Method of evaluation of space systems for safety assurance and residual risk to flightcrew

• US 20050256682A1
• Filed: 05/11/2004
• Published: 11/17/2005
• Est. Priority Date: 05/11/2004
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Original Assignee: Northrop Grumman Corporation
• Inventors: Young, Doug Harold, Galutia, Barry Clifford
• Application Number:
  US10/843,042
• Publication Number:
  US 20050256682A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 702/185
• CPC Class Codes: B64G 1/12 manned
• CPC Class Codes: B64G 1/52 Protection, safety or emergency devices; Survival aids

Abstract

A process for evaluating space systems for safety assurance and residual risk to the flight crew. The process includes a success oriented System Safety phase which attempts to reduce the probability of failure with respect to the loss of a crew member as low as practical; a failure oriented SPACESAFE phase which assumes that at least one Safety Critical Subsystem has failed and attempts to engineer a risk mitigation design minimize adverse effects on the crew; and an Integration phase which complimentary integrates the System Safety phase with the SPACESAFE phase. Such process allows for increased flight crew safety by minimizing risk of a failures that contribute to loss of a crew member.

Claims

1. A process for evaluating space systems for safety assurance and residual risk to the flight crew, the process comprising:

identifying hazards;

identifying Safety Critical Subsystems;

identifying Safety Critical Subsystems failure modes and effects;

proceeding with assessment of risk at subsystem level;

collecting risk calculation to a top level for determination of contractual or statement of work compliance and verification of assessment of risk by test, and

resolving verification failures or analytical failures through design or procedural changes until contract or statement of work compliance at a minimum is achieved.

2. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 1, further comprising,

evaluating and ranking risk mitigation strategies performed outside of Safety Critical Subsystems of interest;

evaluating cost, schedule and risk reduction benefit for the risk mitigation strategies;

reporting results and conclusions to program management and to a customer program management concurrently;

periodically monitoring and reviewing implemented risk mitigation strategies and risk mitigation strategies that were not implemented to determine if the current state of technology will change the conclusions of a trade assessment; and

reporting status of the process periodically to program management and the customer as defined by a System Safety program plan.

3. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 2, wherein evaluating and ranking risk mitigation strategies performed outside of Safety Critical Subsystems of interest considers hardware, software, and procedural changes.

5. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 2, wherein the System Safety phase includes identifying top level hazards, identifying Safety Critical Subsystems, performing hazard analysis FMEA'"'"'s and CIL'"'"'s, and determining whether a resultant risk is acceptable for each Safety Critical Subsystem.

6. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 2, wherein the SPACESAFE phase includes identifying options to save the flight crew in event of a Safety Critical Subsystem failure, performing a cost benefit analysis, prioritizing options by maximum benefit versus cost, a preparing and documenting a SPACESAFE Report.

7. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 5, wherein if it is determined that the resultant risk is acceptable for the Safety Critical Subsystem, then preparing and documenting a safety assessment report, determining an impact that safety assessment report, implementing a System Safety monitoring of the Safety Critical Subsystem.

8. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 5, wherein if it is determined that the resultant risk is not acceptable for the Safety Critical Subsystem, then nominal iterative design and operations is performed, an Engineering Change Proposal is created a sent to an Engineering Review Board (ERB) and a Prime Review Board (PRB) are decisions are made by both board as to approval or non-approval, and input into the SPACESAFE report.

9. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 6, further including periodically re-evaluating the findings of the SPACESAFE Report.

10. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 6, further including submitting the SPACESAFE report to a customer oversight committee and OSP program management.

11. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 6, further including SPACESAFE trade studies.

4. A process for evaluating space systems for safety assurance and residual risk to the flight crew, the process comprising:

a success oriented System Safety phase which sets the probability of failure with respect to the loss of a crew member as low as practical;

a failure oriented SPACESAFE phase which assumes that at least one Safety Critical Subsystem has failed; and

an Integration phase which complimentary integrates the System Safety phase with the SPACESAFE phase;

wherein flight crew safety is increased by minimizing accepted risk of a failure with respect to loss of a crew member.

12. A process for evaluating space systems for safety assurance and residual risk to the flight crew, the process including a first phase including, performing a system baseline and identifying Safety Critical Subsystems;

identifying risk mitigations options;

documenting recommendations for System Safety;

performing a rough order of magnitude parametric cost estimate;

performing a management review; and

determining whether a mitigation is in or out of the identified Safety Critical Subsystem, wherein if the mitigation is in the Safety Critical Subsystem, the recommendation is documented for a customer and the customer'"'"'s response is archived, or if the mitigation is not in the Safety Critical Subsystem, a contractor initiates a SPACESAFE change.

13. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 13, further including a second phase including, preparing initial designs;

performing a cost/benefit analysis;

creating an Engineering Change Proposal;

performing a management review;

submitting the Engineering Change Proposal to the customer for review and approval, wherein the SPACESAFE change is implemented is the change is approved or if the change is not approved, the response of the customer is documented.

14. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 13, further including a third phase including,

design engineering implementing the approved SPACESAFE change, and

System Safety taking over responsibility of the SPACESAFE change.

15. The process for evaluating space systems according to claim 13, further including a fourth phase including,

auditing the implemented SPACESAFE change for effectiveness;

and

feeding the results into a continuous improvement process.