Secure provisioning of secrets into MPSoC devices using untrusted third-party systems

• US 10,706,179 B2
• Filed: 01/10/2018
• Issued: 07/07/2020
• Est. Priority Date: 01/10/2018
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: GE Digital Holdings LLC (GE Aerospace)
• Original Assignee: General Electric Company
• Inventors: Kepa, Krzysztof Michal, Wiseman, Willard Monten, Safford, David, Skeffington, Wesley Michael, Smith, II, William David
• Primary Examiner(s): Hirl, Joseph P
• Assistant Examiner(s): Gundry, Stephen T
• Application Number:
  US15/866,798
• Publication Number:
  US 20190213359A1
• Time in Patent Office: 909 Days
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/572 Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/73 by creating or determining hardware identification, e.g. serial numbers
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0662 with particular pseudorandom sequence generator
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0866 involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3278 using physically unclonable functions [PUF]

Abstract

The example embodiments are directed to a system and method for secure provisioning of secrets into MPSoC devices using untrusted third-party systems. In one example, the method includes generating a random number sequence from a true random number generator to produce secret information, storing the secret information in an on-chip secure storage, encrypting, in a device and using public key encryption, the secret information to generate an encrypted message, and transmitting the encrypted message to a third-party system.

Claims

1. A computer-implemented method comprising:

generating, by a multiprocessor system-on-a-chip, a random number sequence from a true random number generator to produce secret information;

storing the secret information in an on-chip secure storage of the multiprocessor system-on-a-chip;

encrypting, in a device of the multiprocessor system-on-a-chip and using public key encryption, the secret information to generate an encrypted message; and

transmitting the encrypted message, from the multiprocessor system-on-a-chip, to a third-party system, wherein the secret information is inaccessible to the third-party system prior to the encrypting.

2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the secure storage is one of a one-time programmable electronic fuses (eFUSES), a battery-backed RAM (BBRAM), and an electronic circuit.

3. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising, on system startup, commencing monitoring by a tamper detection circuit arranged to detect tamper events.

4. The computer-implemented method of claim 3, further comprising, prior to commencing monitoring by the tamper detection circuit, performing a built-in self-test (BIST) on the device.

5. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to system startup:

commencing a verified boot of a processor on a platform;

determining whether firmware is digitally signed and authorized to be loaded on the processor;

in a case where the firmware is digitally signed and authorized, loading and executing the firmware on the processor; and

in a case where the digitally signed firmware is not authorized, failing to boot the platform.

6. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to encrypting the secret information, retrieving environmental log data indicating an environmental context during production of the secret information and storage of the secret information in the on-chip secure storage.

7. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the random number sequence is processed using a physical unclonable function (PUF).

8. A computing system comprising:

a memory storing instructions; and

a processor configured to execute the instructions, wherein the executed instructions cause the processor to;

generate a random number sequence from a true random number generator to produce secret information;

store the secret information in an on-chip secure storage;

seal the secret information by encrypting, in a device and using public key encryption, the secret information; and

transmit the sealed secret information to a third-party system, wherein the secret information is inaccessible to the third-party system prior to the encrypting.

9. The computing system of claim 8, wherein the secure storage is one of a one-time programmable electronic fuses (eFUSES), a battery-backed RAM (BBRAM), and an electronic circuit.

10. The computing system of claim 8, further comprising, on system startup, commencing monitoring by a tamper detection circuit arranged to detect tamper events.

11. The computing system of claim 10, further comprising, prior to commencing monitoring by the tamper detection circuit, performing a built-in self-test (BIST) on the device.

12. The computing system of claim 8, further comprising, prior to system startup:

commencing a verified boot of a processor on a platform;

determining whether firmware is digitally signed and authorized to be loaded on the processor;

in a case where the firmware is digitally signed and authorized, loading and executing the firmware on the processor; and

in a case where the digitally signed firmware is not authorized, failing to boot the platform.

13. The computing system of claim 8, further comprising, prior to encrypting the secret information, retrieving environmental log data indicating an environmental context during production of the secret information and storage of the secret information in the on-chip secure storage.

14. The computing system of claim 8, wherein the random number sequence is processed using a physical unclonable function (PUF).

15. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored therein instructions that when executed cause a computer to perform a method comprising:

generating a random number sequence from a true random number generator to produce secret information;

storing the secret information in an on-chip secure storage;

encrypting, in a device and using public key encryption, the secret information to generate an encrypted message; and

transmitting the encrypted message to a third-party system, wherein the secret information is inaccessible to the third-party system prior to the encrypting.

16. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the secure storage is one of a one-time programmable electronic fuses (eFUSES), a battery-backed RAM (BBRAM), and an electronic circuit.

17. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, further comprising, on system startup, commencing monitoring by a tamper detection circuit arranged to detect tamper events.

18. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 17, further comprising, prior to commencing monitoring by the tamper detection circuit, performing a built-in self-test (BIST) on the device.

19. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, further comprising, prior to system startup:

commencing a verified boot of a processor on a platform;

determining whether firmware is digitally signed and authorized to be loaded on the processor;

in a case where the firmware is digitally signed and authorized, loading and executing the firmware on the processor; and

in a case where the digitally signed firmware is not authorized, failing to boot the platform.

20. The non-transitory computer-readable medium of claim 15, further comprising, prior to encrypting the secret information, retrieving environmental log data indicating an environmental context during production of the secret information and storage of the secret information in the on-chip secure storage.