Light-weight key update mechanism with blacklisting based on secret sharing algorithm in wireless sensor networks

• US 10,277,564 B2
• Filed: 10/19/2016
• Issued: 04/30/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 05/04/2016
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: NXP USA, Inc. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Original Assignee: NXP USA, Inc. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Inventors: Frincu, Andrei Catalin, Alexandru, Georgel Bogdan
• Primary Examiner(s): Abyaneh, Ali S
• Application Number:
  US15/297,356
• Publication Number:
  US 20170324715A1
• Time in Patent Office: 923 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/101 Access control lists [ACL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/10 in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network software deployment G06F8/60; multiprogramming arrangements G06F9/46
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0838 Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3093 involving Lattices or polynomial equations, e.g. NTRU scheme
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]

Abstract

Various embodiments include a network manager for managing network keys in a network having a plurality of nodes, the device including: a memory; and a processor configured to: determine N nodes to blacklist, wherein N is an integer; select a polynomial function from a plurality of polynomial functions of degree K and wherein the polynomial functions define plurality of secret network keys; generate K-N random abscissa values, wherein none of the random abscissa values are not found in a list of node abscissa values; calculate K-N polynomial function values for the K-N random abscissa values; calculate N polynomial function values for N node abscissa values associated with the N blacklisted nodes; transmit a message to nodes in the network including an indication of the selected polynomial function, the K-N random abscissa values, the N node abscissa values associated with the N blacklisted nodes, the K-N calculated polynomial function values, and the N calculated polynomial function values.

Claims

1. A device configured to manage network keys in a network having a plurality of nodes, the device comprising:

a memory; and

a processor configured to determine N nodes to blacklist, wherein N is an integer, extract, for each of the N nodes to blacklist, a respective abscissa from an Abscissa-node Address Table (AAT), blacklist the determined N nodes, select a polynomial function from a plurality of polynomial functions of degree K, wherein the plurality of polynomial functions define a plurality of secret network keys, generate K-N random abscissa values, wherein none of the K-N random abscissa values are found in the AAT, calculate K-N polynomial function values for the K-N random abscissa values, calculate N polynomial function values for N node abscissa values respectively associated with the N blacklisted nodes, and transmit a message to nodes in the network including an indication of the selected polynomial function, the K-N random abscissa values, the N node abscissa values respectively associated with the N blacklisted nodes, the K-N calculated polynomial function values, and the N calculated polynomial function values.

2. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to provision a new node including:

selecting a new node abscissa value, wherein a new node abscissa value is not found in the AAT;

calculating a plurality of new polynomial function values by evaluating the plurality of polynomial functions at the new abscissa value; and

sending the new abscissa value and the plurality of new polynomial functions values to the new node.

3. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to sign and authenticate the transmitted message.

4. The device of claim 1, wherein the plurality of polynomial functions are part of a secret sharing method.

5. The device of claim 4, wherein the secret sharing method is Shamir'"'"'s secret sharing method.

6. The device of claim 1, wherein zero degree coefficients of the plurality of polynomial functions respectively correspond to the plurality of secret network keys.

7. The device of claim 1, wherein N equals 0 indicates that no nodes are blacklisted.

8. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor is further configured to:

receive a message including an indication of a selected polynomial function from a plurality of polynomial functions, K abscissa values, and K selected polynomial function values, wherein the selected polynomial function has a degree of K and wherein the selected polynomial function defines a current secret network key, determine coefficients of the selected polynomial function based upon the K abscissa values, the K selected polynomial function values, and a node abscissa value; and

determine the current secret network key based upon the determined coefficients.

9. The device of claim 8, wherein zero degree coefficients of the plurality of polynomial functions respectively correspond to the plurality of secret network keys.

10. The device of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to determine whether the received message is authentic.

11. The device of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to drop the received message when the selected polynomial function has been previously used.

12. The device of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to store an indication that the selected polynomial function has been previously used.

13. The device of claim 8, wherein the processor is further configured to drop the received message when the coefficients of the selected polynomial function cannot be determined.

14. The device of claim 8, wherein the plurality of polynomial functions are part of a secret sharing method.

15. The device of claim 14, wherein the secret sharing method is Shamir'"'"'s secret sharing method.

16. The device of claim 8, wherein determining the current secret network key based upon the determined coefficients includes evaluating the selected polynomial function for an input of 0.