Transparently securing data for transmission on financial networks

• US 20060049256A1
• Filed: 05/12/2005
• Published: 03/09/2006
• Est. Priority Date: 09/07/2004
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Verifone, Inc. (Verifone Systems, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Semtek Innovative Solutions Incorporated (Verifone Systems, Inc.)
• Inventors: Mos, Bob, Mos, Robert J., von Mueller, Clay
• Granted Patent: US 7,506,812 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 235/449
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/72 in cryptographic circuits
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/83 input devices, e.g. keyboards, mice or controllers thereof
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/082 using inductive or magnetic sensors
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/02 involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/20 Point-of-sale [POS] network systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/325 using wireless networks
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3552 Downloading or loading of personalisation data
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/367 involving electronic purses or money safes
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/382 insuring higher security of transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3823 combining multiple encryption tools for a transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/3829 involving key management
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/02 Banking, e.g. interest calculation or account maintenance credit or loans G06Q40/03
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/22 in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 19/206 Software aspects at ATMs
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/084 Additional components relating to data transfer and storing, e.g. error detection, self-diagnosis
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0873 Details of the card reader
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/0886 the card reader being portable for interacting with a POS or ECR in realizing a payment transaction
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1016 : Devices or methods for securing the PIN and other transaction-data, e.g. by encryption arrangements for secret communication, see H04L9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 : Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 : Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 : Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3297 : involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps

Abstract

A secure magnetic stripe card stripe reader (MSR) module and software system capable of encrypting the magnetic stripe data to CPI, SDP and CISP standards for use in point of sale (POS) and other applications requiring data security using non secure networks and computing devices. Additionally, when incorporated within an attachment for conventional personal digital assistant (PDA) or cell phone or stationary terminal, provides encrypted data from the magnetic head assembly providing compliance with Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series FIPS 140 covering security and tampering standards. Moreover, this module and software system includes the capability of providing secure POS transactions to legacy transaction processing systems and POS terminals transparently to the existing infrastructure. Furthermore, this module and software system includes the capability of transparently providing detection of fraudulently copied magnetic stripe cards.

Claims

1. A method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, comprising the steps of:

a) using an MSR for reading magnetic stripe card track data;

b) selecting pre-defined card track data;

c) removing said selected pre-defined card track data;

c) encrypting said removed selected pre-defined data;

d) replacing said removed data with said encrypted data; and

e) outputting said encrypted data into an unsecured public network for the purpose of completing a financial transaction;

whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with the original magnetic stripe card data infrastructure system.

2. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 1, further wherein said magnetic stripe data consists of financial transaction data as specified in ISO/IEC 7813:

2001(E), whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with any credit card payment infrastructure system, and does not adversely effect legacy POS equipment used to process transactions.

3. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 1, wherein said selected pre-defined removed data and said encrypted data does not include:

a) the card'"'"'s expiration date;

b) some or all of the card'"'"'s bank identification number; and

c) the last four digits of the cardholder'"'"'s account number;

whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with any credit card payment infrastructure system, and does not adversely effect legacy POS equipment used to process transactions.

4. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 1, wherein non-removed clear text data is masked prior to being output to an unsecured public network for the purpose of completing a financial transaction.

5. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 1, wherein said step of removing selected predefined card track data further includes the steps of:

a) incrementing a non-volatile counter;

b) concatenating the secure head serial number with the counter value;

c) encrypting said concatenated secure head serial number using stored encryption key; and

d) XORing said encryption with selected track card data.

6. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 1, wherein said step of removing selected predefined card track data further includes the steps of:

a) selecting card track data comprising 19 base 10 digits of track 2 data;

b) concatenating said 19 base 10 digits to produce a 19 digit number;

c) converting said 19 digits to an 8 byte binary value;

d) encrypting said 8 byte binary value using a stored encryption key; and

e) converting said encrypted 8 byte binary value into a 20 digit number;

whereby the least significant 19 digits replace the removed digits in the track data, and where the most significant digit is 0 or 1, and where the most significant digit is stored in an added data digit in the card data.

7. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 6, wherein said step of selecting card track data comprising 19 base 10 digits of track 2 data is deleted and replaced with the step of selecting card track data comprising 19 base 10 digits of track 1 data.

8. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 6, wherein the most significant digit is converted to a binary value and added to an unused bank discretionary data field.

9. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 6, wherein multiple sets of digits for encryption are selected from, based on the bank identification number.

10. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 6, wherein one of multiple encryption keys stored in the secure MSR is selected based on selected card data.

11. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 8, wherein the selected card data is the bank identification number.

