Method and system for multiple scope authentication of vehicle components

• US 20040003245A1
• Filed: 06/28/2002
• Published: 01/01/2004
• Est. Priority Date: 06/28/2002
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Continental Automotive Systems, Inc. (Continental AG)
• Original Assignee: Temic Automotive of North America, Incorporated (Continental AG)
• Inventors: Dabbish, Ezzat A., Puhl, Larry C.
• Granted Patent: US 7,137,001 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/04 operating on the propulsion system, e.g. engine or drive motor
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/25 using biometry
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/307 using data concerning maintenance or configuration
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response

Abstract

A vehicle authenticates a first prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key unique to the first prospective component and determining whether the first prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in cryptographic communication with the first prospective component. The vehicle authenticates a component class of a second prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component of the component class is associated with a second cryptographic key unique to the component class and determining whether the second prospective component is an authentic component of the component class based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the second prospective component.

Claims

1. A method for authentication of a first component and a component class of a second component for use in a vehicle, the method performed by the vehicle and comprising the steps of:

obtaining from a first certification authority a first certification that a first authentic component having a first cryptographic key unique to the first authentic component, is associated with a second cryptographic key corresponding to the first cryptographic key;

utilizing the second cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with a first prospective component;

determining whether the first prospective component is the first authentic component based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication;

obtaining from a second certification authority a second certification that a second authentic component which is a member of the component class, the second authentic component having a third cryptographic key being unique to the component class of the second prospective component, is associated with a fourth cryptographic key corresponding to the third cryptographic key;

utilizing the fourth cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the second prospective component; and

determining whether the second prospective component is the second authentic component based on whether the fourth cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein at least one of the first certification and the second certification comprises a digital certificate.

3. The method of claim 1 wherein at least one of the first certification and the second certification comprises a digital signature of a corresponding at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority.

4. The method of claim 1 wherein at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is authenticated by a third certification authority.

5. The method of claim 1 wherein at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is a component supplier of a corresponding at least one of the first authentic component and the second authentic component.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of determining that at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is authorized to certify a corresponding at least one of the first authentic component and the second authentic component.

7. The method of claim 1 wherein the first cryptographic key is accessible only by the first authentic component.

8. The method of claim 1 wherein the third cryptographic key is accessible only by the second authentic component.

9. The method of claim 1 wherein the first cryptographic key is a private cryptographic key of the first authentic component and the second cryptographic key is a public cryptographic key of the first authentic component.

10. The method of claim 1 wherein the third cryptographic key is a private cryptographic key of the second prospective component and the fourth cryptographic key is a public cryptographic key of the second authentic component.

11. A system for authentication of a first component and a component class of a second component for use in a vehicle, comprising:

a vehicle obtaining a first prospective component and obtaining a second prospective component

a computing unit obtaining from a first certification authority a first certification that a first authentic component having a first cryptographic key unique to a first prospective component

is associated with a second cryptographic key corresponding to the first cryptographic key and obtaining from a second certification authority a second certification that a second authentic component which is a member of the component class, the second authentic component having a third cryptographic key unique to the component class of a second prospective component, is associated with a fourth cryptographic key corresponding to the third cryptographic key;

a cryptographic unit utilizing the second cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the first prospective component and utilizing the fourth cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the second prospective component; and

the computing unit determining whether the first prospective component is the first authentic component based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication and determining whether the second prospective component is the second authentic component based on whether the fourth cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

12. The system of claim 11 wherein at least one of the first certification and the second certification comprises a digital certificate.

13. The system of claim 11 wherein at least one of the first certification and the second certification comprises a digital signature of a corresponding at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority.

14. The system of claim 11 wherein at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is authenticated by a third certification authority.

15. The system of claim 11 wherein at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is a component supplier of a corresponding at least one of the first authentic component and the second authentic component.

16. The method of claim 11 wherein the computing unit determines that at least one of the first certification authority and the second certification authority is authorized to certify a corresponding at least one of the first authentic component and the second authentic component.

17. The system of claim 11 wherein the first cryptographic key is accessible only by the first authentic component.

18. The system of claim 11 wherein the third cryptographic key is accessible only by the second authentic component.

19. The system of claim 11 wherein the first cryptographic key is a private cryptographic key of the first authentic component and the second cryptographic key is a public cryptographic key of the first authentic component.

20. The system of claim 11 wherein the third cryptographic key is a private cryptographic key of the second prospective component and the fourth cryptographic key is a public cryptographic key of the second authentic component.