Interlocked Binary Protection Using Whitebox Cryptography

• US 20120192283A1
• Filed: 05/06/2010
• Published: 07/26/2012
• Est. Priority Date: 05/06/2009
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Irdeto B.V. (MultiChoice Group Ltd.)
• Original Assignee: Irdeto Canada Corporation (MultiChoice Group Ltd.)
• Inventors: Gu, Yuan Xiang, Murdock, Daniel Elie, McRae, Paul, Nicolescu, Bogdan, Levitsky, Valery, Zhu, Xijian, Dong, Hongrui
• Granted Patent: US 9,141,787 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 726/26
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/14 against software analysis or reverse engineering, e.g. by obfuscation
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/54 by adding security routines or objects to programs
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/16 Obfuscation or hiding, e.g. involving white box
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/002 Countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms network architectures or network communication protocols for protection against malicious traffic H04L63/1441

Abstract

A system and method for transforming a software application comprising binary code and optionally associated data, from an original form to a more secure form. The method includes performing a combination of binary transmutations to the application, and interlocking the transmutations by generating and placing interdependencies between the transmutations, wherein a transmutation is an irreversible change to the application. Different types of the transmutations are applied at varied granularities of the application. The transmutations are applied to the application code and the implanted code as well. The result is a transformed software application which is semantically equivalent to the original software application but is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks.

Claims

1. A method of transforming a binary software application comprising binary application code from an original form to a secured form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said method comprising:

A) performing a combination of a plurality of binary transmutations to said binary software application during a build time phase by making a series of changes to said binary application code to produce changed binary application code, said changes including implanting new code intertwined with said changed binary application code during build-time; and

B) interlocking said transmutations by generating and placing interdependencies between the transmutations;

C) during execution, applying said combination of transmutations and interlocking to both the binary application code to be protected and the implanted code; and

D) producing a protected application that is semantically equivalent to the original application but which comprises said interlocked transmutations such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application.

6. The method of any one of claims 1-5 wherein Step (B) comprises using transmutations with complementary properties.

12. The method of any one of claims 1-11 where a binary transmutation applies a white-box transformation process comprising :

at build-time;

i) utilizing a white-box transformation build-time facility to generate and assemble white-box transformation keys and operation code; and

ii) transforming said binary code and relevant important information from an input form to an output form by performing a white-box transformation operation with a white-box transformation build-time key, and;

iii) at run-time, utilizing a white-box transformation run-time facility to transform binary code and relevant important information from an output form back to an input form by performing a white-box transformation inverse operation with a white-box transformation run-time key.

13. The method of claim 12, wherein the white-box transformation build-time facility comprises:

a. a white-box transformation generator;

b. a white-box transformation build-time key master

c. a white-box transformation operation master; and

d. a white-box transformation build-time manager

and wherein the white-box transformation run-time facility comprises;

e. a white-box transformation run-time key master;

f. a white-box transformation inverse operation master; and

g. a white-box transformation run-time manager.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein the white-box transformation generator accepts original key data and a transformation algorithm selection supplied by a user, and generates mated pairs of white-box transformation build-time key data (along with semantic operation code) coupled with the corresponding white-box transformation run-time key data (along with the inverse operation code).

15. The method of claim 14, further comprising:

hiding the original key data and important transformation information after white-box transformation run-time key data and operation code are generated, to prevent inadvertent leaking while the corresponding white-box transformation inverse operation code is executing.

16. The method of claim 13 or 14, wherein multiple transformations are applied, and wherein said white-box transformation operation master stores multiple white-box transformation operations, said white-box transformation build-time key master stores multiple white-box transformation keys and wherein said white-box transformation run-time key master stores multiple white-box transformation run-time keys and said white-box transformation inverse operation master stores multiple white-box transformation inverse operations.

