Device, system, and method for protecting cryptographic keying material

• US 10,438,005 B2
• Filed: 04/10/2017
• Issued: 10/08/2019
• Est. Priority Date: 04/10/2017
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Wind River Systems Incorporated (Aptiv PLC)
• Original Assignee: Wind River Systems Incorporated (Aptiv PLC)
• Inventors: Baker, Arlen
• Primary Examiner(s): Dinh, Minh
• Application Number:
  US15/483,576
• Publication Number:
  US 20180293390A1
• Time in Patent Office: 911 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/57 Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/6218 to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/86 Secure or tamper-resistant housings
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/127 Trusted platform modules [TPM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB

Abstract

A device, system, and method protects cryptographic keying material. The method is performed at an electronic device including a plurality of components housed in an enclosure. The method includes determining a tamper state of the enclosure, the tamper state being one of a secure state in which the enclosure has not been physically tampered or an unsecure state in which the enclosure has been physically tampered. When the tamper state is the secure state, the method includes associating a first value with the application. When the tamper state is the unsecure state, the method includes associating a second value with the application. The first value is configured to enable access to the data in the data storage unit. The second value prevents access to the data in the data storage unit.

Claims

1. A method, comprising:

at an electronic device including a plurality of components housed in an enclosure, the components comprising a data storage unit storing data and a processor configured to execute an application configured to access the data in the data storage unit;

determining a tamper state of the enclosure, the tamper state being one of a secure state in which the enclosure has not been physically tampered or an unsecure state in which the enclosure has been physically tampered;

when the tamper state is the secure state, associating a first value with the application; and

when the tamper state is the unsecure state, associating a second value with the application,

wherein the first value is configured to enable access to the data in the data storage unit, and

wherein the second value prevents access to the data in the data storage unit.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the electronic device utilizes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the first and second values are Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the application corresponds to one of the PCRs of the TPM.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the associating the first value with the application comprises:

receiving a prior PCR value associated with an immediately previous PCR relative to the one of the PCRs;

generating an extension data based on a unique binding key associated with the TPM; and

generating the first value based on the prior PCR value and the extension data.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein the associating the second value with the application comprises:

receiving the prior PCR value associated with an immediately previous PCR relative to the one of the PCRs;

generating an alternate extension data that is different from the extension data; and

generating the second value based on the prior PCR value and the alternate extension data.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the determining the tamper state of the enclosure comprises:

receiving a tamper signal from a tamper mechanism coupled to the enclosure; and

determining the tamper state based on the tamper signal.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the tamper signal is one of a Boolean value, a calculated value, a random value, and a repeatable value.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the data storage unit is a Black Key Database storing cryptographic keying material.

10. The method of claim 4, wherein the one of the PCRs is one of a PCR #8 to #23.

11. An electronic device, comprising:

an enclosure;

a data storage unit housed in the enclosure, the data storage unit storing data; and

a processor configured to execute an application configured to access the data in the data storage unit, the processor further determining a tamper state of the enclosure, the tamper state being one of a secure state in which the enclosure has not been physically tampered or an unsecure state in which the enclosure has been physically tampered, when the tamper state is the secure state, the processor associating a first value with the application, and when the tamper state is the unsecure state, the processor associating a second value with the application,

wherein the first value is configured to enable access to the data in the data storage unit, and

wherein the second value prevents access to the data in the data storage unit.

12. The electronic device of claim 11, wherein the electronic device utilizes a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).

13. The electronic device of claim 12, wherein the first and second values are Platform Configuration Register (PCR) values.

14. The electronic device of claim 13, wherein the application corresponds to one of the PCRs of the TPM.

15. The electronic device of claim 14, wherein, for the associating the first value with the application, the processor:

receives a prior PCR value associated with an immediately previous PCR relative to the one of the PCRs;

generates an extension data based on a unique binding key associated with the TPM; and

generates the first value based on the prior PCR value and the extension data.

16. The electronic device of claim 15, wherein, for the associating the second value with the application, the processor:

receives the prior PCR value associated with an immediately previous PCR relative to the one of the PCRs;

generates an alternate extension data that is different from the extension data; and

generates the second value based on the prior PCR value and the alternate extension data.

17. The electronic device of claim 11, further comprising:

a tamper mechanism coupled to the enclosure, the tamper mechanism generating a tamper signal, the tamper signal being transmitted to the processor,

wherein the processor determines the tamper state based on the tamper signal.

18. The electronic device of claim 17, wherein the tamper signal is one of a Boolean value, a calculated value, a random value, and a repeatable value.

19. The electronic device of claim 11, wherein the data storage unit is a Black Key Database storing cryptographic keying material.

20. A method, comprising:

at an electronic device including a plurality of components housed in an enclosure, the components comprising a data storage unit storing data and a processor configured to execute an application configured to access the data in the data storage unit;

receiving a value from the application, the value being one of a first value and a second value, the first value being indicative of a tamper state of the enclosure being a secure state in which the enclosure has not been physically tampered, the second value being indicative of the tamper state of the enclosure being an unsecure state in which the enclosure has been physically tampered;

when the first value is received, unsealing the data storage unit for the application to access the data; and

when the second value is received, preventing the application from unsealing the data storage unit.