ON BOARD VEHICLE NETWORK SECURITY

• US 20130227648A1
• Filed: 03/14/2013
• Published: 08/29/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 11/16/2011
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: AutoConnect Holdings LLC
• Original Assignee: Flextronics America LLC (Flextronics International Limited)
• Inventors: Ricci, Christopher P.
• Granted Patent: US 9,173,100 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 726/3
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/0739 in a data processing system embedded in automotive or aircraft systems
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/0748 in a remote unit communicating with a single-box computer node experiencing an error/fault remote testing G06F11/2294
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/079 Root cause analysis, i.e. error or fault diagnosis in a hardware test environment G06F11/22; in a software test environment G06F11/36
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/1675 Temporal synchronisation or re-synchronisation of redundant processing components
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/2023 Failover techniques
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/2035 without idle spare hardware
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 11/2038 with a single idle spare processing component
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/85 interconnection devices, e.g. bus-connected or in-line devices
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2201/81 Threshold
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2149 Restricted operating environment
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0484 for the control of specific functions or operations, e.g. selecting or manipulating an object, an image or a displayed text element, setting a parameter value or selecting a range
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 3/0488 using a touch-screen or digitiser, e.g. input of commands through traced gestures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2012/40215 Controller Area Network CAN
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2012/40273 the transportation system being a vehicle
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/02 for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/088 using filters or firewalls
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/122 Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/125 Protection against power exhaustion attacks
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/126 : Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/128 : Anti-malware arrangements, e.g. protection against SMS fraud or mobile malware

Abstract

The present disclosure describes a microprocessor executable network controller operable to at least one of (a) isolate at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by a security breach event from a computational component affected by the security breach event and (b) isolate an on board computational component in the vehicular wireless network and affected by the security breach event from the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event.

Claims

1. A vehicle, comprising:

a microprocessor executable network controller operable to at least one of (a) isolate at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by a security breach event from a computational component affected by the security breach event and (b) isolate an on board computational component in the vehicular wireless network and affected by the security breach event from the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event.

2. The vehicle of claim 1, wherein the security breach event is one or more of an instance of a virus, malware, unauthorized access, misuse, modification, denial-of-service attack, spoofing, man-in-the-middle attack, ARP poisoning, smurf attack, buffer overflow, heap overflow, format string attack, SQL injection, identity theft (or MAC spoofing), network injection, caffe latte attack, or denial of a computer network and/or network-accessible resource and wherein the network controller receives a warning signal associated with the security breach event from a gateway, a firewall, a honeypot, a network node impacted by the security breach event, and a network probe.

3. The vehicle of claim 2, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on-board sensor, processing module, software application, expansion module, critical device, non-critical device, and cellular upgrade module.

4. The vehicle of claim 3, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on board sensor, a media controller, a gateway, a firewall, a processing module, a network controller, an input/output system, a display controller, an audio controller, an arbitration module, a health check module, a critical system controller, a non-critical system controller, an on board sensor monitor, a displayed object movement module, a diagnostic module, a media filter, a network selector, a remote control module, a computational module selector, an expansion module, an application, and a plug-in module.

5. The vehicle of claim 1, wherein the network controller analyzes the security breach event by one or more of reviewing historical behavior and comparing the behavior to templates characteristic of differing types of attacks and/or applying rules to the historical behavior.

6. The vehicle of claim 1, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is an external computational device and wherein the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event is isolated from the external computational device by the vehicular wireless network denying vehicular wireless network access by the external computational component.

7. The vehicle of claim 1, wherein at least one of the following is true about the isolation:

(a) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event, the communications not normally passing through a gateway and/or firewall are redirected through and filtered by the gateway and/or firewall and (b) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event are blocked in whole or part.

8. The vehicle of claim 1, wherein the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event is a critical component, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is a node on the vehicular wireless network and physically and/or logically positioned outside of but interiorly and/or internally to the DMZ, and wherein isolation is effected by enabling a critical communication security mechanism that is one or more of (a) encryption of access restrictions in the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network, (b) disabling ESSID broadcasting, (c) hiding the SSID, (d) performing MAC ID filtering, (e) performing static IP addressing, (f) implementing IEEE 802.11, 802.11i, and/or 802.1x security, (g) using wired equivalent privacy encryption, (h) using one or more of TKIP, EAP, LEAP, PEAP, WPAv 1, and/or WPAv2 protocols, and (i) using end-to-end encryption.

9. A method, comprising:

a microprocessor executable network controller identifying a possible security breach event; and

in response, the microprocessor executable network controller at least one of (a) isolating at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event from a computational component affected by the security breach event and (b) isolating an on board computational component in the vehicular wireless network and affected by the security breach event from the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event.

