Stacked Physically Uncloneable Function Sense and Respond Module

• US 20130141137A1
• Filed: 06/01/2012
• Published: 06/06/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 06/01/2011
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: PFG Ip, LLC
• Original Assignee: ISC8 Incorporated
• Inventors: Krutzik, Christian, Clark, Stewart, Boyd, W. Eric
• Application Number:
  US13/486,500
• Publication Number:
  US 20130141137A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 326/8
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 1/00 Apparatus or methods whereby a given sequence of signs, e.g. an intelligible text, is transformed into an unintelligible sequence of signs by transposing the signs or groups of signs or by replacing them by others according to a predetermined system cryptographic typewriters G09C3/00
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/5256 comprising fuses, i.e. connections having their state changed from conductive to non-conductive
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 23/576 using active circuits
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 25/0657 Stacked arrangements of devices
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/00 Indexing scheme for arrangements or methods for connecting or disconnecting semiconductor or solid-state bodies as covered by H01L24/00
• CPC Class Codes: H01L 2924/0002 Not covered by any one of groups H01L24/00, H01L24/00 and H01L2224/00
• CPC Class Codes: H03K 19/173 using elementary logic circuits as components
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/12 Details relating to cryptographic hardware or logic circuitry
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3278 using physically unclonable functions [PUF]

Abstract

A physically uncloneable function (PUF) sense and response module fabricated from a stack of integrated circuit chip layers. At least one of the PUF chips in the stack has a unique identifier resulting from random effects of fabrication processes. The PUF chip generates the fingerprint at power-on resulting that in turn is used to generate a private key. The private key generates a public key used to communicate with the outside world. The encrypted data from the outside world is decrypted with the private key. The public key is stored for comparison with pubic keys generated at subsequent power-up operations. If the key changes, tampering is indicated and a predetermined tamper response event is generated such as the erasing of the contents of a memory.

Claims

1. A microelectronic module for the generation and secure storage of a private encryption key comprising:

a first physically uncloneable function IC layer having a first active surface comprising at least one random semiconductor fabrication process-induced variation between a plurality of neutral-skewed cells to define a first fingerprint value,

a second physically uncloneable function IC layer having a second active surface comprising at least one random semiconductor fabrication process-induced variation between a plurality of neutral-skewed cells to define a second fingerprint value,

the first and second layers bonded to form a three-dimensional microelectronic module wherein at least one I/O of the first IC layer is electrically coupled to at least on I/O of the second IC layer, and,

circuit means for generating and storing a private encryption key using the first and second fingerprint values and using at least one neutral-skewed memory cell value derived from at least one of the first or second layers.

2. The module of claim 1 further comprising a modifier layer having at least one predetermined and randomly dispersed element disposed between the first layer and the second layer whereby the neutral-skewed memory cell value is influenced as the result of the element when the module is powered up.

3. The module of claim 2 wherein the semiconductor process-induced variation is a threshold-induced variation resulting from a dopant fluctuation between a plurality of transistor cells in at least one of the first or second layers.

4. The module of claim 2 wherein the semiconductor process-induced variation is a photolithography-induced variation in at least one of the first or second layers.

5. The module of claim 2 further comprising a secure supervisor IC layer.

6. The module of claim 2 wherein the first and second active surfaces are bonded to a shared modifier layer.

7. The module of claim 2 wherein at least one of the first and second IC layers comprises an SRAM IC chip comprising at least one neutral-skewed cell.

8. The module of claim 2 wherein the modifier layer comprises a modifier element that changes state when exposed to a predetermined range of the audio spectrum.

9. The module of claim 2 wherein the modifier layer comprises a modifier element that changes state when exposed to a predetermined range of the ultrasonic spectrum.

10. The module of claim 2 wherein the modifier layer comprises a modifier element that changes state in the presence of a predetermined range of the electromagnetic spectrum.

11. The module of claim 2 wherein the modifier layer comprises a modifier element that changes state in the presence of a focused ion beam.

12. The module of claim 2 wherein the modifier layer comprises modifier element that changes state when exposed to mechanical vibration.

13. The module of claim 2 further comprising circuit means for reconfiguring at least one I/O in the module as a result of a predetermined tamper event.

14. The module of claim 2 further comprising fuse means configured to disable an electronic function in the module as a result of a predetermined tamper event.

15. The module of claim 14 wherein the fuse means is blown by the output current of an embedded piezoelectric device in the module.

16. The module of claim 14 wherein the fuse means is blown by the output current of an embedded photodiode in the module.

17. The module of claim 14 wherein the fuse means comprises at least one nano-trace having a trace width of less than about 200 nanometers.

18. The module of claim 17 wherein the nano-trace is disposed between and electrically coupled to the first and second layers.