17. The method of claim 13, wherein:

said white-box transformation build-time key master is accessed by the white-box transformation build-time manager;

said white-box transformation operation master organizes and locates multiple white-box transformation semantic operation codes securely and effectively;

said white-box transformation operation master is only accessed by the white-box transformation build-time manager;

said white-box transformation build-time manager coordinates the storing, retrieving, and matching of various white box transformation build-time keys with their corresponding white box transformation semantic operation code;

such that each white-box transformation process utilizes a white-box transformation build-time manager to invoke the proper white-box transformation semantic operations using the corresponding white-box transformation build-time keys at run-time

said white-box transformation run-time key master organizes, stores and locates multiple white-box transformation run-time keys securely and effectively;

said white-box transformation run-time key master is accessed by the white-box transformation run-time manager;

said white-box transformation inverse operation master organizes and locates multiple white-box transformation inverse operation code securely and effectively;

said white-box transformation inverse operation master is accessed by the white-box transformation run-time manager;

said white-box transformation run-time manager coordinates the storing, retrieving, and matching of various white box transformation run-time keys with their corresponding white box transformation inverse operation code; and

such that each white-box transformation process utilizes a white-box transformation run-time manager to invoke the proper white-box transformation inverse operations using the corresponding white-box transformation run-time keys at run-time.

18. The method of claim 13, further comprising:

selecting a wide range of computational algorithms including most popular cryptographic algorithms for white-box transformation algorithms implemented by said white-box transformation generator.

19. The method of claim 14 wherein, if a cryptographic algorithm is selected and a crypto key is provided by a user, the white-box transformation generator generates:

b. a white-box encrypt operation code as white-box transformation operation code

c. a white-box decrypt operation code as white-box transformation inverse operation code

d. a white-box encrypt key data as white-box transformation build-time key data

e. a white-box decrypt key data as white-box transformation run-time key data

20. The method of any one of claims 12-19, wherein different white-box transformation build-time and run-time keys and operation code are generated and assembled for different transmutations at different successively nested layers.

27. The method of any one of claims 12-26 wherein one of said binary transmutations comprises a Module Transmutation (MT) which protects an application module, which can be an application executable and/or dynamically shared library modules, by MT processing at build-time and at run-time in order to prevent static attacks to said application modules, wherein the MT processing at build-time comprises:

a. interacting with the white-box transformation build-time facility to generate and assemble MT specific white-box transformation keys and operations, wherein said assembled MT specific white-box transformation keys and operations comprise MT specific white-box transformation build-time key data and a white-box transformation operation along with corresponding white box transformation run-time key data and a white-box inverse operation;

b. compressing the binary code of an application module to be protected to form compressed binary code;

c. applying said MT specific white-box transformation operation to transform said compressed binary code by using said MT specific white-box transformation build-time key data and white-box transformation operation (from step a) to form a white-box transformed module ;

d. generating a securely packaged application module for said application module by combining said white-box transformed module (from step c) with a Resident Security Module (RSM) that contains said white box transformation run-time key data and inverse operation (assembled in step a) in hidden form; and

wherein the Module Transmutation (MT) is further comprised of run-time processing including;

e. while OS is loading the securely packaged application module and triggering the execution of code in the RSM, the RSM interacts with the white-box transformation run-time facility to inverse-transform the white-box transformed module to the compressed application module by executing the IV specific white box transformation inverse operation using the white box transformation run-time key data;

f. applying an uncompression operation to the compressed application module to obtain the binary code of said application module

g. mapping and loading said application module into memory, and transferring control to the entry point of the application.

29. The method of any one of claims 12-28 wherein one of said binary transmutations comprises at least one Function Transmutation (FT) which protects individual functions within application modules, by FT processing at build-time and at run-time in order to prevent static and dynamic attacks to said functions wherein a Function Transmutation is comprised of FT processing at build-time including:

a. interacting with the white-box transformation build-time facility to generate and assemble FT specific white-box transformation keys and operation codes unique to each of functions to be protected;

b. producing transformed functions by applying an FT specific white-box transformation to transform the binary code comprising each of the said functions by using white-box transformation build-time key data and white-box transformation operations specific to each of the functions (from step a);

c. installing entry and exit function handlers for each of said transformed functions so that all calls to each transformed function are performed via its entry function handler while return from the function is done via its exit function handler;

d. preparing a securely packaged application module for said application module comprising a Resident Security Module (RSM) and all protected functions by combining the white-box transformed functions with hidden white box transformation run-time key data and inverse operation assembled in step (a) corresponding to white-box transformation build-time key data and white-box transformation operation used on step (b), and all entry and exit function handlers installed in step (c) for all protected functions and

wherein the Function Transmutation (FT) is further comprised of run-time actions for each FT protected function including;

e. during the application module execution, when a protected function is invoked, its entry function handler is first executed and interacts with the white-box transformation run-time facility to inverse-transform the white-box transformed function code by executing the white box transformation inverse operation using the white box transformation run-time key data and operation codes specific to the function;

f. loading the inverse-transformed functions into execution memory; and

g. transferring the execution control to the function and, upon exit from the function, invoking the function'"'"'s exit handler.

