.

3. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, wherein writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes generating an audit log and signing the audit log with a service provider private key of a public-private key pair.

4. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, wherein serializing the first computer system includes at least one operation corresponding to migration, suspension, snapshot or storing data persistently.

5. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, wherein writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes determining a particular area of memory containing the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key and excluding the particular area of memory from being written to the image of the first computer system.

6. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, wherein writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes requesting encryption of the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key from a cryptographic key management module such that the encrypted representation of the cryptographic key is written to the image of the first computer system.

7. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage media of claim 1, writing the image of the first computer system to persistent storage such that the image of the first computer system lacks the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes using a first cryptographic key to encrypt the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key.

8. The one or more computer-readable storage media of claim 7, wherein enabling the second computer system to operate with access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key includes decrypting the encrypted plaintext representation of the cryptographic key with the first cryptographic key based at least in part on the metadata associated with the image of the first computer system indicating the operations to be performed in order to cause the second computer system to operate with access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key.

9. A computer-implemented method for protecting cryptographic keys operated by a computing resource service provider, comprising:

providing a second computer system using serialized data corresponding to a first computer system, the second computer system instantiated based at least in part on;

detecting that a serialization event will occur to the first computer system containing one or more plaintext cryptographic keys;

storing metadata associated with the cryptographic key, the metadata comprising information corresponding to functions registered by the first computer system, including operations to be performed for restoring access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key; and

causing one or more serialization operations corresponding to the serialization event to be performed such that the serialized data corresponding to the first computer system does not contain the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys;

causing the second computer system to have access to the plaintext cryptographic key after completion of the serialization event based at least in part on at least one operation indicated in the metadata; and

storing the plaintext cryptographic key on the second computer system.

10. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein the serialization event includes at least one operation corresponding to migration, suspension, snapshot or storing data persistently.

11. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein:

causing the one or more serialization operations corresponding to the serialization event to be performed includes encrypting with a first cryptographic key the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys; and

causing the second computer system to have access to the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys after completion of the serialization event includes decrypting with the first cryptographic key the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys based at least in part on the operation indicated in the metadata.

12. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein:

the first computer system has memory; and

causing the one or more serialization operations corresponding to the serialization event to be performed such that serialized data corresponding to the first computer system does not contain the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys includes indicating a particular area of the memory containing the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys such that the particular area of the memory will not be serialized as a result of the one or more serialization operations.

13. The computer-implemented method of claim 12, wherein the particular area of memory containing the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys is managed by an operating system of the first computer system such that read access to the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys is restricted.

14. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein causing the second computer system to have access to the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys after completion of the serialization event includes restoring access to the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys based at least in part on the operation indicated in the metadata.

15. The computer-implemented method of claim 9, wherein preventing the one or more plaintext cryptographic keys from being stored into persistent memory includes using a key to encrypt all the data to be serialized.

16. A system, comprising:

one or more processors; and

memory with instructions that, as a result of being executed by the one or more processors, cause the system to;

provide a second computer system using an image of a first computer system, the second computer system instantiated based at least in part on;

for a first computer system that operates with access to a plaintext cryptographic key, serializing the first computer system to obtain the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key;

encrypting the plaintext cryptographic key to generate an encrypted cryptographic key;

storing metadata associated with the encrypted cryptographic key, said metadata comprising information corresponding to functions registered by the first computer system, including operations to be performed for restoring the cryptographic key; and

causing the image of the first computer system to be persistently stored;

decrypt the encrypted plaintext cryptographic key based at least in part on the metadata that indicates registered functions and operations to be performed in order to cause the second computer system to operate with access to the plaintext representation of the cryptographic key; and

store the plaintext cryptographic key to memory associated with the second computer system.

17. The system of claim 16, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes creating the image of the first computer system in a manner that excludes a particular area of memory of the first computer system and the first computer system controls access to the particular area of memory.

18. The system of claim 16, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes requesting the encrypted cryptographic key from a key management device.

19. The system of claim 16, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes deleting the plaintext cryptographic key before obtaining the image.

20. The system of claim 16, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes, as a result of expiration of a grace period, performing one or more operations corresponding to obtaining the image of the first computer system.

21. The system of claim 16, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes registering a function with a hypervisor managing the first computer system, the function deleting the plaintext cryptographic key from the first computer system as a result of obtaining the image.

22. The system of claim 21, wherein obtaining the image of the first computer system that lacks the plaintext cryptographic key includes removing access to the plaintext cryptographic key.