Method, system and apparatus for prevention of flash IC replacement hacking attack

• US 20070050622A1
• Filed: 09/01/2005
• Published: 03/01/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 09/01/2005
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Motorola, Inc. (Motorola Solutions, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Motorola, Inc. (Motorola Solutions, Inc.)
• Inventors: Hansen, Joseph, Voss, Joel, Rager, Kent, Khambholja, Keyur
• Application Number:
  US11/219,078
• Publication Number:
  US 20070050622A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/445 by mutual authentication, e.g. between devices or programs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/126 Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning

Abstract

Techniques are provided for preventing replacement of a one-time-programmable (OTP) component. The OTP component can be part of a wireless device. The wireless device is configured such that programming of a new IMEI code into the OTP component is permitted only when the wireless device is in a secure-mode state. A challenge-response protocol is used to place the wireless device in this secure-mode state.

Claims

1. A method for preventing replacement of a one-time-programmable (OTP) component in a communication device programmable with an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) code, comprising:

configuring the communication device such that programming of an IMEI code into the OTP component is permitted only when the communication device is in a secure-mode state; and

using a challenge-response protocol to place the communication device in the secure-mode state.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein using a challenge-response protocol to place the communication device in the secure-mode state, comprises:

confirming that a programming station attempting to program the communication device is authorized to program the communication device.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein configuring the communication device comprises:

causing the communication device to initially power up into a subsidy locked state; and

receiving a command to place the communication device in a subsidy unlocked state after the communication device is placed in the secure-mode state.

4. A method for preventing replacement of a one-time-programmable (OTP) component in a communication device programmable with an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) code, comprising:

receiving a command from a programming station at the communication device to enter a secure-mode state;

determining whether the programming station is a trusted programming station;

entering a secure-mode state if the programming station is a trusted programming station; and

permitting programming of an IMEI code into the OTP component if the communication device is in the secure-mode state.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein determining whether the programming station is a trusted programming station, comprises:

sending a first message comprising a random number from the communication device to the programming station in response to the command;

authenticating the programming station at a secure server to confirm that the programming station is authorized to program the communication device;

generating an encrypted result at the secure server by encrypting the random number using a private key variable, if the secure server authenticates the programming station;

decrypting the encrypted result at the communication device using a trusted public key variable stored in the communication device to generate a decrypted value; and

establishing trust between the communication device and the programming station if the decrypted value is the same as the random number.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein decrypting the encrypted result at the communication device using a trusted public key variable stored in the communication device to generate a decrypted value, further comprises:

decrypting the encrypted result at the communication device using a trusted public key variable stored in the communication device to generate a decrypted value and a security-level parameter.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the security-level parameter is assigned by the secure server per its authorization of the programming station and a user of the programming station, and establishes multiple levels of access to certain capabilities in the communication device for different programming stations.

8. The method of claim 4, wherein the communication device permits programming new values into encrypted subsidy lock parameters (SLPs) of a reprogrammable memory when the communication device is locked if the communication device is in the secure-mode state or if the communication device is unlocked.

9. The method of claim 8, further comprising:

initializing the SLPs with encrypted values that lock the communication device, if the IMEI has not been programmed into the OTP component when the communication device powers on.

10. The method of claim 4, wherein determining whether the programming station is a trusted programming station, comprises:

sending a first message comprising a first random number from the communication device in response to the command;

authenticating the programming station at a secure server to confirm that the programming station is authorized to program the communication device;

generating a signature at the secure server based on the first random number using a private key variable, if the secure server authenticates the programming station;

decrypting the signature at the communication device using a trusted public key variable stored in the communication device to generate a decrypted hash value;

computing a computed hash value at the communication device using received data;

comparing the decrypted hash value to the computed hash value; and

establishing trust between the communication device and the programming station if a second random number in the received data is the same as the first random number.