30. The method of claim 29 wherein said RSM, for each function, clears or scrambles the function'"'"'s memory footprint before returning.

31. The method of claim 29 or 30 wherein intra layer protection is invoked such that one or both of an IV or ADB transmutation is interlocked with the FT applied to a function being protected by applying the IV, ADB or both transmutations to the entry and exit function handlers implicitly.

32. The method of any one of claims 29 -31 wherein an additional inter-layer transmutation, namely a Block Transmutation (BT) protects basic blocks of code within individual functions within application modules by BT processing at build-time and at run-time in order to provide much stronger protection against static, dynamic and automatic attacks to said functions, and in a particular embodiment, wherein the Block Transmutation is comprised of BT processing at build-time including:

a. analyzing control flow and data flow of the said function to identify and determine block information and the structure of the function;

b. augmenting each block by installing entry and exit block handlers for each of blocks so that all execution paths reaching each of the blocks being protected invoke its entry block handler first, and then reach the block code, and finally leave from the block via its exit block handler accordingly.

c. interacting with the white-box transformation build-time facility to generate and assemble BT specific white-box transformation keys and operation codes unique to each of the blocks to be protected;

d. producing transformed blocks by applying a BT specific white-box transformation to transform the augmented binary code of each of the basic blocks (as processed in step b), by using white-box transformation build-time key data and white-box transformation operation specific to each of blocks (as generated and assembled in step c);

e. preparing a securely packaged application module for said application module comprising a Resident Security Module (RSM) containing said transformed blocks with said entry and exit block handlers, and said hidden white box transformation run-time key data and inverse operation assembled;

wherein the Block Transmutation (BT) is further comprised of run-time actions for all protected blocks of one particular FT protected function including;

f. during the application module execution, each time a protected function containing protected blocks is invoked, all blocks that belong to the same function are randomly permuted in memory.

g. each time a protected block is to execute, its entry block handler is invoked which then interacts with the white-box transformation run-time facility to inverse-transform the white-box transformed block by executing the white box transformation inverse operation using the white box transformation run-time key data and operation codes specific to the block;

h. loading the inverse-transformed block in a designated execution memory;

i. transferring execution control to the block loaded and, upon exit from the block, the exit block handler (optionally) clears or scrambles the memory footprint and transfers execution to the next block. Repeat step B, C and D until the protected function exits.

33. The method of claim 32, wherein the Block Transmutation (BT) further comprises random code position permutation of dynamically inverse-transformed blocks in memory based on the frequency of block permutation specified by users via the input security options.

34. The method of claim 32, wherein the Block Transmutation (BT) is further comprised that the exit block handler can optionally interact with the white-box transformation run-time facility to re-transform the white-box inverse-transformed block by executing the white box transformation operation using the white box transformation run-time key data and operation codes specific to the block.

35. The method of claim 33 or 34 wherein the block transmutations are further protected by applying one or both of IV and/or ADB transmutations to each block'"'"'s entry and exit block handlers.

36. The method of any one of claims 27-35 wherein the Instruction Transmutation (IT) protects single instructions of code within individual functions within application modules, by IT processing at build-time and at run-time in order to provide much strong protections against static, dynamic and automatic attacks to said functions.

2. The method of claim 2, wherein said combination of a plurality of binary transmutations comprises at least one inter-layer transmutation applied to successively nested layers of said binary application code.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein Step (B) comprises adding interlocking data, and wherein step (D) comprises producing a protected application which can not be executed correctly without the presence of valid interlocking data.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein Step (B) comprises having one transmutation require a previous transmutation to be present for proper execution.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein Step (B) comprises having one transmutation produce output that is used as input for a second transmutation.

7. The method of any one of claims 2-6, wherein said successively nested layers comprise the modules comprising the application, the functions comprising a module, the basic blocks of instructions comprising the functions, and the individual machine instructions.

8. The method of any one of claims 2-7 wherein said combination of binary transmutations further comprises at least one intra-layer transmutation applied to a layer of said binary application code.

