Rewritable blockchain

• US 10,348,707 B2
• Filed: 05/04/2018
• Issued: 07/09/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 05/23/2016
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Accenture Global Solutions Limited (Accenture PLC), Lumen Patent Firm, Inc.
• Original Assignee: Accenture Global Solutions Limited (Accenture PLC)
• Inventors: Ateniese, Giuseppe, Chiaramonte, Michael T., Treat, David, Magri, Bernardo, Venturi, Daniele
• Primary Examiner(s): Schwartz, Darren B
• Application Number:
  US15/971,777
• Publication Number:
  US 20180254887A1
• Time in Patent Office: 431 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/53 by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/64 Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0619 in relation to data integrity, e.g. data losses, bit errors
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0622 in relation to access
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0659 Command handling arrangements, e.g. command buffers, queues, command scheduling
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0673 Single storage device
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/46 Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0618 Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0637 Modes of operation, e.g. cipher block chaining [CBC], electronic codebook [ECB] or Galois/counter mode [GCM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0643 Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3221 interactive zero-knowledge proofs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 : involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/50 : using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Abstract

A system includes circuitry for rewriting blockchains in a validity-preserving operation. In some cases, using a key secret held by a trusted party. In some cases, the blockchains may include a series of blocks secured integrity codes that may prevent non-tamper-evident rewrites by non-trusted parties that are not in possession of the key secret. In some cases, the key may allow valid but tamper-evident rewrites of the blockchain by trusted entities. In some cases, integrity outputs may be generated from the integrity codes based on the content of the previous blocks in the series such that attempts by untrusted parties to replace a block may be detected through coding-inconsistencies with other blocks.

Claims

1. A system comprising:

a memory configured to store a data-tamper-protected blockchain,

the data-tamper-protected blockchain including multiple blocks, each of the multiple blocks data-tamper-protected by a respective integrity output stored within the data-tamper-protected blockchain, the multiple blocks including;

a subsequent block and a previous block,

the previous block including;

a previous transaction record, and

a previous integrity output, and

the subsequent block including;

a subsequent transaction record, and

the respective integrity output for the previous block; and

rewrite circuitry configured to perform, on behalf of a trusted party and without altering the respective integrity output for the previous block, a validity-preserving rewrite to the previous block of the data-tamper-protected blockchain using a key secret controlled by the trusted party.

2. The system of claim 1, where content of the previous block is coding-consistent with the respective integrity output for the previous block.

3. The system of claim 1, where:

the data-tamper-protected blockchain is secured by an integrity code comprising a cryptographic hash, a chameleon hash, or both; and

the key secret is specific to the integrity code.

4. The system of claim 3, where:

the integrity code comprises the chameleon hash nested within the cryptographic hash; and

the key secret is specific to the chameleon hash.

5. The system of claim 1, where the rewrite circuitry is configured to perform the validity-preserving rewrite by rewriting original data in the previous block with a redacted version of the original data, supplemental data relative to the original data, or both.

6. The system of claim 1, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain is secured by an integrity code configured to prevent revelation of rewrite capabilities through inspection of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

7. The system of claim 1, where the rewrite circuitry is configured to use the validity-preserving rewrite of the previous block to effect a deletion of a specific block coding-consistent with an integrity code stored, prior to the validity-preserving rewrite, within the previous block.

8. The system of claim 1, where:

the key secret comprises multiple key secret portions that are combinable to form the key secret; and

the trusted party comprises multiple individually-untrusted parties, the individually-untrusted parties each in control an individual portion of the multiple key secret portions.

9. The system of claim 1, where the memory is further configured to store metadata configured to indicate rewritability of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

10. The system of claim 1, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain comprises a smart contract record.

11. The system of claim 1, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain comprises a transaction record for an account.

12. A method comprising:

obtaining, at rewrite circuitry and on behalf of a trusted party, a key secret for a data-tamper-protected blockchain,

the data-tamper-protected blockchain including multiple blocks, each of the multiple blocks;

includes a respective integrity code that data-tamper protects a respective previous block in the blockchain,

is data-tamper-protected by a respective subsequent block in the blockchain, and

includes a respective transaction record; and

at the rewrite circuitry and using the key secret, performing a validity-preserving rewrite to a selected block of the multiple blocks of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

13. The method of claim 12, where:

the data-tamper-protected blockchain is secured by an integrity code comprising a cryptographic hash, a chameleon hash, or both; and

the key secret is specific to the integrity code.

