GENERATING SECURITY MATERIAL

• US 20100333185A1
• Filed: 06/08/2010
• Published: 12/30/2010
• Est. Priority Date: 06/24/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Marvell Asia Pte Limited (Marvell Technology Group Limited)
• Original Assignee: Marvell World Trade Limited (Marvell Technology Group Limited)
• Inventors: LIU, Yong, LAMBERT, Paul A.
• Granted Patent: US 8,813,201 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 726/6
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/601 Broadcast encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/065 for group communications cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management involving conference or group key H04L9/0833
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0892 by using authentication-authorization-accounting [AAA] servers or protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0833 involving conference or group key network architectures or network communication protocols for key management in group communication in a packet data network H04L63/065
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/045 using private Base Stations, e.g. femto Base Stations, home Node B

Abstract

An apparatus and method establish a secure, direct, station-to-station communication between a first station and a second station in a topology (e.g., PBSS) having a central secret holder/provider that allows secure, direct, station-to-station communications and that allows secure station-to-station broadcast communications. The first station and the second station will have previously established a security association (SA) with a topology control point (PCP). The method includes creating pair-wise unique material for the first station. The pair-wise unique material is computed as a function of (i) a known shared secret associated with the PCP, (ii) a first piece of unique data associated with the first station, and (iii) a second piece of unique data associated with the second station. The method includes securely communicating the pair-wise unique material from the first station to the second station.

Claims

1. A method for establishing a secure, direct, station-to-station communication between a first station and a second station in a topology comprising a central secret holder and provider that allows secure, direct, station-to-station communications and that allows secure station-to-station broadcast communications, in which the first station and the second station have previously established a security association (SA) with a topology control point (PCP), the method comprising:

creating pair-wise unique material for the first station,

wherein the pair-wise unique material is computed as a function of (i) a known shared secret associated with the PCP, (ii) a first piece of unique data associated with the first station, and (iii) a second piece of unique data associated with the second station; and

securely communicating the pair-wise unique material from the first station to the second station.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein:

the known shared secret is a group transient key (GTK) separately provided by the PCP to the first station and the second station, the first piece of unique data is a media access control (MAC) address associated with the first station, or a nonce;

the second piece of unique data is a MAC address associated with the second station or a nonce.

3. The method of claim 2, further comprising using an extensible authentication protocol over local area network (EAPoL) four-way handshake to communicate the first piece of unique data and the second piece of unique data between the first station and the second station.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising:

in response to a race condition associated with colliding EAPoL four-way handshake establishment attempts by the first station and the second station, selectively resolving the race condition based on the MAC address of the first member and the second member or another unique identifier of the first member and the second member.

5. The method of claim 3, further comprising:

securing a communication between the first member and the second member using the pair-wise unique material.

11. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

creating group-wise security material for a broadcasting member of the topology, wherein the broadcasting member has established an SA with the PCP, and wherein the broadcasting member is to securely transmit a message to one or more other stations in the topology, the group-wise security material being computed as a function of (i) a known broadcast secret associated with the PCP and (ii) a piece of unique data associated with the broadcasting member; and

securely communicating the group-wise security material from the broadcasting member to the one or more other members of the topology, wherein the known shared secret is a group transient key (GTK) provided by the PCP, wherein the first piece of unique data is a media access control (MAC) address associated with the first station or a nonce, and wherein the second piece of unique data is a MAC address associated with the second station or a nonce, and wherein the known broadcast secret is the GTK provided by the PCP, and wherein the unique data is a MAC address associated with the broadcasting member or a nonce.

6. A method, comprising:

creating group-wise security material for a broadcasting member of a piconet basic service set (PBSS), wherein the broadcasting member has previously established a security association (SA) with a PBSS control point (PCP), and wherein the broadcasting member is to securely transmit a message to one or more members of the PBSS, where the message will not transit the PCP,

wherein the group-wise security material is computed as a function of a known secret associated with the PCP and a piece of unique data associated with the broadcasting member; and

securely communicating the group-wise security material from the broadcasting member to one or more other members of the PBSS.