10. The method of any one of claim 8 or 9 wherein said at least one intra-layer transmutation includes an anti-debug transmutation applied to at least one layer.

11. The method of any one of claims 2-10 wherein a binary transmutation comprises a static build time process comprising:

i) inserting transmutation execution code into the source code of the application to be protected to produce a changed source code, which is then compiled to produce said binary application code;

ii) inserting complimentary changes to the binary application to be protected such that the changes to the application source code do not work correctly unless said complementary changes to the binary application are present; and

iii) performing binary transmutation specific operations on the binary form of the application to be protected and generating associated static interlocking data that is required at execution time.

and wherein a binary transmutation further comprises a run time process comprising;

a. executing the transmutation execution code inserted into the application in such a manner that the original semantics of the application are not preserved if the transmutations are removed or modified;

b. dynamically generating run time interlocking data that is further required while executing the transmutation execution code

c. utilizing said associated static and dynamic interlocking data to verify the interlocking dependencies as required;

d. executing a chain of multiple transmutations in a designated order such that one transmutation is required to generate an application state suitable for the execution of a second transmutation while executing the protected application.

21. The method of any one of claims 2-20 wherein the method adds interlocking protection comprised of making changes to the source code that work in conjunction with changes made to the binary code in such a manner that both changes need to be present for the protected application to function correctly and wherein the interlocking comprises both inter-layer and intra-layer transmutations in such a manner as to make it difficult to remove any or all of the transmutations, and wherein transmutations are interlocked by nesting transmutations, with each nested transmutation providing further protection to the layer it encapsulates, while receiving further protection from an encapsulating layer, and additionally including at least one intra-layer transmutation, with each intra-layer transmutation providing overlapping protection within either a layer of the protected application, or for the protected application as a whole.

22. The method of any one of claims 9-21 wherein the IV Transmutation is comprised of a IV processing at build-time comprising:

a. generating and assembling IV specific white-box transformation keys and operation codes;

b. computing static IV voucher data that represents hashing information of the application binary code at build-time;

c. applying a IV specific white-box transformation to transform said voucher data of said application by using said specific white-box transformation keys and operation codes to prevent un-authorized access and attacks to the voucher data;

d. assembling hidden white box transformation run-time key data corresponding to said specific white-box transformation keys and operation codes;

and wherein the IV Transmutation is further comprised of run-time actions at the beginning of and during the execution of the protected application comprising;

e. while an IV library is invoked, an IV initializer interacts with the white-box transformation run-time facility to inverse-transform the white-box transformed IV data to the plain IV data by executing the IV specific white box transformation inverse operation on white box transformation run-time key data and load the plain data into a protected data structure;

f. computing dynamic IV voucher data of the binary code loaded into memory by an OS, said dynamic IV voucher data representing hashing information of the application binary code at run-time, and storing the dynamic IV voucher data into a protected data structure;

g. checking the integrity of the application code to be protected by comparing said static IV voucher data, which is presented in protected form, against said dynamic IV voucher data.

23. The method of claim 22 wherein the application of the IV transmutation includes checks for integrity determined by user specification of designated options by allowing users inserting IV API calls into selected places of source code of the application during the build-time phase and subsequently automatically adding an automatic integrity verification engine to the application during build time which executes during run time.

24. The method of claim 22 or 23 wherein the IV transmutation checks the integrity of the binary application code itself and also checks the integrity of the code of any other binary transmutations applied to the code.

25. The method of any one of claims 21-24 wherein the IV transmutation execution is interlocked to the application by invoking callback functions

26. The method of claim 25 wherein the callback functions are added during the build-time phase and are interlocked with IV transmutation execution through inserting IV API calls with callback functions as parameters during the IV transmutation preparation.

9. The method of 8 wherein said at least one intra-layer transmutation includes an integrity verification (IV) transmutation applied to at least one layer at both build time and run time.

28. The method of 27 wherein said RSM is protected by applying one or both of ADD and IV binary transmutations to said RSM.