12. The method for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 8, wherein the selected card data is the card brand name, such as Visa, MasterCard, American Express, etc.

13. A method for transparently decrypting MSR encoded data after transmission on unsecured public networks, comprising the steps of:

a) providing a software application or service that accepts encrypted card information;

b) enabling said software application to also accept a unique terminal identification number;

c) select the terminal decryption key based on terminal identification number

d) decrypting the previously encrypted MSR encoded card data; and

e) restoring the original card data such that the data returns to the original card information.

14. The method for transparently de-encrypting MSR encoded data after transmission on unsecured public networks, according to claim 13, wherein stolen or miss-handled and recovered encrypted MSR encoded card data can be traced back to the originating MSR, comprising the steps of:

a) decrypting card data using all known encryption keys;

b) comparing the decrypted data with the clear text and non-masked card data to verify accuracy;

c) reverse indexing the POS identification from the encryption key database;

d) verifying account transaction history with identified POS transaction history; and

e) notifying the appropriate authority of the detected compromise.

15. The method for transparently encrypting and de-encrypting MSR encoded data for transmission on secure financial networks, according to claim 13, wherein each encrypted card transaction is made unique, comprising the steps of:

a) combining an exclusive function of the selected data and a real time clock value prior to encryption;

b) providing a decrypting service which maintains a log of card usage; and

c) comparing the data time stamped values with the card usage log;

c) disallowing transaction requests with the same or earlier time stamps to the logged values.

16. The method for transparently encrypting and de-encrypting MSR encoded data for transmission on secure financial networks, according to claim 13 wherein the encryption key is the output of a key generation function for the encrypted data comprising the steps of:

a) selecting non-encrypted card data, and

b) hashing the encryption key with said data to generate a new key, and

c) encryption and decrypting MSR data with said new key.

17. The method for transparently encrypting and de-encrypting MSR encoded data for transmission on secure financial networks, according to claim 15 wherein the time stamp resolution is limited to a value greater than the reset lifetime accuracy of the real time clock for the purpose of preventing synchronization errors.

18. The method for transparently encrypting and de-encrypting MSR encoded data for transmission on secure financial networks, according to claim 15, wherein the real time clock time stamp is an incrementing counter in the secure MSR, whereby multiple card swipes of the same card provide unique responses.

19. A method for encoding card track data for encrypting data for transmission on unsecured public networks, comprising the steps of:

a) receiving account information to encode as card track data;

b) removing data not required by POS equipment to process a transaction;

c) encrypting the removed data;

d) replacing the removed data with the encrypted data;

e) encoding the encrypted data on the magnetic stripe; and

f) storing a decryption key along with a card identifier in a database;

whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with any credit card payment infrastructure system.

20. A method for de-encrypting encoded card track data for transmission on secure financial networks, comprising the steps of:

a) providing a software application or service that accepts encrypted card information;

b) providing an encryption key database;

c) using a card identifier to retrieve the encryption key from said encryption key database;

d) decrypting the previously encrypted card data; and

e) restoring the original card data such that it is returned to the original card information.

21. A secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly comprising:

a) a magnetic transducer head enclosure;

b) a magnetic transducer head for detecting magnetic transitions on a magnetic stripe;

c) a transducer head amplifier and a transducer head transitions detector;

d) a microcomputer controller containing programs to decode the data from the head transition detector and output said data in one or more formats; and

e) a battery for powering the head amplifier and microcontroller;

whereby said head amplifier and said controller and said battery are contained within said magnetic head enclosure.

22. The secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly, according to claim 21, wherein said battery is external to said magnetic head enclosure.

23. The secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly, according to claim 21, further including a dual gap read head in one or more track locations and card signature measuring software for the purpose of encrypting the card signature and placing the encrypted signature in the card stripe output data.

24. The secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly, according to claim 23, wherein the signature data output is in masked fields of the encrypted card output data, whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with any credit card payment infrastructure system, and does not adversely effect legacy POS equipment used to process transactions.

25. A secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly, according to claim 21 which is pre-programmed to output encrypted data format by reading magnetic stripe card track data, selecting pre-defined card track data, removing said selected pre-defined card track data, encrypting said removed selected pre-defined data, replacing said removed data with said encrypted data, and outputting said encrypted data into an unsecured public network for the purpose of completing a financial transaction, whereby the system maintains universal message format compatibility with any credit card payment infrastructure system.

26. A secure magnetic stripe card reader module assembly, according to claim 21 which is pre-programmed to output encrypted data in the standard F2F magnetic head output format, thereby providing a direct replacement of the magnetic head in legacy POS systems capable of encrypting the card stripe data.