Secure protocol for peer-to-peer network

• US 10,575,174 B2
• Filed: 01/18/2017
• Issued: 02/25/2020
• Est. Priority Date: 12/16/2010
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC (Microsoft Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC (Microsoft Corporation)
• Inventors: Hassan, Amer A., Desai, Mitesh K., Gupta, Yatharth, Filgueiras, Henrique
• Primary Examiner(s): Chen, Shin-Hon (Eric)
• Application Number:
  US15/409,383
• Publication Number:
  US 20170127282A1
• Time in Patent Office: 1,133 Days
• Field of Search: None
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/065 for group communications cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management involving conference or group key H04L9/0833
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/083 using passwords cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/104 Peer-to-peer [P2P] networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/1046 Joining mechanisms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/1093 Some peer nodes performing special functions
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/083 involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3242 involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/062 Pre-authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/18 Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks

Abstract

A wireless computing device operating as a controller of a peer-to-peer group configured to generate unique master keys for each device joining the group. The wireless computing device may use the unique master keys to selectively remove remote devices from the group such that the remote device cannot later rejoin the group. Other remote devices, each possessing a master key that remains valid, can disconnect from the group and later reconnect to the group without express user action. To support such behavior, the wireless device may provide a user interface through which a user may manage connected remote devices by providing commands to selectively disconnect or remove remote devices from the group.

Claims

1. A method of managing wireless communications, the method comprising:

operating a wireless user device as a member of a peer-to-peer group, including, at the wireless user device;

identifying a first remote device that is attempting to join the peer-to-peer group, including obtaining a media access control (MAC) address from the first remote device;

handshaking with the first remote device, including;

determining, based on the MAC address, whether a pairwise master key of the first remote device is valid; and

in response to determining that the pairwise master key of the first remote device is valid, generating a transient key for the first remote device based on the pairwise master key of the first remote device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

removing the first remote device from the peer-to-peer group, including;

invalidating the pairwise master key of the first remote device; and

invalidating the transient key generated for the first remote device.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

after invalidating the pairwise master key of the first remote device and invalidating the transient key generated for the first remote device, exchanging data with another remote device that is a member of the peer-to-peer group.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein:

operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes;

storing the pairwise master key of the first remote device in a key store; and

invalidating the pairwise master key of the first remote device comprises;

deleting the pairwise master key of the first remote device from the key store.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein:

operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes;

receiving a user request to remove the first remote device from the peer-to-peer group; and

the invalidating of the pairwise master key of the first remote device is in response to the user request.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

performing a group owner negotiation with the first remote device.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

at a first time, disconnecting the first remote device from the peer-to-peer group; and

at a second time, reconnecting the first remote device to the peer-to-peer group, the reconnecting comprising;

authenticating the first remote device based on the pairwise master key of the first remote device; and

generating another transient key based on the pairwise master key of the first remote device.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein operating the wireless user device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

transmitting the generated transient key to the first remote device; and

receiving a communication from the first remote device, wherein the communication was encrypted by the first remote device using the generated transient key.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein determining whether the pairwise master key of a first remote device is valid includes:

performing a handshake in accordance with a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA2) protocol.

10. At least one computer readable storage medium comprising a memory, or a disk, storing computer executable instructions for performing operations, the operations comprising:

operating a first user device as a controller for a peer-to-peer wireless network, including, at the first user device;

determining that a second user device is attempting to join the peer-to-peer group, including obtaining a media access control (MAC) address from the second user device;

handshaking with the second user device, including;

determining, based on the MAC address whether a pairwise master key transmitted to the first user device by the second user device is valid; and

in response to determining that the pairwise master key transmitted to the first user device by the second user device is valid, issuing a transient key to the second user device based on the pairwise master key of the first remote device.

11. The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein the operations further comprise:

receiving a communication from the second user device, wherein the communication was encrypted by the second user device using the issued transient key.

12. The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein operating the first user device as the controller for the peer-to-peer wireless network further includes:

removing the second user device from the peer-to-peer wireless network, including;

invalidating a pairwise master key for the second user device; and

invalidating the transient key issued to the second user device.

13. The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 12, wherein:

operating the first user device as the controller for the peer-to-peer wireless network further includes;

receiving a user request to remove the second user device from the peer-to-peer wireless network; and

the invalidating of the pairwise master key for the second wireless device is in response to the user request.

14. The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein operating the first user device as the controller for the peer-to-peer wireless network further includes:

at a first time, disconnecting the second user device from the peer-to-peer wireless network; and

at a second time, reconnecting the second user device to the peer-to-peer wireless network, including;

authenticating the second user device based on a pairwise master key transmitted to the first user device by a second user device in association with an attempt by the second user device to reconnect to the peer-to-peer wireless network; and

issuing another transient key for the peer-to-peer wireless network to the second user device.

15. The at least one computer readable storage medium of claim 10, wherein determining whether the pairwise master key transmitted to the first user device by the second user device is valid includes:

performing a process in accordance with a Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA2) protocol.

16. A user computing device comprising:

a radio;

at least one processor; and

computer storage medium storing computer-executable instructions for execution on the at least on processor, the computer-executable instructions for causing the user computing device to perform operations, the operations including;

operating the user computing device as a member of a peer-to-peer group, including, at the user computing device;

identifying a first remote device that is attempting to join the peer-to-peer group, including obtaining a media access control (MAC) address from the first remote device;

handshaking with the first remote device, including;

determining, based on the MAC address, whether a pairwise master key of the first remote device is valid; and

in response to determining that the pairwise master key of the first remote device is valid, generating a transient key for the first remote device based on the pairwise master key of the first remote device.

17. The computing device of claim 16, wherein operating the user computing device as the member of the peer-to-peer group further includes:

removing the first remote device from the peer-to-peer group, including;

invalidating the pairwise key of the first remote device; and

invalidating the transient key generated for the first remote device.

18. The computing device of claim 16, wherein the operations further include:

invalidating the pairwise master key for remote device without invalidating a pairwise master key for another remote device.

19. The computing device of claim 18, wherein invalidation of the pairwise master key for the other remote device removes the other remote device from the peer-to-peer group.

20. The computing device of claim 16, wherein the operations further include:

receiving a communication from the second user device, wherein the communication was encrypted by the second user device using the issued transient key.