Server active management technology (AMT) assisted secure boot

• US 20080244257A1
• Filed: 03/30/2007
• Published: 10/02/2008
• Est. Priority Date: 03/30/2007
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Original Assignee: Intel Corporation
• Inventors: Zimmer, Vincent J., Vaid, Kushagra, Shekhar, Mrigank
• Granted Patent: US 8,984,265 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/2
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/575 Secure boot
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0827 involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths network architectures or network communication protocols using different networks H04L63/18

Abstract

In some embodiments, the invention involves a system and method relating to secure booting of a platform. In at least one embodiment, the present invention is intended to securely boot a platform using one or more signature keys stored in a secure location on the platform, where access to the signature is by a microcontroller on the platform and the host processor has no direct access to alter the signature key. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Claims

1. A system for secure boot on a platform, comprising:

a host processor coupled with a firmware memory store;

firmware for booting the host processor, the firmware to utilize one or more signature keys during boot, each signature key associated with a software image to be loaded on the platform during boot; and

a second processor on the platform, the second processor communicatively coupled to a secure area of a memory store, the secure area of the memory store being inaccessible to the firmware and other host processor applications;

the second processor configured to manage the one or more signature keys to control image loading during boot.

2. The system as recited in claim 1, wherein the secure area of memory store resides on the firmware memory store.

3. The system as recited in claim 2, wherein the firmware memory store is flash memory partitioned by a chipset on the platform, the partitioning to make the secure memory area inaccessible to the firmware.

4. The system as recited in claim 1, wherein the firmware is configured to retrieve a signature key from the firmware memory store if the signature key is not available in the secure memory area.

5. The system as recited in claim 1, wherein the firmware will not load or launch the software image if the signature key associated with the software image fails validation.

6. The system as recited in claim 5, wherein validation failure is a result of at least one of an expired certificate, missing certificate or a revoked certificate.

7. The system as recited in claim 1, wherein a signature key comprises at least one of a platform key, protected variable key, or a public key.

8. The system as recited in claim 7, wherein the one or more signature keys comprise a hierarchy of signature keys where a higher level key protects a lower level key.

9. The system as recited in claim 8, wherein the platform key is a higher level than a protected variable key which is a higher level than a public key, wherein a public key is associated with each software image to be loaded during boot.

10. The system as recited in claim 1, wherein the second processor has out-of-band communication capabilities and is configured to validate the one or more signature keys and to access at least one of a certificate validation or online certificate revocation list from a remote location via out-of-band communication.

11. The system as recited in claim 10, wherein the certificate validation or online certificate revocation list is retrieved from at least one of a local area network, remote network, location on the public Internet, a location on an intranet, or a machine accessible bulletin board.

12. The system as recited in claim 10, wherein the second processor comprises one of an active management technology microcontroller, a manageability engine controller, or a baseboard management controller.

13. A method for secure boot on a platform, comprising:

commencing a secure boot of a host processor on the platform by platform firmware;

determining whether a second processor has access to at least one signature key associated with a software image to be loaded at boot and stored in a secure store, and

if so, then retrieving the at least one signature key from the secure store by the second processor, but

if not, then retrieving the at least one signature key from a firmware store;