7. The method of claim 6, the known secret being a group transient key (GTK) provided by the PCP, and the piece of unique data being a media access control (MAC) address associated with the broadcasting member, or a nonce.

8. The method of claim 6, further comprising:

using an extensible authentication protocol over local area network (EAPoL) four-way handshake to communicate the piece of unique data or the group-wise security material to the PCP.

9. The method of claim 6, further comprising:

communicating the group-wise security material from the PCP to the one or more other members of the PBSS; and

communicating group-wise security information associated with the one or more other members of the PBSS to the broadcasting member.

10. The method of claim 6, further comprising:

using the group-wise security material to secure a communication between the broadcasting member and the one or more other members of the PBSS.

12. An apparatus for computing a pair-wise transient key for a first station (S_i) and a second station (S_j) of a piconent basic service set (PBSS), S_i and S_j having previously established a security association (SA) with a PBSS control point (PCP), S_i and S_j to perform a secure, station-to-station communication that does not transit the PCP, the method comprising:

pair-wise key logic to compute the pair-wise transient key (PTK), and where, according to;

PTK_ij=f(GTK_PCP, Unique_SI, Unique_SJ)

wherein GTK_PCP is a group transient key generated by the PCP,

wherein Unique_SI is information unique to S_i, and

wherein Unique_SJ is information unique to S_j;

and

pair-wise communication logic to securely communicate the PTK_ij between S_i and S_j.

13. The apparatus of claim 12, Unique_Si being a media access control (MAC) address associated with S_i or a nonce, and Unique_Sj being a MAC address associated with S_j or a nonce.

14. The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the pair-wise communication logic securely communicates Unique_Si and Unique_Sj between _Si and S_j using an extensible authentication protocol over local area network (EAPoL) four-way handshake.

15. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

race logic to resolve a first message race condition associated with colliding EAPoL four-way handshake establishment attempts by S_i and S_j based on the MAC address of S_i and S_j.

16. The apparatus of claim 13, further comprising:

computing PTK_ij according to;

PTK_ij=f(GTK_PCP, Unique_Si, Unique_Sj, additional parameters)

wherein the additional parameters are based, at least in part, on beacon information provided by the PCP.

20. The apparatus of claim 12, further comprising:

group-wise key logic to compute, for a broadcasting member S_B of the PBSS, a group-wise transient key (GTK_B), where S_B has previously established an SA with the PCP, and where S_B is to perform a secure, station-to-station communication that does not transit the PCP, where the secure, station-to-station communication involves one or more other members of the PBSS,

wherein the GTK_B is computed according to;

GTK_B=f(GTK_PCP, Unique_SB)

wherein GTK_PCP is a group transient key generated by the PCP, and

wherein Unique_SB is information unique to S_B;

and

group-wise communication logic to securely communicate GTK_B from S_B to the one or more other members of the PBSS.

17. An apparatus to compute a group-wise transient key (GTK_B) for a broadcasting member S_B of a piconet basic service set (PBSS), where S_B has previously established a security association (SA) with a PBSS control point (PCP), and where S_B is to perform a secure, station-to-station communication that does not transit the PCP, where the secure, station-to-station communication will involve one or more other members of the PBSS, comprising:

group-wise key logic to compute GTK_B,

according to;

GTK_B=f(GTK_PCP, Unique_SB)

wherein GTK_B is a group transient key generated by the PCP, and

wherein Unique_SB is information unique to S_B;

and

group-wise communication logic to securely communicate GTK_B from S_B to the one or more other members of the PBSS.

18. The apparatus of claim 17, Unique_SB being a media access control (MAC) address associated with S_B or a nonce.

19. The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the group-wise communication logic securely communicates Unique_SB and GTK_SB to the PCP using an extensible authentication protocol over local area network (EAPoL) four-way handshake, wherein the group-wise communication logic signals the PCP to selectively distribute the GTK_SB to one or more members of the PBSS, and wherein the group-wise communication logic signals the PCP to selectively distribute group transient keys associated with other members of the PBSS to S_B.