37. A system of protecting a software application comprising binary code and optionally associated data, from an original form to a more secure form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said system comprising:

a. providing secure binary libraries for a software application to invoke the designated transmutation execution behaviors at code locations that user want to protect.

b. providing options for users to apply different types of the transmutations at varied granularities, such as module, function, block and instruction that comprise said application.

c. providing a build-time toolset to perform binary transmutation preparations to the said application, and transform the original execution of the said application to a secured execution by using the toolset.

d. producing a protected application that is semantically equivalent to the original application, and comprises said interlocked transmutation executions, which also are interlocked with transmutation preparations, such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application.

e. during executing a protected application, the secured execution of the said protected application comprising interlocked transmutation executions protects the execution such that prevents from attacks statically and dynamically and only very small portion of binary code presented in execution memory is in clear form during any time of its execution.

38. The system of claim 37, wherein c., d. and e. further comprise:

generating, arranging and adding interlocking data and code by interlocking between transmutation preparations and executions, and producing a protected application which can not be executed correctly without the presence of valid interlocking data and code;

generating, arranging and adding interlocking data and code by interlocking among executions of different transmutations, and producing a protected application which can not be executed correctly without the presence of valid interlocking data and code;

having multiple transmutations produce multiple layers of protections to the said application; and

wherein b. further includes overlapping more than one transmutation on at least one granularity.

39. The system of claim 38 further comprising having nested complimentary transmutations produce multiple nested layers of protections with complementary properties, each protected by IV, ADB or both.

40. The system of claim 39 further comprising splitting a granularity in parts and calling transmutation execution for a next part of the granularity only when an IV check result is determined to be successful on the current transmutation on the current granularity.

41. The system of any of claims 37-40 further comprising providing fail and success callback functionalities between the transmutations wherein white-box transformation inverse operation of a transmutation on a given granularity can only proceed if white-box transformation inverse operation of another transmutation succeeds.

44. The system of claim 37 wherein the white box transformation allows splitting a white box run-time key data into two or more parts, where at least one part is internal and embedded within the protected application, and the other parts are external and stored in one or more separate storage forms.

45. The system and method of claim 44, further comprising:

allowing external white box transformation run-time key parts being provisioned separately to a device where the protected application, with the internal white box transformation run-time key part, is installed during a device provisioning time.

46. The system and method of claim 44, further comprising:

providing a specific white box run-time operation invoked by the white box transformation run-time key master to reconstitute different and separated white box run-time key data parts into a usable form.

47. The system and method of claim 44, further comprising:

creating an interlock dependency between the protected application and these separately provisioned external parts of the white box transformation run-time key to improve security as follows;

a. an attacker must break multiple parts of the white-box key in order to get the whole key so that will make such an attack much harder and reduce security risk during any period of distributing and provisioning the protected application and external key information.

b. the implementer can introduce diversity by changing the ratio of multiple different parts of the key since different instances of the protected application and white-box transformation run-time key can have different percentages of key data splitting.

c. interlocking an instance of a protected application with one device or interlocking instances of a protected application with a set of devices that share the same key data format so that an instance of protected application to a single device whereas code lifting of all or part of the semantically equivalent application from the device fails to function on any unauthorized and matched devices.

48. The system and method of claim 47 where provisioning takes the form of:

d. install the external parts of the white-box transformation run-time key on a device by the manufacturer at manufacturing time or service provider at provisioning time;

e. downloading the external parts of the white-box transformation run-time key via a network when the application is invoked either the first time or every time;

f. obtaining the external part of the white-box transformation run-time key from a user-supplied device such as a smart card connected to the device when the application is invoked;

g. manually entering the external part of the white-box transformation run-time key by the user when the application is invoked.

42. The Method/System of any proceeding claim where said transmutations are applied both to said code and to associated data.

43. A computer program product comprising machine readable medium tangibly storing machine readable and executable instructions, which when executed by a processor, cause said processor to implement any of the methods disclosed and/or claimed herein.

49. A method of transforming a binary software application comprising binary application code from an original form to a secured form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said method comprising:

analyzing said binary application to determine at least one component of said application to which at least one binary transmutation can be applied, said component including component code;

performing a series of changes to said component code to produce changed component code, said changes including applying at least one WB transformation to said component code and implanting new code intertwined with said changes to said binary application code;

interlocking said changes by generating and placing interdependencies between said changes; and

applying said changes and interlocking to both the binary application code to be protected and the implanted code to produce a transmuted application that is semantically equivalent to the original application but which comprises said interlocked transformations such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application.

