Multiple cryptographic key security device

• US 20060174125A1
• Filed: 01/31/2005
• Published: 08/03/2006
• Est. Priority Date: 01/31/2005
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Neopost Technologies S.A. (Quadient SA)
• Original Assignee: Neopost Technologies S.A. (Quadient SA)
• Inventors: Brookner, George M.
• Application Number:
  US11/047,230
• Publication Number:
  US 20060174125A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/176
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823

Abstract

A security domain for controlling PKI keys includes a root certificate authority, and one or more regional certificate authorities, each having a remote control and a postal security device. Different PKI keys are utilized to sign and to validate the authenticity of a digital signature for each certificate authority.

Claims

1. A security domain for controlling PKI keys comprising:

a root certificate authority; and

one or more regional certificate authorities, each having a remote control and a postal security device, wherein different PKI keys are utilized to sign and to validate the authenticity of a digital signature for each certificate authority.

2. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the one or more regional certificate authorities issue remote control certificates and postal security device authentication certificates.

3. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein one or more certificates used within the security domain can be managed locally.

4. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the postal security device belongs to one security domain.

5. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the root certificate authority operates to sign one or more region certificates with signatures derived from one or more parameter sets.

6. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the remote control establishes secure communications with the postal security device.

7. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the root certificate authority and each of the one or more regional certificate authorities provides different key pairs.

8. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 7, wherein the different key pairs are generated from different parameter sets.

9. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the PKI keys are in one of a pending active state, an active state or an inactive state.

10. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein certificates generated by the root certificate authority or the one or more regional certificate authorities are in one of a pending active state, an active state or an inactive state.

11. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein the PKI Keys are of different lengths.

12. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, wherein each of the PKI keys are generated by distinct seeding parameters.

13. The security domain for controlling PKI keys of claim 1, where a root certificate authority consent allows a transition between different security domains.