SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR GUARANTEEING SOFTWARE INTEGRITY VIA COMBINED HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE AUTHENTICATION

• US 20080215885A1
• Filed: 06/18/2007
• Published: 09/04/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 09/26/2002
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Atreus Labs LLC
• Original Assignee: International Business Machines Corporation
• Inventors: Lotspiech, Jeffrey B.
• Granted Patent: US 7,734,921 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/170
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/64 Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 10/087 Inventory or stock management, e.g. order filling, procurement or balancing against orders
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/127 Trusted platform modules [TPM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/56 Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/302 involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 using cryptographic hash functions
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3249 using RSA or related signature schemes, e.g. Rabin scheme

Abstract

A system, method, and computer program product enabling individual user devices to authenticate and validate a digital message sent by a distribution center, without requiring transmissions to the distribution center. The center transmits the message with an appended modulus that is the product of two specially selected primes. The transmission also includes an appended authentication value that is based on an original message hash value, a new message hash value, and the modulus. The new message hash value is designed to be the center'"'"'s public RSA key; a corresponding private RSA key is also computed. Individual user devices combine a digital signet, a public modulus, preferably unique hardware-based numbers, and an original message hash to compute a unique integrity value K. Subsequent messages are similarly processed to determine new integrity values K′, which equal K if and only if new messages originated from the center and have not been corrupted.

Claims

1-28. -28. (canceled)

29. A method for guaranteeing message integrity, comprising:

transmitting a transmission including a message and at least one appended value from a distribution center, said at least one appended value further comprising a modulus pq and an authentication value s;

receiving said transmission with an instance of a user device, said instance of a user device further comprising tamper-resistant hardware;

computing an integrity value K′

that depends on said transmission and at least one stored value, where K′

selectively enables decryption of said message and completion of an electronic commerce transaction, and

wherein said integrity value K′

selectively enables said decryption of said message if and only if a hash value h matches a correct hash value h₁, guaranteeing the integrity of said message,

wherein said integrity value K′

equals g₁^xg₂^a mod M, where x=s^h mod pq, pq is a modulus, s is an authentication value, h₁ is an odd-valued correct hash value of said message computed according to a means for hashing, said h is a hash value of said message computed by said user device according to the same means for hashing as for said correct hash value h₁, M is a public modulus, a is a stored digital signet, and g₁ and g₂ are stored values that uniquely identify the instance of said user device, and

wherein said message includes one software program portion, said integrity value K′

includes another software program portion, and said message and said integrity value K′

together comprise a complete software program;

said message further comprising protected information intended for use only by authorized recipients, wherein said protected information further comprises at least one of;

a text file, an audio file, a video file, an application, and a database;

said modulus pq further comprising a product of two prime numbers p and q, neither of said prime numbers p and q being separately included in said transmission,

wherein said prime numbers p and q are selected by said distribution center such that the likelihood of a product (p−

1)(q−

1) and an odd-valued correct hash value h₁ of said transmitted message having a greatest common denominator other than 1 is substantially zero, whereby h₁z=1 mod Φ

(pq) where Φ

(pq)=(p−

1)(q−

1) and said correct hash value h₁ is a public RSA key corresponding to said private RSA key z;

said s authentication value further comprising an encrypted version of an original hash value h₀, said modulus pq, and a private RSA key z where s=h₀^z mod pq;

said correct hash value h₁, further forced to be odd, if initially even, by predetermined means; and

said stored values are further stored in said tamper-resistant hardware.

30-44. -44. (canceled)