Game theoretic prioritization scheme for mobile ad hoc networks permitting hierarchal deference

• US 20060167784A1
• Filed: 12/06/2004
• Published: 07/27/2006
• Est. Priority Date: 09/10/2004
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Steven Mark Hoffberg
• Original Assignee: Steven Mark Hoffberg
• Inventors: Hoffberg, Steven M.
• Granted Patent: US 7,590,589 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 705/37
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/0652 e-cash with decreasing value according to a parameter, e.g. time
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/10 specially adapted for electronic funds transfer [EFT] systems; specially adapted for home banking systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/308 using the Internet of Things
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/401 Transaction verification
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 30/08 Auctions
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/00 Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/03 Credit; Loans; Processing thereof
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/04 Trading; Exchange, e.g. stocks, commodities, derivatives or currency exchange
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 40/06 Asset management; Financial planning or analysis
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 50/188 Electronic negotiation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/029 Location-based management or tracking services

Abstract

A method for providing unequal allocation of rights among agents while operating according to fair principles, comprising assigning a hierarchal rank to each agent; providing a synthetic economic value to a first set of agents at the a high level of the hierarchy; allocating portions of the synthetic economic value by the first set of agents to a second set of agents at respectively different hierarchal rank than the first set of agents; and conducting an auction amongst agents using the synthetic economic value as the currency.

Claims

1. A method for providing unequal allocation of rights among agents while operating according to fair principles, comprising:

(a) assigning a hierarchal rank to each agent;

(b) providing a synthetic economic value to a first set of agents at the a high level of the hierarchy;

(c) allocating portions of the synthetic economic value by the first set of agents to a second set of agents at respectively different hierarchal rank than the first set of agents; and

(d) conducting an auction amongst agents using the synthetic economic value as the currency.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction allocates a communication resource.

3. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction allocates a wireless communication resource.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction allocates communication bandwidth within a communication network.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction allocates communication opportunity within a multihop ad hoc communication network.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction operates according to a Vickrey-Clark-Groves combinatorial auction framework.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein said auction allocates a communication resource.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein said hierarchal rank comprises a predetermined assigned rank within a social, business, military or religious organization.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein said synthetic economic value comprises a cryptographically secure micropayment.

10. The method according to claim 1, wherein said synthetic economic value comprises a cryptographically secure micropayment which has a time-dependent value.

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein said synthetic economic value comprises a cryptographically secure micropayment which has a location-dependent value.

12. The method according to claim 1, wherein said synthetic economic value comprises a micropayment which has a time-dependent value.

13. The method according to claim 1, wherein said synthetic economic value is generated by an agent based on a generation function inherited from a higher hierarchal level.

14. The method according to claim 1, wherein an agent can transfer said synthetic economic value or a generation capacity therefore to another agent independent of said auction.

15. The method according to claim 1, wherein the auction provides compensation from an agent to other agents which deferred to that agent.

16. The method according to claim 1, wherein the auction compensates for both a consumtion of resources and a deference by lower valued agents to the the higher valued agents in accordance with a published subjectiove valuation.