Integrated circuit, method for protecting an integrated circuit and computer program product

• US 10,282,312 B2
• Filed: 09/16/2016
• Issued: 05/07/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 09/23/2015
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: NXP B.V. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Original Assignee: NXP B.V. (NXP Semiconductors NV)
• Inventors: Riou, Sebastien
• Primary Examiner(s): Patel, Ashokkumar B
• Assistant Examiner(s): Farooqui, Quazi
• Application Number:
  US15/268,462
• Publication Number:
  US 20170083459A1
• Time in Patent Office: 963 Days
• Field of Search: 713193, 713189, 713192, 713194
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1408 by using cryptography for digital transmission H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 12/1466 Key-lock mechanism
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/316 by observing the pattern of computer usage, e.g. typical user behaviour
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/86 Secure or tamper-resistant housings
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2133 Verifying human interaction, e.g., Captcha
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/073 Special arrangements for circuits, e.g. for protecting identification code in memory protection against unauthorised use of computer memory G06F12/14
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 19/07372 by detecting tampering with the circuit
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/082 Features insuring the integrity of the data on or in the card
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 1/00 Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/5225 Shielding layers formed together with wiring layers
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/573 using passive means
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/576 using active circuits
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/004 for fault attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0866 involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics

Abstract

According to a first aspect of the present disclosure, an integrated circuit is provided which comprises an active shield in a first layer and at least one security-critical component in a second layer, said security-critical component being configured to generate an access key for enabling access to at least a part of said security-critical component, wherein said access key is based on an output value of the active shield. According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a corresponding method for protecting an integrated circuit is conceived. According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, a corresponding computer program product is provided.

Claims

1. An integrated circuit comprising;

an active shield in a first layer and a security-critical component in a second layer, said security-critical component being configured to generate an access key for enabling access to at least a part of said security-critical component and use the access key to enable access to content of a storage unit comprised in the security-critical component, wherein said access key is based on an output value of the active shield and on a fixed random number generated once at a production time of the integrated circuit.

2. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1, wherein said content is encrypted content, and the access key comprises a decryption key for decrypting said encrypted content.

3. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1, the security-critical component further being configured to generate the access key by performing an exclusive-or operation on the output value of the active shield and said fixed random number.

4. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1, the security-critical component further being configured to provide an input value to the active shield, said input value being based on a fixed random seed value.

5. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 4, wherein the fixed random seed value is generated once at a production time of the integrated circuit.

6. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 4, the security-critical component further being configured to mask the input value with a variable random value before providing said input value to the active shield.

7. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 6, the security-critical component further being configured to unmask the output value of the active shield using said variable random value.

8. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 7, the security-critical component further being configured to use Boolean masking.

9. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 7, wherein the security-critical component comprises a shield controller which is configured to mask the input value and unmask the output value.

10. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1, the security-critical component further being configured to generate an error signal if said access is not enabled.

11. A smart card comprising the integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1.

12. An electronic identification document comprising the integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1.

13. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 1, wherein the active shield comprises a plurality of slices and each slice is configured to implement a linear function.

14. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 13, wherein each slice comprises a first logic unit and a second logic unit and shield lines transport bits between the first logic unit and the second logic unit.

15. The integrated circuit as claimed in claim 13, wherein each slice, except a first slice, is configured to accept as input an output of a previous slice and a shield controller is configured to receive an output of a last slice and generate the access key.

16. A method for protecting an integrated circuit, said integrated circuit comprising:

an active shield in a first layer and a security-critical component in a second layer, wherein the security-critical component generates an access key for enabling access to at least a part of said security-critical component and using the access key to enable access to content of a storage unit comprised in the security-critical component, and wherein said access key is based on an output value of the active shield and on a fixed random number generated once at a production time of the integrated circuit.

17. An article of manufacture including a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon that comprises executable instructions which, when being executed by a processor, cause the processor to perform an integrated circuit protection method for an integrated circuit comprising an active shield in a first layer and a security-critical component in a second layer, the article of manufacture comprising:

instructions for generating an access key to enable access to at least a part of said security-critical component; and

instructions for using the access key to enable access to content of a storage unit comprised in the security-critical component, wherein the access key is based on an output value of the active shield and on a fixed random number generated once at a production time of the integrated circuit.