50. A method of protecting a software application comprising binary code and optionally associated data, from an original form to a more secure form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said method comprising:

c. providing a build-time toolset to perform binary transmutation preparations to said application and transform the original execution of the said application to a secured execution by using the toolset; and

d. producing a protected application that is semantically equivalent to the original application, comprising interlocked transmutation executions, which also are interlocked with transmutation preparations, such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application;

wherein

the secured execution of the said protected application comprises interlocked transmutation executions configured such that only a small portion of binary code is in clear form during any time of its execution.

51. The method of claim 50, wherein step a comprises:

generating, arranging and adding interlocking data and code by interlocking between transmutation preparations and executions, and producing a protected application which can not be executed correctly without the presence of valid interlocking data and code;

52. The method of claim 51 wherein said generating, arranging and adding interlocking data and code comprises interlocking among executions of different transmutations of different granularities, and producing a protected application which can not be executed correctly without the presence of valid interlocking data and code;

and having multiple transmutations produce multiple layers of protections to the said application.

53. The method of claim 52 wherein said different transmutations of different granularities comprise having nested complimentary transmutations produce multiple nested layers of protections with complementary properties, each protected by IV, ADB or both.

54. The method of any one of claims 50-53 further comprising:

a. providing secure binary libraries for a software application to invoke the designated transmutation execution behaviors at code locations that a user wants to protect; and

b. providing options for users to apply different types of the transmutations at varied granularities, such as module, function, block and instruction that comprise said application.

55. A method of transforming a binary software application comprising binary application code from an original form to a secured form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said method comprising:

A) performing a combination of a plurality of binary transformations to said binary software application during a build time phase by making a series of changes to said binary application code to produce changed binary application code, said changes including implanting new code intertwined with said changed binary application code during build-time;

B) interlocking said transformations by generating and placing interdependencies between the transformations; and

C) applying said combination of transformations and interlocking to both the binary application code to be protected and the implanted code to produce a transmuted application that is semantically equivalent to the original application but which comprises said interlocked transformations such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application.

56. The method of claim 55, wherein:

STEP A+B comprise performing binary transmutation specific operations on the binary form of the application to be protected and generating associated static interlocking data that is required at execution time.

and wherein a binary transmutation further comprises a run time process comprising;

a. executing the transmutation execution code inserted into the application in such a manner that the original semantics of the application are not preserved if the transmutations are removed or modified;

b. dynamically generating run time interlocking data that is further required while executing the transmutation execution code

c. utilizing said associated static and dynamic interlocking data to verify the interlocking dependencies as required;

d. executing a chain of multiple transmutations in a designated order such that one transmutation is required to generate an application state suitable for the execution of a second transmutation while executing the protected application.

57. The method of claim 56 such that any given transmutation includes the insertion of the IV and ADB routines with their accompanying interlock facilities and the decomposing of the program into functions, blocks, and instructions that are then transformed with WB technology require a specific environment in which to run (which includes entry and exit handlers, an RSM, etc.) and is thus rendered practically irreversible.

58. A method of transforming a binary software application comprising binary application code from an original form to a secured form that is resistant to static and/or dynamic attacks attempting to tamper with, reverse engineer, or lift all or part of the application, said method comprising:

analyzing said binary application to determine components of said application to which binary transmutations can be applied, wherein each binary transmutation comprises;

performing changes to said code by apply a transformation to said component code and additionally implanting transmutation execution code intertwined with said transformed component code;

interlocking said changes by generating and placing interdependencies between said changes and other aspects of said application code <

which can include the main application, or other components>

; and

applying said changes and interlocking to both the binary application code to be protected and the implanted code to produce a transmuted application that is semantically equivalent to the original application but which comprises said interlocked transformations such that the binary protection is no longer separated from the protected application.

59. The method as claimed in claim 58 wherein a binary transmutation comprises generating associated static interlocking data that is required at execution time.

and wherein a binary transmutation further comprises a run time process comprising:

a. executing the transmutation execution code inserted into the application in such a manner that the original semantics of the application are not preserved if the transmutations are removed or modified;

b. dynamically generating run time interlocking data that is further required while executing the transmutation execution code

c. utilizing said associated static and dynamic interlocking data to verify the interlocking dependencies as required;

d. executing a chain of multiple transmutations in a designated order such that one transmutation is required to generate an application state suitable for the execution of a second transmutation while executing the protected application.

60. A method as claimed in any one of the proceeding claims, further comprising Dynamic Function loading.

61. A method of dynamic function loading as described.