METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR SECURITY PROTECTION OF AN ORIGINAL USER IDENTITY IN AN INITIAL SIGNALING MESSAGE

• US 20070297367A1
• Filed: 06/15/2007
• Published: 12/27/2007
• Est. Priority Date: 06/19/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Interdigital Technology Corporation (InterDigital, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Interdigital Technology Corporation (InterDigital, Inc.)
• Inventors: Terry, Stephen, Guccione, Louis, Wang, Peter
• Granted Patent: US 8,412,157 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 370/331
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0414 during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/12 Applying verification of the received information cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for data integrity or data verification H04L9/32
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0833 involving conference or group key network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3273 for mutual authentication network architectures or network communication protocols for achieving mutual authentication in a packet data network H04L63/0869
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/106 Packet or message integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/126 Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning

Abstract

A wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) includes a control plane (C-plane) packet data convergence protocol (C-PDCP) layer which performs ciphering of a signaling message. The C-PDCP layer is activated upon power up of the WTRU and initial security parameters are loaded to the C-PDCP layer. An initial connection signaling message and a user identity are ciphered using the initial security parameters even before the WTRU is authenticated. The initial security parameters including a ciphering key (CK) may be generated from system information broadcast from the network. The CK may be a public key for asymmetric encryption, and may be selected from a public key set broadcast by or derived from the network system information. An index of the selected public key may be separately encoded. Alternatively, the index may be communicated by using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.

Claims

1. In a wireless communication system including a wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU), the WTRU including a control plane (C-plane) packet data convergence protocol (C-PDCP) layer for performing ciphering and integrity protection of an initial connection signaling message, a method for security protection of a user identity (ID) in an initial connection signaling message, the method comprising:

activating the C-PDCP layer upon power up of the WTRU;

loading initial security parameters to the C-PDCP layer;

ciphering the initial connection signaling message including the user ID using the initial security parameters; and

sending the ciphered initial connection signaling message and the user ID to a network.

2. The method of claim 1 wherein the initial security parameters are loaded from a universal subscriber identity module (USIM).

3. The method of claim 1 wherein the initial security parameters are generated from system information broadcast from the network.

4. The method of claim 3 wherein the system information includes at least one public key or information for deriving a public key.

5. The method of claim 1 wherein the initial connection signaling message includes a public land mobile network (PLMN) identity.

6. The method of claim 1 further comprising:

the network sending an authentication request message to the WTRU including a random number and an authentication token;

the WTRU authenticating the network based on the random number and the authentication token;

the WTRU computing session keys and a response (RES);

the WTRU sending an authentication response message including the RES to the network;

the network authenticating the WTRU using the RES; and

the network sending a security mode command message to the WTRU.

7. The method of claim 6 wherein the authentication response message is protected by using the initial security parameters.

8. The method of claim 6 wherein the network ciphers a downlink control message including the security mode command message with a key used for ciphering the initial connection signaling message using a symmetric encryption algorithm.

9. The method of claim 6 further comprising:

configuring a user plane (U-plane) PDCP layer with a new session key for U-plane data ciphering.

10. The method of claim 1 wherein a ciphering algorithm to be used is one of the initial security parameters.

11. The method of claim 10 wherein the ciphering algorithm is f8 algorithm and the initial security parameters include a ciphering key (CK), a COUNT-C value, a bearer ID, a direction value, and a length value.

12. The method of claim 11 wherein the COUNT-C value is a pre-arranged value known only to the WTRU and the network.

13. The method of claim 11 wherein the COUNT-C value is a START value stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) combined with a pre-agreed value known between the WTRU and the network.

14. The method of claim 13 wherein the pre-agreed value is a non-access stratum (NAS) layer sequence number.

15. The method of claim 11 wherein the COUNT-C value is a computed value by the WTRU and the network.

16. The method of claim 11 wherein the bearer ID is a signaling radio bearer ID number.

17. The method of claim 11 wherein the bearer ID is a pre-arranged value between the WTRU and the network.

18. The method of claim 11 wherein the direction value is set to ‘

0’

for uplink.

19. The method of claim 10 wherein the ciphering algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm.

20. The method of claim 19 wherein the ciphering algorithm uses a ciphering key (CK) which is a pre-arranged public/private key-pair between the WTRU and the network.

21. The method of claim 20 wherein the public key is broadcast via system information by the network.

22. The method of claim 21 wherein the WTRU selects a public key from a public key set comprising a plurality of public keys.

23. The method of claim 22 wherein the WTRU uses its IMSI value to select an index into the public key set to select a public key.

24. The method of claim 22 wherein the WTRU uses a FRESH value to select an index into the public key set to select a public key.

25. The method of claim 24 wherein the WTRU encrypts the index with a pre-agreed public key and includes the encrypted index in the connection request message.

26. The method of claim 22 wherein the system information includes a first key index seed and the connection request message includes a second key index seed, and the public key is selected using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.

27. The method of claim 1 wherein an integrity protection algorithm to be used is one of the initial security parameters.

28. The method of claim 27 wherein the integrity protection algorithm is f9 algorithm, and the initial security parameters include an integrity key (IK), a COUNT-I value, a message, a direction value, and a FRESH value.

29. The method of claim 28 wherein the IK is generated by the WTRU using a random number received from the network via system information and a shared secret key K.

30. The method of claim 29 wherein the IK is generated by using f4 algorithm.

31. The method of claim 28 wherein the COUNT-I value is a pre-arranged value known to the WTRU and the network.

32. The method of claim 28 wherein the COUNT-I value is set to a START value stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) combined with a pre-agree value known between the WTRU and the network.

