Securely sharing a transport layer security session with one or more trusted devices

• US 10,320,842 B1
• Filed: 03/24/2017
• Issued: 06/11/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 03/24/2017
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: CA, Inc. (d/b/a CA Technologies) (Broadcom, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Symantec Corporation (NortonLifeLock Inc.)
• Inventors: Du Toit, Roelof N., Robbin, Noah Z., Wells, David
• Primary Examiner(s): Holder, Bradley W
• Application Number:
  US15/468,895
• Time in Patent Office: 809 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0464 using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/141 Setup of application sessions admission control or resource allocation in data switching networks H04L47/70
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/146 Markers for unambiguous identification of a particular session, e.g. session cookie or URL-encoding
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 69/326 in the transport layer [OSI layer 4] H04L69/16 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Abstract

Securely sharing a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session with one or more trusted devices. In one embodiment, a method may include establishing a TLS session between a client device and a server device, communicating encrypted messages that are encrypted using encryption keys between the client device and the server device, and intercepting and decrypting one or more of the encrypted messages at a trusted device using the encryption keys. In this embodiment, the establishing of the TLS session may include negotiating a master secret, establishing a secure channel between the trusted device and the client device or the server device, sending, from the client device or the server device, the master secret to the trusted device over the secure channel, and employing the master secret at the client device, at the server device, and at the trusted device to generate, for the TLS session, the encryption keys.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method for securely sharing a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session with a chain of trusted devices, the method comprising:

establishing a TLS session between a client device and a server device, the establishing of the TLS session comprising;

negotiating a master secret for the TLS session that is known to both the client device and the server device,

establishing a chain of secure channels between a chain of trusted devices and the client device or the server device, the chain of trusted devices being communicatively positioned between the client device and the server device,

sending, from the client device or the server device, the master secret to the chain of trusted devices over the chain of secure channels, and

employing the master secret at the client device, at the server device, and at the chain of trusted devices to generate, for the TLS session, encryption keys;

after establishment of the TLS session, communicating encrypted messages, that are encrypted using the encryption keys, between the client device and the server device; and

during the communicating of the encrypted messages, intercepting and decrypting one or more of the encrypted messages at one or more of the trusted devices in the chain of trusted devices using the encryption keys.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein either the client device or the server device is a Man in the Middle (MITM) device acting as the client device or acting as the server device and is communicatively positioned between the client device and another server device or communicatively positioned between the server device and another client device.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is a TLS session-specific channel that only exists during the establishment of the TLS session.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is a Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) channel.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the establishing of each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is accomplished using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein the establishing of each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is accomplished using a One Round Trip Time (1-RTT) TLS 1.3 handshake.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the intercepting and the decrypting of the one or more of the encrypted messages at the one or more of the trusted devices in the chain of trusted devices is accomplished without interrupting the communicating of the one or more of the encrypted messages between the client device and the server device, without modifying the one or more of the encrypted messages, and without re-encrypting the one or more of the encrypted messages.

8. One or more non-transitory computer-readable media comprising one or more computer-readable instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of one or more computing devices, cause the one or more computing devices to:

establish a Transport Layer Security (TLS) session between a client device and a server device, the establishing of the TLS session comprising;

negotiating a master secret for the TLS session that is known to both the client device and the server device,

establishing a chain of secure channels between a chain of trusted devices and the client device or the server device, the chain of trusted devices being communicatively positioned between the client device and the server device,

sending, from the client device or the server device, the master secret to the chain of trusted devices over the chain of secure channels, and

employing the master secret at the client device, at the server device, and at the chain of trusted devices to generate, for the TLS session, encryption keys;

after establishment of the TLS session, communicate encrypted messages, that are encrypted using the encryption keys, between the client device and the server device; and

during the communicating of the encrypted messages, intercept and decrypt one or more of the encrypted messages at one or more of the trusted devices in the chain of trusted devices using the encryption keys.

9. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 8, wherein either the client device or the server device is a Man in the Middle (MITM) device acting as the client device or acting as the server device and is communicatively positioned between the client device and another server device or communicatively positioned between the server device and another client device.

10. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 8, wherein each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is a TLS session-specific channel that only exists during the establishment of the TLS session.

11. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 10, wherein each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is a Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) channel.

12. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 11, wherein the establishing of each of the secure channels in the chain of secure channels is accomplished using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange or is accomplished using a One Round Trip Time (1-RTT) TLS 1.3 handshake.

13. The one or more non-transitory computer-readable media of claim 8, wherein the intercepting and the decrypting of the one or more of the encrypted messages at the one or more of the trusted devices in the chain of trusted devices is accomplished without interrupting the communicating of the one or more of the encrypted messages between the client device and the server device, without modifying the one or more of the encrypted messages, and without re-encrypting the one or more of the encrypted messages.