Fully Secure Item-Level Tagging

• US 20100289627A1
• Filed: 07/22/2010
• Published: 11/18/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 08/19/2005
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: ADASA Inc.
• Original Assignee: ADASA Inc.
• Inventors: McAllister, Clarke William, Campbell, Daniel Shihady
• Granted Patent: US 8,917,159 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 340/10.42
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/44 Program or device authentication
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2143 Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
• CPC Class Codes: G06Q 10/087 Inventory or stock management, e.g. order filling, procurement or balancing against orders
• CPC Class Codes: G08B 13/2417 having a radio frequency identification chip
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/083 involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0891 Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3226 using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using passwords in a packet data network H04L63/083
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3234 involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using an additional device in a packet data network H04L63/0853

Abstract

The present invention provides value to brand owners, retailers, and consumers through the use of radio frequency identification, stenography, nanolithography, fingerprints, novel heuristic threat evaluation, indication, and detection model. Additionally, using cryptography, tag passwords are formulated and identities are reversibly flipped, thus allowing item identities to remain secret to unauthorized observers. This unique combination of heuristics and authentication technologies provides an efficient means of finding and stopping the flow of counterfeit products throughout global supply chains. The present invention includes radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, encoders, servers, identity changers, and authenticity verifiers to make this task a viable and adaptive weapon against the elusive counterfeiters. The present end-to-end RFID system offers unprecedented security for retailers and consumers, while remaining efficient and scalable.

Claims

1. ) A supply chain visibility and product authentication system to improve supply chain efficiency and to assist brand owners in the protection of their brand. At the front of the system is a secure RFID tag encoder and downstream in the supply chain is a secure RFID tag authenticator;

both are intermittently coupled through a security server with no real time connection required and all encryption functions stored off-tag. The system is comprised of;

RFID tags containing an access and kill password and a cryptographic key index;

a security server managing and providing a changing set of cryptographic keys over a distribution network;

one or more secure RFID encoders encoding the RFID tags using the set of cryptographic keys provided by the security server to create the access and kill password from data on the RFID tag. The cryptographic keys are hidden in protected memory of the secure RFID encoder; and

one or more secure RFID authenticators determining an authentic RFID tag by using the securely stored cryptographic keys provided by the security server and data from the RFID tag to compute a kill password and to compare the computed kill password with the kill password stored on the RFID tag.

2. ) The system of claim 1, wherein the secure RFID encoder receives from the security server authorizations that enable the encoding of a certain number of tags for a given specified list of SKU'"'"'s.

3. ) The system of claim 1, wherein the RFID tag contains a Quality Control Code that is used to reveal where, when, and how the RFID tag was encoded. The Quality Control Code is encrypted and not able to be interpreted by unauthorized persons.

4. ) The system of claim 1, wherein the RFID tag contains a single fingerprint and associated minutia of the operator that applied the RFID tag. The fingerprint can be read by either the secure RFID encoder or secure RFID authenticator and compared to a reference that is preferably stored on the security server.

5. ) The system of claim 1 further comprising a secure RFID tag attached to a cartridge that contains a supply of the RFID tags to be encoded, the attached RFID tag is encrypted and is read from and written to by the secure RFID encoder during encoder operation.

6. ) The system of claim 1, wherein brand protection is further enforced by aggregating over a greater number of RFID tags data that reveals selected encoding information in greater detail.

7. ) The system of claim 1 further comprising the secure RFID authenticator collecting and exchanging heuristic information with the security server.

8. ) A secure RFID tag encoder enabled by authorizations to encode RFID tags used to identify and authenticate goods, comprising:

a unique encoder number;

a processing means for computing and controlling encoder actions;

an RFID tag interrogator means for modifying the state of the RFID tags in order to record a unique identifier and an encrypted password into each RFID tag;

a means for receiving and hiding in encoder memory a changing set of cryptographic keys;

a means of receiving authorizations that enable the encoding of a certain number of RFID tags for a given specified list of SKU'"'"'s; and

a means to prevent physical or logical tampering with or monitoring of circuitry and signals that are used to produce the cryptographically secured codes.

