Certificate-based pairing of key fob device and control unit

• US 10,293,785 B2
• Filed: 06/19/2018
• Issued: 05/21/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 07/17/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Original Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Inventors: Peeters, Eric, Ho, Jin-Meng
• Primary Examiner(s): Zaidi, Syed A
• Application Number:
  US16/011,892
• Publication Number:
  US 20180304857A1
• Time in Patent Office: 336 Days
• Field of Search: 713158
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/23 using reflectors
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/25 using filters
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/27 using semi-transparent optical elements
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/31 Virtual images
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/334 Projection means
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/349 Adjustment of brightness
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/77 Instrument locations other than the dashboard
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/00 Instruments specially adapted for vehicles; Arrangement of instruments in or on vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/213 Virtual instruments
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/23 Head-up displays [HUD] optical aspects of head-up displays G02B27/01
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/60 Instruments characterised by their location or relative disposition in or on vehicles arrangements of lighting devices on dashboards B60Q3/10
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 2325/108 Encryption
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/24 using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 2027/0118 comprising devices for improving the contrast of the display / brillance control visibility
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 26/0833 the reflecting element being a micromechanical device, e.g. a MEMS mirror, DMD G02B26/0825 takes precedence; micromechanical devices in general B81B
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/01 Head-up displays
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/0101 characterised by optical features G02B27/0172 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 5/30 Polarising elements light-modulating devices with active elements G02F1/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10227 loading programming parameters or programs into the interrogator, e.g. for configuring the interrogator
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 2009/00769 with data transmission performed by wireless means
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/00309 : operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4012 : Beam combining, e.g. by the use of fibres, gratings, polarisers, prisms
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4093 : Red, green and blue [RGB] generated directly by laser action or by a combination of laser action with nonlinear frequency conversion
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 : Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 : Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 : Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 : Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 : for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 : using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0838 : Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 : with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 : involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 : involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 : using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 : using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3129 : scanning a light beam on the display screen scanning a light beam on a screen in displays other than projection devices G09G3/02; scanning systems in general G02B26/10; projectors using laser light sources in general H04N9/3161
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3155 : for controlling the light source light source control per se H05B35/00 – H05B47/00; control of an illumination source for displays in general G09G3/3406
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3167 : for polarizing the light beam polarizing optical systems per se G02B27/28
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/50 : Secure pairing of devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/11 : by determining the brightness or colour temperature of ambient light
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/14 : by determining electrical parameters of the light source
• CPC Class Codes: Y02B 20/40 : Control techniques providing energy savings, e.g. smart controller or presence detection

Abstract

A control unit, in a disclosed embodiment, includes a transceiver, memory, and a processor. The processor is coupled to the transceiver and memory and executes instructions from the memory to cause the control unit to receive a first transmission containing a certificate, verify the authenticity of the certificate, and, after verifying authenticity of the certificate, execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a first common secret encryption key, receive a second transmission containing an encrypted first public key that is encrypted by the first common secret encryption key, decrypt the encrypted first public key using the first common secret encryption key to determine the first public key, execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a second common secret encryption key, generate an operational key, encrypt the operational key using the second common secret encryption key, and transmit the encrypted operational key.

Claims

1. A control unit comprising:

a transceiver;

a memory to store instructions; and

a processor coupled to the transceiver and memory, wherein the processor is configured to execute the instructions to cause the control unit to;

receive a first transmission containing a certificate;

verify the authenticity of the certificate;

after verifying authenticity of the certificate, establish a first communication link using transceiver to execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a first common secret encryption key;

receive a second transmission containing an encrypted first public key, wherein the encrypted first public key is encrypted by the first common secret encryption key;

decrypt the encrypted first public key using the first common secret encryption key to determine the first public key;

after determining the first public key, establish a second communication link using the transceiver to execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a second common secret encryption key;

generate an operational key;

encrypt the operational key using the second common secret encryption key; and

transmit the encrypted operational key.

2. The control unit of claim 1, wherein verifying authenticity of the certificate associated with the vehicle dealer is performed using a using a second public key that is stored in the memory.

3. The control unit of claim 2, wherein the certificate is associated with a vehicle dealer, the first public key is associated with a key fob device to which the control unit is configured to be paired, and the second public key is associated with a vehicle manufacturer.

4. The control unit of claim 1, wherein verifying authenticity of the certificate includes determining that the certificate is not on a certificate revocation list.

5. The control unit of claim 1, wherein the operation key is generated as a random number.

6. The control unit of claim 5, wherein the random number is a 128-bit random number.

7. The control unit of claim 1, wherein at least one of the public key agreement protocols executed by establish the first and second communication links is one of an Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement protocol or an Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) key agreement protocol.

8. The control unit of claim 1, wherein the second communication link is established based at least in part on information contained in the first public key.

9. The control unit of claim 8, wherein the information contained in the first public key identifies a key fob device to which the control unit is configured to be paired.

10. A method to produce an encrypted operational key, the method comprising:

receiving a first transmission containing a certificate;

verifying the authenticity of the certificate;

after verifying authenticity of the certificate, executing a public key agreement protocol to generate a first common secret encryption key;

receiving a second transmission containing an encrypted first public key, wherein the encrypted first public key is encrypted by the first common secret encryption key;

using the first common secret encryption key to decrypt the encrypted first public key;

after decrypting the first public key, executing a public key agreement protocol to generate a second common secret encryption key;

generating an operational key;

encrypting the operational key using the second common secret encryption key; and

transmit the encrypted operational key.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein verifying authenticity of the certificate comprises using a second public key.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein:

the certificate is associated with a vehicle dealer;

the first public key is associated with a key fob device to which the control unit is configured to be paired; and

the second public key is associated with a vehicle manufacturer.

13. The method of claim 10, wherein verifying authenticity of the certificate includes determining that the certificate is not on a certificate revocation list.

14. The method of claim 10, wherein the operation key is generated as a random number.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein the random number is a 128-bit random number.

16. The method of claim 10, wherein at least one of the public key agreement protocol executed to generate the first common secret encryption key and the public key agreement protocol executed to generate the second common secret encryption key is one of an Elliptical Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement protocol or an Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) key agreement protocol.