11. A system, comprising:

a programming station configured to generate a command; and

a communication device configured to receive the command, wherein the command instructs the communication device to enter a secure-mode state, the communication device comprising;

a one-time-programmable (OTP) component programmable with an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) code; and

a processor configured to permit programming of an IMEI code into the OTP component only if the communication device is in the secure-mode state.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the system further comprises:

a secure server, wherein trust is established between the communication device and the programming station if a challenge-response protocol is satisfied between the communication device, the programming station, and the secure server.

13. The system of claim 11, wherein the processor is configured to generate, responsive to the command, a first message comprising a random number, and wherein the communication device is further configured to transmit the first message to the programming station.

14. The system of claim 13, wherein the communication device further comprises a decryption engine, and a second memory configured to store a trusted public key variable, wherein the secure server comprises an encryption engine, and wherein the challenge-response protocol is satisfied if:

the secure server authenticates the programming station to confirm that the programming station is authorized to program the communication device,

the encryption engine generates an encrypted result by either;

encrypting the random number from the first message using a private key variable, or

encrypting a cryptographic hash of the random number from the first message using a private key variable, and

the decryption engine decrypts the encrypted result using the trusted public key variable to generate a decrypted value that matches the random number that was sent in the first message.

15. The system of claim 14, wherein the processor determines whether the communication device is in an initial manufacturing state based upon a state held in an OTP component when the communication device powers on.

16. The system of claim 15, wherein the communication device further comprises a reprogrammable memory, and wherein the reprogrammable memory initially contains encrypted subsidy lock parameters (SLPs), and wherein the processor permits programming new values into the encrypted SLPs when the communication device is locked only if the communication device is in the secure-mode state.

17. The system of claim 13, wherein the communication device further comprises a decryption engine, and a second memory configured to store a trusted public key variable, wherein the secure server comprises an encryption engine, and wherein the challenge-response protocol is satisfied if:

the secure server authenticates the programming station to confirm that the programming station is authorized to program the communication device,

the encryption engine generates an encrypted result by either;

encrypting the random number from the first message using a private key variable, or

encrypting a cryptographic hash of the random number from the first message using a private key variable, and

the decryption engine decrypts the encrypted result using the trusted public key variable to generate a decrypted value that matches a hash of the random number that was sent in the first message.

18. A communication device, comprising:

a receiver configured to receive a command from a programming station, wherein the command instructs the communication device to enter a secure-mode state;

a one-time-programmable (OTP) component configured to receive an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) code, wherein the OTP component is initially unprogrammed; and

a processor configured to permit programming of an IMEI code into the OTP component only if the communication device is in the secure-mode state, wherein the communication device enters the secure-mode state once trust is established between the communication device and the programming station.

19. The communication device of claim 18, wherein the communication device further comprises:

a reprogrammable memory which initially contains encrypted subsidy lock parameters (SLPs), and wherein the processor permits programming new values into the encrypted SLPs when the communication device is locked only if the communication device is in the secure-mode state.

20. The communication device of claim 19, wherein the processor determines whether the IMEI has been programmed into the OTP component when the communication device powers on, and if the processor determines that the IMEI has not been programmed into the OTP component when the communication device powers on, then the processor initializes the SLPs with encrypted values that lock the communication device to only accept test SIM cards.

21. The communication device of claim 18, wherein the communication device further comprises:

a transmitter;

a decryption engine;

a second memory configured to store a trusted public key variable, and

wherein the processor is configured to generate, responsive to the command, a first message comprising a random number; and

a transmitter configured to transmit the first message to the programming station.

22. The communication device of claim 21, wherein a challenge-response protocol to establish trust between the wireless device and the programming station is satisfied if a secure server comprising an encryption engine authenticates the programming station to confirm that the programming station is authorized to program the communication device and the encryption engine generates an encrypted result by encrypting the random number using a private key variable, and

the decryption engine decrypts the encrypted result using the trusted public key variable to generate a decrypted value that is the same as the random number.

23. The communication device of claim 22, wherein the decryption engine decrypts the encrypted result using a trusted public key variable stored in the communication device to generate a decrypted value that is the same as the random number and a security-level parameter, wherein the security-level parameter establishes multiple levels of access to certain capabilities in the communication device for different users.