9. ) The secure RFID tag encoder of claim 8 further comprising a GPS receiver and a real-time clock means for reporting the location of the RFID tag encoder with the date and time of encoding actions.

10. ) The secure RFID tag encoder of claim 8 further comprising a Faraday cage or electronic means to prevent eavesdroppers from detecting secret passwords sent to the RFID tag or secret passwords that are read directly from the RFID tag.

11. ) The secure RFID tag encoder of claim 8 further comprising the means for an operator of the secure RFID tag encoder to logon using any combination of:

a password, a security token, or a biometric feature.

12. ) The secure RFID tag encoder of claim 8, wherein sets of the cryptographic keys are communicated to the secure RFID tag encoder through a wired or wireless network, or a physical token device.

13. ) An RFID tag predisposed to identifying itself to an RFID reader its product identification code while preventing unauthorized duplication, malicious killing of tags, and hiding the product identification code from public view, comprised of:

a memory means;

a means for storing an access and kill password in a partition of the memory means;

a means for preventing the kill password from being read until unlocked;

a means for unlocking the kill password using the access password;

a means for storing a cryptographic key index in a partition of the memory means;

a means for storing a password specification header in a partition of the memory means;

a means for storing and reporting an alternate identity in a partition of the memory means, cryptographically related to the original product identification code using the cryptographic key index; and

a means for indicating the use of the alternate identity to help facilitate converting the alternate identity back to the original product identification code using the cryptographic key index.

14. ) The RFID tag of claim 13 further comprising an encrypted Quality Control Code comprised of a day and time field, an encoder number, and a Global Location Code that collectively represent the time and place that a specific encoder encoded an RFID tag.

15. ) The RFID tag of claim 14, wherein the Quality Control Code is further comprised of a Data Carrier Mark that is an index into a table that specifies the characteristics of conventional hidden marks or fingerprints and the associated minutia that are embedded into the data carrier of the RFID tag.

16. ) The RFID tag of claim 13, wherein the password specification header specifies any of:

a fixed password, a password acquired from a table, or a password that is cryptographically formulated.

17. ) An RFID authenticator means for determining if an RFID tag is authentic, while not requiring a real-time network connection, comprising:

a means for securely storing a changing set of cryptographic keys provided from a security server;

a means for determining the appropriate method to determine the access and kill passwords of the RFID tag by reading a password specification header stored on the RFID tag;

a means for determining the authenticity of the RFID tag by computing a kill password using data from the RFID tag and the set of cryptographic keys, and comparing the computed kill password to the kill password stored on the RFID tag; and

a means for exchanging heuristic information with the security server.

18. ) The RFID authenticator means of claim 17 further comprising a means for scanning the fingerprint that was left on the RFID tag when the RFID tag was manually applied by an operator of an RFID encoder.

19. ) The RFID authenticator means of claim 17 further comprising the means for hiding passwords sent to the RFID tag or passwords that are read directly from the RFID tag in order to prevent eavesdroppers from detecting the passwords.

20. ) An RFID interrogator for reversibly altering the identity of an RFID tag from a publicly readable and decodable form to an alternate identity that is cryptographically related to the first identity. The alteration of the identity is based upon steps that access a changing set of cryptographic keys that are locally stored in the RFID interrogator. The RFID interrogator is comprised of:

a means to read information and a cryptographic key index from the RFID tag;

a means to acquire a changing set of cryptographic keys from a trusted source;

a means to alter the primary identifying information in the RFID tag in a pattern that is cryptographically related to the original pattern using the changing set of cryptographic keys;

a means to revert the RFID tag from the altered identity to the primary identification state using the changing set of cryptographic keys; and

a means to determine if the RFID tag is either in the primary or altered identification tag state.