14. The method of claim 13, where:

the integrity code comprises the chameleon hash nested within the cryptographic hash; and

the key secret is specific to the chameleon hash.

15. The method of claim 12, where performing the validity-preserving rewrite comprises rewriting original data in the selected block with a redacted version of the original data, supplemental data relative to the original data, or both.

16. The method of claim 12, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain is secured by an integrity code configured to prevent revelation of rewrite capabilities through inspection of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

17. The method of claim 12, performing the validity-preserving rewrite of the selected block comprises effecting a deletion of a specific block coding-consistent with an integrity code stored, prior to the validity-preserving rewrite, within the selected block.

18. The method of claim 12, where:

the key secret comprises multiple key secret portions that are combinable to form the key secret; and

the trusted party comprises multiple individually-untrusted parties, the individually-untrusted parties each in control an individual portion of the multiple key secret portions.

19. The method of claim 12, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain is associated with metadata configured to indicate rewritability of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

20. The method of claim 12, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain comprises a smart contract record.

21. The method of claim 12, where the data-tamper-protected blockchain comprises a transaction record for an account.

22. A method comprising:

for a blockchain including tamper-evident content, performing, via rewrite circuitry and responsive to a command from a trusted party, a non-tamper-evident rewrite on a previous block of the blockchain that, prior to rewriting, is coding-consistent with a previous integrity output stored within a subsequent block of the blockchain, where;

the subsequent block includes a transaction record; and

the subsequent block is coding-consistent with a subsequent integrity output stored within the blockchain.

23. The method of claim 22, where performing the non-tamper-evident rewrite comprises accessing a key secret for the blockchain based on user account authority associated with the trusted party.

24. The method of claim 22, where the transaction record comprises a transaction record for an account.

25. A product comprising:

one or more machine-readable media other than a transitory signal; and

instructions stored on the one or more machine-readable media, the instructions configured to, when executed, cause a machine to;

at rewrite circuitry, obtain a key secret for a blockchain, the blockchain configured to maintain tamper-evident content, the blockchain including a series of blocks, each block of the series of blocks;

coding-consistent with a respective subsequent integrity output stored within a respective subsequent block of the blockchain;

including a respective transaction record; and

configured to store a respective previous integrity output that is coding-consistent with a respective previous block of the blockchain; and

perform, at rewrite circuitry and based on the key secret, a coding-consistent rewrite on a selected block of the series of blocks of the blockchain that, prior to rewriting, is coding-consistent with the respective subsequent integrity output for the selected block.

26. The product of claim 25, where the instructions are further configured to cause the machine to obtain the key secret by accessing the key secret based on user account authority associated with a trusted party.

27. The product of claim 25, where blockchain is associated with metadata configured to indicate rewritability of the blockchain.

28. The product of claim 25, where:

the key secret comprises multiple key secret portions that are combinable to form the key secret; and

the multiple key secret portions are controlled by multiple individually-untrusted parties, the individually-untrusted parties each in control an individual portion of the multiple key secret portions.

29. A method comprising:

obtaining, at rewrite circuitry and on behalf of a trusted party, a key secret for a data-tamper-protected blockchain,

the data-tamper-protected blockchain including multiple blocks, each of the multiple blocks;

includes a respective integrity code that data-tamper-protects a respective previous block in the blockchain,

is data-tamper-protected by a respective subsequent block in the blockchain, and

includes a respective event record; and

at the rewrite circuitry and using the key secret, performing a validity-preserving rewrite to a selected block of the multiple blocks of the data-tamper-protected blockchain.

30. A method comprising:

for a blockchain including tamper-evident content, performing, via rewrite circuitry and responsive to a command from a trusted party, a non-tamper-evident rewrite on a previous block of the blockchain that, prior to rewriting, is coding-consistent with a previous integrity output stored within a subsequent block of the blockchain, where;

the subsequent block includes an event record; and

the subsequent block is coding-consistent with a subsequent integrity output stored within the blockchain.