Key derivation for a module using an embedded universal integrated circuit card

• US 10,700,856 B2
• Filed: 11/27/2018
• Issued: 06/30/2020
• Est. Priority Date: 11/19/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: John A. Nix
• Original Assignee: Network-1 Technologies, Inc.
• Inventors: Nix, John A.
• Primary Examiner(s): Cervetti, David Garcia
• Application Number:
  US16/201,401
• Publication Number:
  US 20190097794A1
• Time in Patent Office: 581 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/33 using certificates
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/35 communicating wirelessly
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2105 Dual mode as a secondary aspect
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2115 Third party
• CPC Class Codes: H04J 11/00 Orthogonal multiplex systems, e.g. using WALSH codesH04J13/00 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2854 Wide area networks, e.g. public data networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/72 Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0272 Virtual private networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0435 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for symmetric key encryption H04L9/06
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/045 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply hybrid encryption, i.e. combination of symmetric and asymmetric encryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements using a plurality of keys or algorithms H04L9/14
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0464 using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/123 : received data contents, e.g. message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/166 : at the transport layer
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/04 : specially adapted for terminals or networks with limited capabilities; specially adapted for terminal portability
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 : involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0662 : with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0816 : Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 : involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 : with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/085 : Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 : Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 : Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 : Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 : involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3239 : involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 : using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/02 : Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/03 : Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 : Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/06 : Authentication
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 : Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 40/005 : Routing actions in the presence of nodes in sleep or doze mode
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0216 : using a pre-established activity schedule, e.g. traffic indication frame
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0235 : where the received signal is a power saving command
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0277 : according to available power supply, e.g. switching off when a low battery condition is detected
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/27 : Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/082 : for traffic bypassing of mobility servers, e.g. location registers, home PLMNs or home agents
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 8/205 : Transfer to or from user equipment or user record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/04 : Network layer protocols, e.g. mobile IP [Internet Protocol]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/12 : WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/12 : Access point controller devices
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 30/70 : in wireless communication networks

Abstract

A module with an embedded universal integrated circuit card (eUICC) can include a received eUICC profile and a set of cryptographic algorithms. The received eUICC profile can include an initial shared secret key for authentication with a wireless network. The module can receive a key K network token and send a key K module token to the wireless network. The module can use the key K network token, a derived module private key, and a key derivation function to derive a secret shared network key K that supports communication with the wireless network. The wireless network can use the received key K module token, a network private key, and the key derivation function in order to derive the same secret shared network key K derived by the module. The module and the wireless network can subsequently use the mutually derived key K to communicate using traditional wireless network standards.

Claims

1. A subscription manager system for distributing a profile to a module comprising:

(1) one or more processors; and

(2) first non-transitory computer-readable media operatively connected to the one or more processors and having stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a method comprising steps of;

(a) recording, in second non-transitory computer-readable media, a digital signature algorithm comprising an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm;

(b) recording, in the second non-transitory computer-readable media, a module identity, a server private key, and a server certificate for a corresponding server public key, wherein the server public key and the server private key use the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm;

(c) recording, in the second non-transitory computer-readable media, a symmetric ciphering algorithm, wherein the symmetric ciphering algorithm comprises an Advanced Encryption Standard with a 128 bit key length;

(d) receiving a certificate associated with the module from a module provider system associated with a module provider, wherein the certificate includes the module identity, a module public key, and cryptographic parameters;

(e) verifying the certificate associated with the module using a certificate authority;

(f) sending, to the module, the server certificate, wherein the module verifies the server certificate using a certificate authority public key stored by the module;

(g) receiving a challenge from the module;

(h) generating a network private key and a corresponding network public key, using a key pair generation algorithm and the cryptographic parameters;

(i) sending the generated network public key to the module;

(j) sending a digital signature and the challenge to the module, wherein the digital signature is generated using the server private key, the challenge, and the digital signature algorithm, wherein the module verifies the digital signature using at least the server public key;

(k) generating a mutually derived shared key using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman based on at least;

i. the module public key;

ii. the network private key; and

iii. the cryptographic parameters,

wherein the mutually derived shared key is derived by the module based on at least;

iv. a module private key associated with the module public key;

v. the network public key; and

vi. the cryptographic parameters;

(l) encrypting the profile using;

i. the symmetric ciphering algorithm, and

ii. the mutually derived shared key; and

(m) sending the encrypted profile, wherein the encrypted profile includes network access credentials for a wireless network.

2. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable media have stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a further step of:

(n) sending, to the module, the generated network public key after the module authenticates with a network associated with the subscription manager system.

3. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable media have stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a further step of:

(n) generating the network public key using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm based on a first elliptic curve, wherein the network public key is generated using the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm using the first elliptic curve.

4. The subscription manager system of claim 3, wherein the certificate associated with the module further comprises the first elliptic curve.

5. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable media have stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a further step of sending the generated network public key to the module without a certificate for the network public key.

6. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the network access credentials include an international mobile subscriber identity and a key K.

7. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the module receives the server certificate using a domain name and downloading the server public key.

8. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the module provider further services the module and loads an initial profile into the module, and wherein the encrypted profile is received by the module using the initial profile to connect with an initial wireless network.

9. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein prior to the step (2)(e), a server associated with the subscription manager system has recorded a pre-shared secret key, and the module has recorded the pre-shared secret key.

10. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the module includes an embedded universal integrated circuit card, and wherein the embedded universal integrated circuit card records in second memory within the embedded universal integrated circuit card the module private key and the profile.

11. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the first non-transitory computer-readable media have stored thereon machine-readable instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform a further step of:

(n) generating the mutually derived shared key using American National Standards Institute standard X-9.63.

12. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the sending step (2)(j) occurs before the generating step (2)(k).

13. The subscription manager system of claim 1, wherein the sending step (2)(j) occurs after the generating step (2)(k).