METHOD OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION BETWEEN A COMMUNICATION INTERFACE AND A HOST PROCESSOR OF AN NFC CHIPSET

• US 20080085001A1
• Filed: 10/04/2007
• Published: 04/10/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 10/05/2006
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Verimatrix Incorporated (Verimatrix SA)
• Original Assignee: INSIDE Contactless
• Inventors: MARTINEAU, Philippe, CHARRAT, Bruno
• Granted Patent: US 8,762,720 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 380/247
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 1/00 Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3273 for mutual authentication network architectures or network communication protocols for achieving mutual authentication in a packet data network H04L63/0869

Abstract

An authentication method between a secure host processor and a controller of an NFC system, the controller being equipped with an NFC interface circuit sending and receiving contactless data, includes connecting the host processor to the controller and checking that there is a predefined relation between a first secret data stored by the host processor and a second secret data stored by the controller. The method further includes transmitting the second secret data to the controller and storing of the second secret data by the controller. The host processor may be removably associated with a contactless component storing the second secret data which is contactlessly transmitted to the controller.

Claims

1. An authentication method between a secure host processor and a controller of an NFC system, the controller being connected to an NFC interface circuit sending and receiving contactless data, the method comprising:

connecting the host processor to the controller;

checking that there is a predefined relation between a first secret data stored by the host processor and a second secret data stored by the controller;

transmitting the second secret data to the controller; and

storing the second secret data by the controller.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the controller authenticates the host processor by checking the relation between the first and second secret data.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the host processor authenticates the controller by checking the relation between the first and second secret data.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising transmitting by the controller a session key to the host processor if the authentication of the host processor by the controller was successful, the session key being used to cipher data exchanged between the host processor and the controller.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

sending an authentication request by the host processor to the controller,

answering the request by the controller by supplying a random number,

ciphering by the host processor the random number received using of an encryption function using the first secret data as an enciphering key, and transmitting the result of the enciphering to the controller, and checking by the controller the result of the enciphering received by means of an encryption function using the second secret data as an enciphering key, the authentication of the host processor being successful if the check was successfully performed.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the first and second secret data are identical.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the first secret data is a public enciphering key and the second secret data is a private enciphering key linked to the first secret datum by an asymmetric encryption relation.

8. The method of to claim 1, further comprising supplying the host processor, the host processor being removably associated with a contactless component storing the second secret data for transmitting to the controller;

and connecting the host processor to the controller, the second secret data being transmitted to the controller by the contactless component.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein the host processor is an integrated circuit of a SIM card removable from a card integrating a contactless component storing the second secret data for contactlessly transmitting to the controller, and the NFC system is a mobile telephone comprising another host processor connected to the controller.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the second secret data is transmitted to the controller by at least one of optically reading an optical code, which is translated and transmitted to the controller, and keyboarding the value of the secret data, which is transmitted to the controller.

11. A system comprising:

a controller connected to an interface circuit for sending/receiving contactless data of NFC type; and

a connector for connecting the controller to a host processor, the controller being configured to check that there is a predefined relation between a first secret data stored by the host processor and a second secret data stored by the controller, and to receive and store the second secret data when the system is initialized.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the controller is configured to authenticate the host processor by checking the relation between the first and second secret data.

13. The system of claim 11, wherein the host processor is configured to authenticate the controller by checking the relation between the first and second secret data.

14. The system of claim 11, wherein the controller is configured to transmit a session key to the host processor if the authentication of the host processor by the controller was successful, the session key being used to cipher the data exchanged between the host processor and the controller.

15. The system of claim 11, wherein:

the host processor is configured to send an authentication request to the controller;

the controller is configured to answer the request by supplying a random number;

the host processor is configured to cipher the random number received using an encryption function using the first secret data as an enciphering key, and to transmit the result of the enciphering to the controller; and

the controller is configured to check the result of the enciphering received using an encryption function using the second secret data it stores as an enciphering key, the authentication of the host processor being successful if the check was successfully performed.

16. The system of claim 11, wherein the first and second secret data are identical.

17. The system of claim 11, wherein the first secret data is a public key and the second secret data is a private key linked to the first secret data by an asymmetric encryption relation.

18. The system claim 11, wherein the host processor is removably associated with a contactless component storing the second secret data for contactlessly transmitting to the controller.

19. The system of claim 18, wherein the host processor is an integrated circuit of a SIM card removable from a smart card integrating a contactless component storing the second secret data for contactlessly transmitting to the controller, and the NFC system is a mobile telephone comprising another host processor connected to the controller.

20. The system of claim 11, wherein the second secret data is transmitted to the controller by at least one of optically reading an optical code, which is translated and transmitted to the controller, and keyboarding the value of the second secret data, which is transmitted to the controller.

21. A smart card comprising:

an integrated circuit card removable from the smart card and integrating a secure processor saving a first secret data; and

a contactless component coupled to an NFC interface circuit sending and receiving contactless data, and saving a second secret data for contactlessly transmitting, the second secret data being linked to the first secret data by a predefined relation.

22. The smart card according to claim 21, wherein the secure processor is configured to authenticate a controller by checking the relation between the first and second secret data.

23. The smart card of claim 21, wherein the secure processor is configured to receive a session key if the secure processor has been authenticated by a controller, the session key being used to cipher data exchanged between a host processor and the controller.

24. The smart card of claim 21, the secure processor being configured to:

send an authentication request to the controller;

receive a random number;

cipher the random number received using an encryption function using the first secret data as an enciphering key; and

transmit the result of the enciphering.

25. The smart card of claim 21, wherein the first secret data is a public key and the second secret data is a private key linked to the first secret data by an asymmetric encryption relation.