Secure session communication between a mobile device and a base station

• US 10,412,581 B2
• Filed: 02/14/2017
• Issued: 09/10/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 02/14/2017
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Ford Global Technologies, LLC (Ford Motor Company)
• Original Assignee: Ford Global Technologies, LLC (Ford Motor Company)
• Inventors: Smyth, Cameron, Southern, Robert James, Van Wiemeersch, John Robert, Erkkila, David Ray, Westra, Mike Raymond, Caushi, Aldi, Turner, John William, Shahidehpour, Bobak, Elangovan, Vivekanandh
• Primary Examiner(s): Bayou, Yonas A
• Application Number:
  US15/432,886
• Publication Number:
  US 20180234843A1
• Time in Patent Office: 938 Days
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/068 using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for controlling usage of secret information H04L9/088
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/141 Setup of application sessions admission control or resource allocation in data switching networks H04L47/70
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0643 Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/03 Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/40 for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/80 Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/10 Connection setup

Abstract

A vehicle includes: (i) a main telematics module, (ii) a connectivity module including antenna(s) and processor(s). The connectivity module is configured to: (a) authenticate a mobile device via a vehicle-access-key (VAK); (b), if (a), issue an ephemeral-session-key (DSK) to the mobile device; (c), if (b), establish an active session with the mobile device; (d) encrypt all messages to the mobile device with the VAK during (a) and with the DSK during (c). The connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK upon expiration of a predetermined time interval.

Claims

1. A computing system comprising:

a main telematics module,

a connectivity module comprising antenna(s), processor(s), the connectivity module configured to;

(a) authenticate a mobile device via a vehicle-access-key (VAK);

(b), if (a), issue an ephemeral-session-key (DSK) to the mobile device;

(c), if (b), establish an active session with the mobile device;

(d) encrypt messages to the mobile device with the VAK during (a) and with the DSK during (c); and

(e) maintain the active session with the mobile device only when a signed challenge message periodically transmitted by the connectivity module is satisfied with a signed response from the mobile device within a countdown, the countdown resetting each time the signed response is received from the mobile device.

2. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK.

3. The computing system of claim 2, wherein the connectivity module is configured to automatically revoke the DSK upon expiration of a predetermined time interval.

4. The computing system of claim 3, wherein the time interval begins during (b).

5. The computing system of claim 4, wherein the connectivity module is configured to during (c), reject messages from the mobile device encrypted with the VAK but accept messages from another mobile device encrypted with a different VAK.

6. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to begin (a) upon receiving an unencrypted message comprising a valid VAK ID and a valid VAK hash.

7. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to include an unencrypted VAK authentication code in messages including VAK encrypted data.

8. The computing system of claim 7, wherein the connectivity module is configured to include an unencrypted DSK hash in messages including DSK encrypted data.

9. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to break the DSK into a first block (DSK1) and a second block (DSK2).

10. The computing system of claim 9, wherein both of DSK1 and DSK2 are necessary to compute DSK.

11. The computing system of claim 9, wherein the connectivity module is configured to break the DSK by factoring the DSK such that DSK1 is a first factor and DSK2 is a second factor.

12. The computing system of claim 9, wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK1 in a first message and DSK2 in a later second message.

13. The computing system of claim 12, wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK2 in reply to a valid response from the mobile device.

14. The computing system of claim 13, wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit an encrypted nonce to the mobile device.

15. The computing system of claim 14, wherein to be valid, the response must include a value based on the nonce.

16. The computing system of claim 15, wherein the connectivity module is configured to transmit DSK assembly instructions with DSK1 or DSK2.

17. The computing system of claim 16, wherein the connectivity module is configured to increment the nonce and transmit the incremented nonce to the mobile device prior to (c).

18. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the VAK is a first VAK, the DSK is a first DSK and the connectivity module is configured to store multiple VAKs and multiple DSKs.

19. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to revoke the DSK upon receiving a message from the mobile device encrypted with the VAK during (c).

20. The computing system of claim 1, wherein the connectivity module is configured to include unencrypted mobile device metadata in each message to the mobile device, the metadata enabling the mobile device to route the message.