33. The method of claim 32 wherein the pre-agreed value is a non-access stratum (NAS) layer sequence number.

34. The method of claim 28 wherein the COUNT-I value is a computed value by the WTRU and the network.

35. The method of claim 28 wherein the direction value is set to ‘

0’

for uplink.

36. The method of claim 28 wherein the message is a radio bearer ID plus a first non-access stratum (NAS) message.

37. The method of claim 28 wherein the FRESH value is selected from a set of pre-arranged FRESH values between the WTRU and the network.

38. The method of claim 37 wherein the IK is used to compute an index for the FRESH value.

39. The method of claim 28 wherein the FRESH value is generated by using a FRESH value generation algorithm with a random number broadcast via system information and a shared secret key K.

40. The method of claim 1 wherein the wireless communication system is a third generation (3G) long term evolution (LTE).

41. A wireless transmit/receive unit (WTRU) for security protection of a user identity (ID) in an initial connection signaling message in a wireless communication system, the WTRU comprising:

a non-access stratum (NAS) layer configured to generate a first control signaling message and trigger a connection to a network;

a radio resource control (RRC) layer configured to generate a second control signaling message and perform integrity protection of the first and second control signaling messages; and

a control plane (C-plane) packet data convergence protocol (C-PDCP) layer configured to perform ciphering of at least one of the first and second control signaling messages including an initial connection signaling message and the user ID using initial security parameters that are loaded to the C-PDCP layer upon power up of the C-PDCP layer and send the ciphered initial connection signaling message and the user ID to a network.

42. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the initial security parameters are loaded from a universal subscriber identity module (USIM).

43. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the initial security parameters are generated from system information broadcast from the network.

44. The WTRU of claim 43 wherein the system information includes at least one public key or information for deriving a public key.

45. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the initial connection signaling message includes a public land mobile network (PLMN) identity.

46. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the NAS layer is configured to authenticate the network based on a random number and an authentication token included in an authentication request message from the network, and compute session keys and send an authentication response message including a response (RES) to the network so that the network authenticates the WTRU using the RES.

47. The WTRU of claim 46 wherein the authentication response message is protected by using the initial security parameters.

48. The WTRU of claim 46 further comprising:

a user plane (U-plane) PDCP layer for processing U-plane data, the RRC layer loads a new session key to the U-plane PDCP layer for U-plane ciphering.

49. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein a ciphering algorithm to be used is one of the initial security parameters.

50. The WTRU of claim 49 wherein the ciphering algorithm is an f8 algorithm, wherein the initial security parameters include at least one of a ciphering key (CK), a COUNT-C value, a bearer ID, a direction value, and a length value.

51. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the COUNT-C value is a pre-arranged value known only to the WTRU and the network.

52. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the COUNT-C value is a START value stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) combined with a pre-agreed value known between the WTRU and the network.

53. The WTRU of claim 52 wherein the pre-agreed value is a non-access stratum (NAS) layer sequence number.

54. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the COUNT-C value is a computed value by the WTRU and the network.

55. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the bearer ID is a signaling radio bearer ID number.

56. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the bearer ID is a pre-arranged value between the WTRU and the network.

57. The WTRU of claim 50 wherein the direction value is set to ‘

0’

for uplink.

58. The WTRU of claim 49 wherein the ciphering algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm.

59. The WTRU of claim 58 wherein the ciphering algorithm uses a ciphering key (CK) which is a pre-arranged public/private key-pair between the WTRU and the network.

60. The WTRU of claim 59 wherein the public key is broadcast via system information.

61. The WTRU of claim 60 wherein the C-PDCP layer selects a public key from a public key set comprising a plurality of public keys.

62. The WTRU of claim 60 wherein the C-PDCP layer uses the user ID to select an index into the public key set.

63. The WTRU of claim 60 wherein the C-PDCP layer uses a FRESH value to select an index into the public key set.

64. The WTRU of claim 63 wherein the C-PDCP layer encrypts the index with a pre-agreed public key and includes the encrypted index in the connection request message.

65. The WTRU of claim 61 wherein the system information includes a first key index seed and the connection request message includes a second key index seed, wherein the public key is selected using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange method.

66. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein an integrity protection algorithm to be used is one of the initial security parameters.

67. The WTRU of claim 66 wherein the integrity protection algorithm is an f9 algorithm, and parameters include an integrity key (IK), a COUNT-I value, a message, a direction value, and a FRESH value.

68. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the IK is generated by the WTRU using a random number received via system information and a shared secret key K.

69. The WTRU of claim 68 wherein the IK is generated by using an f4 algorithm.

70. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the COUNT-I value is a pre-arranged value known to the WTRU and the network.

71. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the COUNT-I value is set to a START value stored in a universal subscriber identity module (USIM) combined with a pre-agree value known between the WTRU and the network.

72. The WTRU of claim 71 wherein the pre-agreed value is a non-access stratum (NAS) layer sequence number.

73. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the COUNT-I value is a computed value by the WTRU and the network.

74. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the direction value is set to ‘

0’

for uplink.

75. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the message is a radio bearer ID plus a first non-access stratum (NAS) message.

76. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the FRESH value is selected from a set of pre-arranged FRESH values between the WTRU and the network.

77. The WTRU of claim 76 wherein the IK is used to compute an index for the FRESH value.

78. The WTRU of claim 67 wherein the FRESH value is generated by using a FRESH value generation algorithm with a random number broadcast via system information and a shared secret key K.

79. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the wireless communication system is a third generation (3G) long term evolution (LTE).

80. The WTRU of claim 41 wherein the network ciphers a downlink control message with a key used for ciphering the initial connection signaling message using a symmetric encryption algorithm.