Modifying message data and generating random number digital signature within computer chip

• US 20020016913A1
• Filed: 08/06/2001
• Published: 02/07/2002
• Est. Priority Date: 08/04/2000
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: First Data Corporation (Fiserv Incorporated)
• Original Assignee: First Data Corporation (Fiserv Incorporated)
• Inventors: Wheeler, Lynn Henry, Wheeler, Anne M.
• Application Number:
  US09/923,075
• Publication Number:
  US 20020016913A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/170
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/32 using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2113 Multi-level security, e.g. mandatory access control
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/00 Payment architectures, schemes or protocols apparatus for performing or posting payment transactions G07F7/08, G07F19/00; electronic cash registers G07G1/12
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/02 involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/04 Payment circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/0855 involving a third party
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/12 specially adapted for electronic shopping systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3558 Preliminary personalisation for transfer to user
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3674 involving authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3676 Balancing accounts
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3821 Electronic credentials
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3823 combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3825 Use of electronic signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3829 involving key management
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/385 using an alias or single-use codes
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/388 using mutual authentication without cards, e.g. challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/4014 Identity check for transactions
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40145 Biometric identity checks
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/403 : Solvency checks
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 : using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 50/188 : Electronic negotiation
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0886 : the card reader being portable for interacting with a POS or ECR in realizing a payment transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 : Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 : Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/42 : Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 : Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 : wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 : for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 : using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/083 : using passwords cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/12 : Applying verification of the received information cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 : involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures

Abstract

A method of generating a digital signature within a computer chip includes receiving data representing a message, and generating a digital signature for the message by modifying the message data with additional data, calculating a hash value of the modified message, and encrypting the hash value using a private key of a public-private key pair. The additional data includes data prestored within content searchable memory of the computer chip and a verification status of the computer chip. The verification status is identified out of a plurality of predefined verification statuses as a function of verification data input into the computer chip and data prestored within the computer chip. An identified verification status is used by one entity in determining risk regarding an electronic communication from another entity, especially where the electronic communication comprises a request and a digital signature generated by the computer chip.

Claims

1. A method of generating a digital signature within a computer chip, comprising receiving data representing a message and generating a digital signature for the message by:

(a) modifying the message data with additional data, and

(b) then encrypting said modified message data using a private key of a public-private key pair stored within the computer chip.

2. A method of generating a digital signature within a computer chip, comprising receiving data representing a message and generating a digital signature for the message by:

(a) modifying the message data by appending additional data thereto,

(b) calculating a hash value of said modified message data, and

(c) then encrypting said calculated hash value using a private key of a public-private key pair.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein said step of modifying comprises appending the additional data to the message data.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein said step of modifying comprises embedding the additional data within the message data.

5. The method of claim 2, wherein the additional data comprises data prestored within memory of the computer chip.

6. The method of claim 2, wherein the additional data represents a verification status of the device.

7. The method of claim 2, wherein the message data includes a field identifier corresponding to a field of data prestored within the memory of the computer chip, the field identifier having a null value, and wherein said step of modifying the message data comprises retrieving the value stored in the memory location identified by the field identifier and embedding said retrieved value in the message data with the field identifier.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the memory of the computer chip in which the additional data is stored is content searchable memory.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the message data comprises XML formatting.

10. A method for extracting user information from a computer chip, the computer chip including content searchable memory in which different fields of data are prestored, comprising transmitting an identifier of a particular field of data prestored within the computer chip together with a null value therefor.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the identifier and null value therefor transmitted to the computer chip comprise XML formatting.

13. The method of claim 12, further comprising the step of using the digital signature as a random number to safeguard against a replay attack.

14. The method of claim 12, further comprising the step of using the digital signature to generate a session key for secure electronic communications.

15. The method of claim 12, wherein the digital signature is generated within a computer chip.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein the computer chip includes a random number generator.

17. The method of claim 16, wherein the digital signature is generated within the computer chip using a private key of a public-private key pair and a random number obtained from the random number generator.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein an elliptical curve digital signature algorithm is utilized to generate the digital signature.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein the random number generator is directly inaccessible from outside of the computer chip.

20. The method of claim 18, wherein the random number generator is accessible only by a digital signature circuit.

12. A method of obtaining a random number for utilization in an application requiring a random number, comprising generating a digital signature using a digital signature algorithm, and then using said generated digital signature as the random number in the application.