METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR SIMULATING A WORKFLOW AND ANALYZING THE BEHAVIOR OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE ATTRIBUTES THROUGH A DATA PROVIDENCE ARCHITECTURE

• US 20100250932A1
• Filed: 01/05/2010
• Published: 09/30/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 03/24/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Lockheed Martin Corporation (Martin Marietta Corporation)
• Original Assignee: Lockheed Martin Corporation (Martin Marietta Corporation)
• Inventors: CRAPO, Andrew, BARNETT, Bruce, DILL, Stephen J., MOITRA, Abha
• Granted Patent: US 8,452,962 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 51/00 User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 51/08 Annexed information, e.g. attachments
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 51/234 for tracking messages
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/20 for managing network security; network security policies in general filtering policies H04L63/0227

Abstract

A method and apparatus that simulates a workflow and analyzes the behavior of information assurance attributes through a data providence architecture is disclosed. The method may include injecting one or more faults into a simulated workflow, receiving a message in the simulated workflow having a data provenance wrapper, examining each data provenance record of the message and any attachments for discrepancies, identifying any discrepancies in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments; calculating a degree of trust based on any discrepancies identified in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments, analyzing the calculated degree of trust with respect to the one or more injected faults and the information assurance attributes, and outputting the analysis to a user.

Claims

1. A method for simulating a workflow and analyzing the behavior of information assurance attributes through a data providence architecture, comprising:

injecting one or more faults into a simulated workflow;

receiving a message in the simulated workflow having a data provenance wrapper, wherein the message may or may not have attachments and the data provenance wrapper contains a data provenance record with data provenance information for the message and each attachment, the one or more injected faults being included in at least one of the received message, the data provenance information, and at least one of the attachments;

examining each data provenance record of the message and any attachments for discrepancies, wherein the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments includes;

verifying signatures of senders of the message and any attachments;

calculating a hash value for the message and any attachments;

verifying that the hash value for the message and any attachments matches the values in the data provenance record for the message and any attachments;

verifying the timestamp of the message and any attachments; and

verifying information assurance attributes of the message and any attachments, the information assurance attributes being at least one of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and availability;

identifying any discrepancies in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments;

calculating a degree of trust based on the security attributes and message identification information included in the message, the data provenance record and any discrepancies identified in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments;

analyzing the calculated degree of trust with respect to the one or more injected faults and the information assurance attributes; and

outputting the analysis to a user.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the data provenance information includes at least one of message identification information, outgoing security attributes, timestamp, identification information of owner of signature, references, hash of an invariant part of the message, hash algorithm used, security label, authenticity objective information, authenticity subjective information, confidentiality objective information, confidentiality subjective information, integrity objective information, integrity subjective information, availability objective information, availability subjective information, and sender'"'"'s signature.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the received message is one of a simulated message and an actual message.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein simulated workflow allows for experimentation of different cryptographic techniques.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more injected faults are one of a malicious attack and a man-in-the middle attack.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the simulated workflow allows threats and attacks to be modeled.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the message is received at one of a processing device, a mobile communication device, a portable computer, a desktop computer, a server, a network router, a gateway device, and combinations thereof.

8. An apparatus that simulates a workflow and analyzes the behavior of information assurance attributes through a data providence architecture, comprising:

a communication interface that facilitates the sending and receiving of messages;

a data provenance information analysis unit that injects one or more faults into a simulated workflow, receives a message in the simulated workflow having a data provenance wrapper, examines each data provenance record of the message and any attachments for discrepancies, identifies any discrepancies in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments, calculates a degree of trust based on the security attributes and message identification information included in the message, the data provenance record and any discrepancies identified in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments, analyzes the calculated degree of trust with respect to the one or more injected faults and the information assurance attributes, and outputs the analysis to a user,

wherein the message may or may not have attachments and the data provenance wrapper contains a data provenance record with data provenance information for the message and each attachment, the one or more injected faults being included in at least one of the received message, the data provenance information, and at least one of the attachments; and

wherein in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments, the data provenance information analysis unit verifies signatures of senders of the message and any attachments, calculates a hash value for the message and any attachments, verifies that the hash value for the message and any attachments matches the values in the data provenance record for the message and any attachments, verifies the timestamp of the message and any attachments, and verifies information assurance attributes of the message and any attachments, the information assurance attributes being at least one of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and availability.

9. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the data provenance information includes at least one of message identification information, outgoing security attributes, timestamp, identification information of owner of signature, references, hash of an invariant part of the message, hash algorithm used, security label, authenticity objective information, authenticity subjective information, confidentiality objective information, confidentiality subjective information, integrity objective information, integrity subjective information, availability objective information, availability subjective information, and sender'"'"'s signature.

10. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the received message is one of a simulated message and an actual message.

11. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein simulated workflow allows for experimentation of different cryptographic techniques.

12. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the one or more injected faults are one of a malicious attack and a man-in-the middle attack.

13. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the simulated workflow allows threats and attacks to be modeled.

14. The apparatus of claim 8, wherein the message is received at one of a processing device, a mobile communication device, a portable computer, a desktop computer, a server, a network router, a gateway device, and combinations thereof.

15. A computer-readable medium storing instructions for simulating a workflow and analyzing the behavior of information assurance attributes through a data providence architecture, the instructions comprising:

injecting one or more faults into a simulated workflow;

receiving a message in the simulated workflow having a data provenance wrapper, wherein the message may or may not have attachments and the data provenance wrapper contains a data provenance record with data provenance information for the message and each attachment, the one or more injected faults being included in at least one of the received message, the data provenance information, and at least one of the attachments;

examining each data provenance record of the message and any attachments for discrepancies, wherein the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments includes;

verifying signatures of senders of the message and any attachments;

calculating a hash value for the message and any attachments;

verifying that the hash value for the message and any attachments matches the values in the data provenance record for the message and any attachments;

verifying the timestamp of the message and any attachments; and

verifying information assurance attributes of the message and any attachments, the information assurance attributes being at least one of authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and availability;

identifying any discrepancies in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments;

calculating a degree of trust based on the security attributes and message identification information included in the message, the data provenance record and any discrepancies identified in the examination of each data provenance record of the message and any attachments;

analyzing the calculated degree of trust with respect to the one or more injected faults and the information assurance attributes; and

outputting the analysis to a user.

16. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the data provenance information includes at least one of message identification information, outgoing security attributes, timestamp, identification information of owner of signature, references, hash of an invariant part of the message, hash algorithm used, security label, authenticity objective information, authenticity subjective information, confidentiality objective information, confidentiality subjective information, integrity objective information, integrity subjective information, availability objective information, availability subjective information, and sender'"'"'s signature.

17. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the received message is one of a simulated message and an actual message.

18. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein simulated workflow allows for experimentation of different cryptographic techniques.

19. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the one or more injected faults are one of a malicious attack and a man-in-the middle attack.

20. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the simulated workflow allows threats and attacks to be modeled.

21. The computer-readable medium of claim 15, wherein the message is received at one of a processing device, a mobile communication device, a portable computer, a desktop computer, a server, a network router, a gateway device, and combinations thereof.