NOISY LOW-POWER PUF AUTHENTICATION WITHOUT DATABASE

• US 20090282259A1
• Filed: 04/10/2007
• Published: 11/12/2009
• Est. Priority Date: 04/11/2006
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Intrinsic ID BV
• Original Assignee: Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (Koninklijke Philips N.V.)
• Inventors: Skoric, Boris, Tombeur, Antoon Marie Henrie, Tuyls, Pim Theo
• Application Number:
  US12/296,682
• Publication Number:
  US 20090282259A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/185
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/35 communicating wirelessly
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2103 Challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/341 Active cards, i.e. cards including their own processing means, e.g. including an IC or chip
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/388 using mutual authentication without cards, e.g. challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 20/40975 using encryption therefor
• CPC Class Codes: G07F 7/1008 Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/08 Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/12 Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3278 using physically unclonable functions [PUF]

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method of authenticating, at a verifier (210), a device (101, 201) comprising a physical token (102), a system for performing authentication and a device comprising a physical token which provides measurable parameters. A basic idea of the present invention is to provide a secure authentication protocol in which a low-power device (101, 201), for example an RFID tag, comprising a physical token (102) in the form of a physical uncloneable function (PUF) is relieved from performing cryptographic operations or other demanding operations in terms of processing power. To this end, a PUF device (101, 201) to be authenticated verifies if it in fact is being queried by an authorized verifier. For instance, an RFID tag comprising a PUF (102) may be arranged in a banknote which a bank wishes to authenticate. This verification is based on the bank'"'"'s unique ability to reveal concealed data, such as data having been created in an enrolment phase at which the RFID tag (or actually the PUF) was registered with the bank. Now, the RFID tag again challenges its PUF to create response data sent to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the response data is correct and, if so, authenticates the device comprising the physical token, since the device is able to produce response data that corresponds to response data concealed and stored in the enrolment phase.

Claims

1. A method of authenticating, at a verifier (210), a device (101, 201) comprising a physical token (102), the method comprising the steps of:

receiving, at the verifier, a first set of concealed response data from the device, which response data was derived from the physical token, concealed and stored in the device during enrolment;

revealing the concealed response data and sending it to the device;

challenging, at the device, the physical token with a first challenge that was employed to derive the first set of response data, to derive response data and comparing the derived response data with the first set of response data received from the verifier;

challenging, if the derived response data corresponds to the first response data set received from the verifier, the physical token with a second challenge that was employed to derive a second set of response data from the physical token and which second set was concealed and stored in the device during enrolment, to derive response data;

sending the second set of concealed response data and the response data derived from the second challenge to the verifier;

revealing, at the verifier, the second set of concealed response data and comparing the second set of response data with the response data derived from the second challenge, wherein the device is considered to be authenticated if there is correspondence between the two data sets.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the step of receiving a first set of concealed response data at the verifier (210) further comprises the step of:

checking whether the first set of concealed response data is provided with a valid digital signature and, if so, performing the step of revealing the first set of concealed data and sending it to the device (201).

3. The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of:

checking, at the verifier (210), whether the second set of concealed response data is provided with a valid digital signature and, if so, performing the step of revealing the second set of concealed response data and comparing the second set of response data with the response data derived from the second challenge.

4. The method of claim 1, further comprising the steps of:

receiving, at the verifier (210), concealed verification data from the device (201), which verification data was concealed and stored in the device during enrolment;

revealing the concealed verification data and sending it to the device; and

applying, at the device, a noninvertible function to the verification data and comparing an output of the function to a parameter stored in the device, wherein the step of deriving response data and comparing the derived response data with response data received from the verifier is performed if the output of the function corresponds to the stored parameter.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein the step of receiving concealed verification data at the verifier (210) further comprises the step of:

checking, at the verifier, whether the concealed verification data is provided with a valid digital signature and, if so, performing the step of revealing the concealed verification data and sending it to the device (201).

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein said response data comprises a response of the physical token (102).

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein said response data comprises processed data based on a response of the physical token (102) and noise-correcting data.

8. The method according to claim 7, further comprising the steps of:

encrypting the noise-correcting data; and

storing the encrypted noise-correcting data in the device (101, 201).

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein the physical token (102) is a physical uncloneable function.

11. The method according to claim 1, wherein the physical token (102) is cryptographically bound to the device (101) in which it is comprised.

12. The method according to claim 11, further comprising the steps of:

associating response data of the physical token (102) with an identifier of the device (101) in which the token is comprised; and

concealing the data created by the association and storing the concealed data in the device.

16. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of updating data that was stored in the device (101, 201) during enrolment comprises the steps of:

concealing, at the verifier (210), the received response data derived from the second challenge; and

replacing, in the device, the concealed second set of response data stored in the device during enrolment with the concealed response data derived from the second challenge.

17. The method according to claim 16, further comprising the step of:

receiving, at the verifier (210), the response data derived from the physical token (102) by using the first challenge;

concealing, at the verifier, said received response data derived from the first challenge; and

replacing, in the device (101, 201), the first set of concealed response data stored in the device during enrolment with the concealed response data derived from the first challenge.

10. (canceled)

13. (canceled)

14. (canceled)

15. (canceled)

18. (canceled)

19. A system for performing authentication, said system comprising:

a verifier (210); and

a device (101, 201) comprising a physical token (102);

wherein;

the verifier is arranged to

receive, from the device, a first set of concealed response data, which response data was derived from the physical token, concealed and stored in the device during enrolment;

reveal the concealed response data; and

send it to the device;

the device is arranged to

derive response data by challenging the physical token with a first challenge that was employed to derive the first set of response data;

compare the derived response data with the first set of response data received from the verifier;

derive response data by challenging, if the derived response data corresponds to the first response data set received from the verifier, the physical token with a second challenge that was employed to derive a second set of response data from the physical token and which second set was concealed and stored in the device during enrolment; and

send the second set of concealed response data and the response data derived from the second challenge to the verifier;

the verifier is further arranged to;

reveal the second set of concealed response data and compare the second set of response data with the response data derived from the second challenge, wherein the device is considered to be authenticated if there is correspondence between the two data sets.

20. The system of claim 19, wherein the verifier (210) further is arranged to check whether the first set of concealed response data is provided with a valid digital signature and, if so, reveal the first set of concealed data and send it to the device (201).

21. The system of claim 19, wherein the verifier (210) further is arranged to check whether the second set of concealed response data is provided with a valid digital signature and, if so, reveal the second set of concealed response data and compare the second set of response data with the response data derived from the second challenge.

22. The system of claim 19, wherein

the verifier (210) further is arranged to receive concealed verification data from the device, which verification data was concealed and stored in the device during enrolment, to reveal the concealed verification data and to send it to the device;

and

the device (201) further is arranged to apply a noninvertible function to the verification data and compare an output of the function to a parameter stored in the device, wherein deriving response data and comparing the derived response data with response data received from the verifier is performed if the output of the function corresponds to the stored parameter.

23. (canceled)

24. (canceled)

25. A device (101) comprising a physical token (102) which provides measurable parameters, said device further comprising:

sensor elements (103) for measuring the parameters provided by the physical token;

logic circuitry (108) for processing data supplied to it in a noninvertible function;

at least one memory (106, 107) for storing concealed response data derived from said physical token (102) during enrolment of the device; and

communication means (105, 109) for communicating with an external entity.

26. The device (101) according to claim 25, wherein said physical token (102) comprises a coating which at least partly covers the device.

27. The device (101) according to claim 25, wherein said device is a radio frequency identification (RFID) tag.

28. (canceled)