10. The method of claim 9, wherein the security breach event is one or more of an instance of a virus, malware, unauthorized access, misuse, modification, denial-of-service attack, spoofing, man-in-the-middle attack, ARP poisoning, smurf attack, buffer overflow, heap overflow, format string attack, SQL injection, identity theft (or MAC spoofing), network injection, caffe latte attack, or denial of a computer network and/or network-accessible resource and wherein the network controller receives a warning signal associated with the security breach event from a gateway, a firewall, a honeypot, a network node impacted by the security breach event, and a network probe.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on-board sensor, processing module, software application, expansion module, critical device, non-critical device, and cellular upgrade module.

12. The method of claim 11, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on board sensor, a media controller, a gateway, a firewall, a processing module, a network controller, an input/output system, a display controller, an audio controller, an arbitration module, a health check module, a critical system controller, a non-critical system controller, an on board sensor monitor, a displayed object movement module, a diagnostic module, a media filter, a network selector, a remote control module, a computational module selector, an expansion module, an application, and a plug-in module.

13. The method of claim 9, wherein the network controller detects a possible security breach event by one or more of reviewing historical behavior and comparing the behavior to templates characteristic of differing types of attacks and/or applying rules to the historical behavior.

14. The method of claim 9, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is an external computational device and wherein the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event isolation is isolated from the external computational device by the vehicular wireless network denying vehicular wireless network access by the external computational component.

15. The method of claim 9, wherein at least one of the following is true about the isolation:

(a) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event, the communications not normally passing through a gateway and/or firewall are redirected through and filtered by the gateway and/or firewall and (b) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event are blocked in whole or part.

16. The method of claim 9, wherein the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event is a critical component, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is a node on the vehicular wireless network and physically and/or logically positioned outside of but interiorly and/or internally to the DMZ, and wherein isolation is effected by enabling a critical communication security mechanism that is one or more of (a) encryption of access restrictions in the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network, (b) disabling ESSID broadcasting, (c) hiding the SSID, (d) performing MAC ID filtering, (e) performing static IP addressing, (f) implementing IEEE 802.11, 802.11i, and/or 802.1x security, (g) using wired equivalent privacy encryption, (h) using one or more of TKIP, EAP, LEAP, PEAP, WPAv 1, and/or WPAv2 protocols, and (i) using end-to-end encryption.

17. A non-transient, tangible computer readable medium comprising a microprocessor executable network controller on board a selected vehicle that, when executed, (a) identifies a possible security breach event and (b) in response, at least one of (i) isolates at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event from a computational component affected by the security breach event and (ii) isolates an on board computational component in the vehicular wireless network and affected by the security breach event from the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event.

18. The computer readable medium of claim 17, wherein the security breach event is one or more of an instance of a virus, malware, unauthorized access, misuse, modification, denial-of-service attack, spoofing, man-in-the-middle attack, ARP poisoning, smurf attack, buffer overflow, heap overflow, format string attack, SQL injection, identity theft (or MAC spoofing), network injection, caffe latte attack, or denial of a computer network and/or network-accessible resource and wherein the network controller receives a warning signal associated with the security breach event from a gateway, a firewall, a honeypot, a network node impacted by the security breach event, and a network probe.

19. The computer readable medium of claim 18, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on-board sensor, processing module, software application, expansion module, critical device, non-critical device, and cellular upgrade module.

20. The computer readable medium of claim 19, wherein the at least one other board computational component is one or more of an on board sensor, a media controller, a gateway, a firewall, a processing module, a network controller, an input/output system, a display controller, an audio controller, an arbitration module, a health check module, a critical system controller, a non-critical system controller, an on board sensor monitor, a displayed object movement module, a diagnostic module, a media filter, a network selector, a remote control module, a computational module selector, an expansion module, an application, and a plug-in module.

21. The computer readable medium of claim 17, wherein the network controller detects a possible security breach event by one or more of reviewing historical behavior and comparing the behavior to templates characteristic of differing types of attacks and/or applying rules to the historical behavior.

22. The computer readable medium of claim 17, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is an external computational device and wherein the at least one other on board computational component not affected by the security breach event is isolated from the external computational device by the vehicular wireless network denying vehicular wireless network access by the external computational component.

23. The computer readable medium of claim 17, wherein at least one of the following is true about the isolation:

(a) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event, the communications not normally passing through a gateway and/or firewall are redirected through and filtered by the gateway and/or firewall and (b) communications between the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event and the computational component affected by the security breach event are blocked in whole or part.

24. The computer readable medium of claim 17, wherein the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network not affected by the security breach event is a critical component, wherein the computational component affected by the security breach event is a node on the vehicular wireless network and physically and/or logically positioned outside of but interiorly and/or internally to the DMZ, and wherein isolation is effected by enabling a critical communication security mechanism that is one or more of (a) encryption of access restrictions the at least one other on board computational component in a vehicular wireless network, (b) disabling ESSID broadcasting, (c) hiding the SSID, (d) performing MAC ID filtering, (e) performing static IP addressing, (f) implementing IEEE 802.11, 802.11i, and/or 802.1x security, (g) using wired equivalent privacy encryption, (h) using one or more of TKIP, EAP, LEAP, PEAP, WPAv 1, and/or WPAv2 protocols, and (i) using end-to-end encryption.