ASYNCHRONOUS ENHANCED SHARED SECRET PROVISIONING PROTOCOL

• US 20090037737A1
• Filed: 10/06/2008
• Published: 02/05/2009
• Est. Priority Date: 03/31/2004
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC (Microsoft Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Microsoft Corporation
• Inventors: Zick, Donald A.
• Granted Patent: US 8,433,903 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/171
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1466 Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/18 using different networks or channels, e.g. using out of band channels cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving distinctive intermediate devices or communication paths H04L9/0827; cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for authentication using a plurality of channels H04L9/3215
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0841 involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0869 involving random numbers or seeds
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3236 using cryptographic hash functions
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0433 Key management protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/122 Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices

Abstract

An Asynchronous Enhanced Shared Secret Provisioning Protocol (ESSPP) provides a novel method and system for adding devices to a network in a secure manner. A registration process is launched by at least one of two network devices together. These two devices then automatically register with each other. When two devices running Asynchronous ESSPP detect each other, they exchange identities and establish a key that can later be used by the devices to mutually authenticate each other and generate session encryption keys. An out-of-band examination of registration signatures generated at the two devices can be performed to help ensure that there was not a man-in-the-middle attacker involved in the key exchange.

Claims

1. A method for registering a first device with a second device, comprising:

deriving a commitment value at the first device from a first security value known to the first device;

communicating the commitment value from the first device to the second device;

communicating the security value from the first device to the second device; and

at the second device, attempting to derive the commitment value communicated thereto from the security value communicated thereto and terminating registration if the commitment value is not correctly derived from the security value.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the commitment value is a hash of the security value.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the security value is a registration nonce value.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

communicating information for use in generating a first secret from the second device to the first device over a first communication channel;

generating the first secret at the first device;

generating a second secret at the second device;

validating first verification information related to the first secret and second verification information related to the second secret using a second communication channel; and

enabling the first and second devices to use the first and second secrets upon a third party being assured that the first secret and the second secret are substantially identical based on the validation.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the first verification information has a shorter length than a length needed to provide a substantially identical level of security in a method that does not utilize a commitment value.

6. The method of claim 4, wherein the first verification information is a hash value derived from the first secret and the security value.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the first verification information is a hash value derived from a catenation of the first secret with the security value.

8. The method of claim 4, wherein the first device and the second device generate the first and second secrets using Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

9. A device capable of registering with a disparate device, comprising:

an interface to a first communication channel; and

means for conducting a registration process that receives a first hash of a security value from the disparate device using the first communication channel, receives the security value from the disparate device using the first communication channel, generates a second hash of the security value, and terminates registration if the first hash of the security value differs from the second hash of the security value.

10. The device of claim 9, wherein the security value is a registration nonce value.

11. The device of claim 9, further comprising an interface to a second communication channel, wherein the means for conducting a registration process generates a secret that is to be shared with the disparate device using the first communication channel, validates verification information derived from the secret on the second communication channel, and is enabled to use the secret upon receipt of an indication that a third party is assured that the secret is shared with the disparate device.

12. The device of claim 11, wherein the verification information is a hash value derived from the secret and the security value.

13. The device of claim 12, wherein the verification information is a hash value derived from a catenation of the secret with the security value.

14. The device of claim 11, wherein the verification information comprises a credential.

15. A computer-readable medium having stored thereon machine-executable instructions which, when executed by a machine, causes the machine to perform a method of registering with a network device comprising:

receiving a commitment value on a first communication channel, wherein the commitment value is derived from a security value;

receiving the security value on the first communication channel;

attempting to derive the commitment value from the security value; and

terminating registration with the network device if the commitment value is not successfully derived from the security value.

16. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the security value is a registration nonce value.

17. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the commitment value is a hash of the registration value.

18. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the method further comprises:

communicating information for use in generating a to-be-shared secret to the network device on the first communication channel;

generating the to-be-shared secret;

communicating verification information relating to the to-be-shared secret on a second communication channel; and

utilizing the to-be-shared secret upon receipt of an indication that a third party is assured that the to-be-shared secret has been shared with the network device.

19. The computer-readable medium of claim 18, wherein the verification information is derived from a hash of the to-be-shared secret.

20. The computer-readable medium of claim 18, wherein the verification information is derived from a hash of the to-be-shared secret and a nonce value.