Digital security bubble

• US 10,432,597 B1
• Filed: 02/21/2018
• Issued: 10/01/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 07/16/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Wickr Inc. (Amazon.com, Inc.)
• Inventors: Howell, Christopher, Statica, Robert, Coppa, Kara Lynn
• Primary Examiner(s): Reza, Mohammad W
• Application Number:
  US15/900,897
• Time in Patent Office: 587 Days
• Field of Search: 713171
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/62 Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/84 output devices, e.g. displays or monitors
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2203/04104 Multi-touch detection in digitiser, i.e. details about the simultaneous detection of a plurality of touching locations, e.g. multiple fingers or pen and finger
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2203/04808 Several contacts: gestures triggering a specific function, e.g. scrolling, zooming, right-click, when the user establishes several contacts with the surface simultaneously; e.g. using several fingers or a combination of fingers and pen
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0481 based on specific properties of the displayed interaction object or a metaphor-based environment, e.g. interaction with desktop elements like windows or icons, or assisted by a cursor's changing behaviour or appearance
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0488 using a touch-screen or digitiser, e.g. input of commands through traced gestures
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/04886 by partitioning the display area of the touch-screen or the surface of the digitising tablet into independently controllable areas, e.g. virtual keyboards or menus
• CPC Class Codes: G06V 20/64 Three-dimensional objects
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/04 for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0421 Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/08 for authentication of entities cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0853 using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving additional secure or trusted devices H04L9/3234
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/08 Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting key management in a packet data network H04L63/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0825 using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 : involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 : involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 : using cryptographic hash functions

Abstract

A digital security bubble encapsulation is disclosed. A public key and a device identifier of at least one recipient is requested from a first server. A message containing one or more components is encrypted using a symmetric key. The symmetric key is encrypted with a public key received in response to the request. The encrypted message, the encrypted symmetric key, and the device identifier are encapsulated in a digital security bubble encapsulation. The digital security bubble encapsulation is transmitted to a second server.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

receiving, at a first device, a notification of an encrypted encapsulation from a security platform;

obtaining, by the first device, the encrypted encapsulation from the security platform in response to receiving the notification, wherein the encrypted encapsulation includes an encrypted message, an encrypted first key, and a device identifier associated with an intended recipient;

decrypting, by the first device, the encrypted encapsulation;

comparing, by the first device, the received device identifier with a local device identifier;

decrypting, by the first device, the encrypted first key using a private key of the intended recipient in response to a determination that the received device identifier matches the local device identifier;

decrypting, by the first device, the encrypted message using the first key to produce a decrypted message; and

providing, by the first device, the decrypted message to a recipient.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the device identifier is based at least in part on at least one hardware identifier.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the first key is a symmetric key.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the encrypted encapsulation includes a plurality of encrypted first keys.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein each of the plurality of encrypted first keys is encrypted with a second key associated with an intended recipient.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the encapsulation includes at least one message control option selected from the group consisting of message lifetime, sharing, saving, forwarding, recalling, and deleting.

7. The method of claim 6, comprising:

deleting, by the first device, the decrypted message after an expiration of the lifetime option.

8. A non-transitory computer-readable medium comprising instructions that, when executed by a processor, perform the steps of:

receiving a notification of an encrypted encapsulation from a security platform;

obtaining the encrypted encapsulation from the security platform in response to receiving the notification, wherein the encrypted encapsulation includes an encrypted message, an encrypted first key, and a device identifier associated with an intended recipient;

decrypting the encrypted encapsulation;

comparing the received device identifier with a local device identifier;

decrypting the encrypted first key using a private key of the intended recipient in response to a determination that the received device identifier matches the local device identifier;

decrypting the encrypted message using the first key to produce a decrypted message; and

providing the decrypted message to a recipient.

9. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the device identifier is based at least in part on at least one hardware identifier.

10. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the first key is a symmetric key.

11. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, wherein the encrypted encapsulation includes a plurality of encrypted first keys.

12. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 11, wherein each of the plurality of encrypted first keys is encrypted with a second key associated with an intended recipient.

13. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 8, comprising computer instructions for:

deleting the decrypted message after an expiration of a lifetime option included in the encrypted encapsulation.