Detecting of navigation data spoofing based on signal strength variance
First Claim
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1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
- receiving, by a computer system of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), global positioning system (GPS) data, the computer system configured to direct a flight of the UAV to deliver an item from a source to a destination based at least in part on the GPS data;
determining, by the computer system, a received signal strength of the GPS data;
determining, by the computer system, an expected signal strength corresponding to the GPS data;
comparing, by the computer system, the received signal strength of the GPS data to the expected signal strength;
determining, by the computer system, a discrepancy between the received signal strength the expected signal strength;
determining, by the computer system, that the GPS data is spoofed based at least in part on the discrepancy; and
directing, by the computer system, a portion of the flight independently of the GPS data that is spoofed.
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Abstract
Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous/non-autonomous operation of a manned/unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, a first set of data may be provided from a source external to a manned/unmanned vehicle. A second set of data may be accessed. This second set may be provided from a source internal or external to the manned/unmanned vehicle and may be associated with the same autonomous/non-autonomous operation. The two sets may be compared to determine whether the first set of data may be trusted or not. If untrusted, a corrective action may be performed.
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Citations
20 Claims
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1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
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receiving, by a computer system of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), global positioning system (GPS) data, the computer system configured to direct a flight of the UAV to deliver an item from a source to a destination based at least in part on the GPS data; determining, by the computer system, a received signal strength of the GPS data; determining, by the computer system, an expected signal strength corresponding to the GPS data; comparing, by the computer system, the received signal strength of the GPS data to the expected signal strength; determining, by the computer system, a discrepancy between the received signal strength the expected signal strength; determining, by the computer system, that the GPS data is spoofed based at least in part on the discrepancy; and directing, by the computer system, a portion of the flight independently of the GPS data that is spoofed. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4)
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5. One or more non-transitory computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with a computer system configured to direct a flight of a UAV to deliver an item from a source to a destination based at least in part on external navigation data, cause the computer system to at least:
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receive the external navigation data from a source external to the UAV; determine a received signal strength of the external navigation data; determine an expected signal strength corresponding to the external navigation data; determining that the external navigation data is spoofed based at least in part on calculating a discrepancy between the received signal strength and the expected signal strength; and directing a portion of the flight independently of the external navigation data that is spoofed. - View Dependent Claims (6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)
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12. A system associated with an unmanned vehicle, the system comprising:
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one or more processors; and one or more non-transitory computer readable media comprising instructions that, when executed with the one or more processors, cause the system to at least; receive navigation data associated with the unmanned vehicle, the navigation data indicating a current location of the unmanned vehicle; determine a current signal strength of the navigation data; obtain historical navigation data, the historical navigation data comprising signal strengths historically encountered along a travel route comprising the current location; determine an expected signal strength from the historical navigation data, the expected signal strength corresponding to the current location; determine that a conflict exists between the current signal strength of the navigation data and the expected signal strength; determine that the navigation data is untrusted based at least in part on the conflict; and perform a corrective action based at least in part on the determination that the navigation data is untrusted. - View Dependent Claims (13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20)
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Specification