Method to Detect Tampering of Data

• US 20130254881A1
• Filed: 03/23/2012
• Published: 09/26/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 03/23/2012
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: Infineon Technologies Austria Ag (Infineon Technologies AG)
• Original Assignee: Infineon Technologies Austria Ag (Infineon Technologies AG)
• Inventors: Helmschmidt, Juergen, Rossi, Sergio, Parodi, Fabio, Schoenfeldt, Stephan
• Application Number:
  US13/428,718
• Publication Number:
  US 20130254881A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 726/22
• CPC Class Codes: G01D 4/004 Remote reading of utility meters to a fixed location
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/1441 Countermeasures against malicious traffic countermeasures against attacks on cryptographic mechanisms H04L9/002
• CPC Class Codes: Y02B 90/20 Smart grids as enabling technology in buildings sector smart grids supporting the management or operation of end-user stationary applications in general, or like technologies with no associated climate change mitigation effect Y04S20/00
• CPC Class Codes: Y04S 20/30 Smart metering, e.g. specially adapted for remote reading
• CPC Class Codes: Y04S 40/20 Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Abstract

A method to detect tampering of data includes constant acquiring of raw measurement data in a sensor unit. The raw measurement data of a defined time interval is processed in a metrology unit to obtain first measurement results. The first measurement results are transmitted to an authority at defined time instances via a communication channel. A defined fraction of raw measurement data is transmitted to the authority in a random manner via the communication channel. The raw measurement data of the defined time interval is processed at the authority to obtain second measurement results. The first and second measurement results of a time interval are compared.

Claims

1. A method to detect tampering of data, the method comprising:

constantly acquiring raw measurement data in a sensor unit;

processing the raw measurement data of a defined time interval in a metrology unit to obtain first measurement results;

transmitting the first measurement results to an authority at defined time instances via a communication channel;

transmitting a defined fraction of the raw measurement data to the authority in a random manner via the communication channel;

processing the raw measurement data of the defined time interval at the authority to obtain second measurement results; and

comparing the first measurement results and the second measurement results.

2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising packing the raw measurement data into an array before transmitting the first measurement results.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the raw measurement data is characterized by a plurality of parameters and wherein the array comprises only one sample of each parameter of one measurement point or a subset of each parameter of one measurement point.

4. The method according to claim 2, wherein the array further comprises a code word that marks the array as a raw data array.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein the array further comprises a randomly chosen internal configuration value of the metrology unit.

6. The method according to claim 5, wherein the array comprises a pointer that points inside the array to assign which randomly chosen internal configuration value is included in the array.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein the defined fraction of the raw measurement data is chosen depending on a random number.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the random number is provided by a true random number generator.

9. The method according to claim 1, further comprising determining the presence of a tampering attack when a deviation between the first and second measurement results exceeds a maximum threshold.

10. The method according to claim 1, further comprising determining the presence of a tampering attack when more than the defined fraction of the raw measurement data is received at the authority.

11. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

storing the raw measurement data or a random subset of the raw data is stored into an intermediate, not changeable secure memory device; and

sending the raw measurement data or the random subset to the authority out of this memory.

12. The method according to claim 11, wherein sending the raw measurement data or the random subset comprises sending the raw measurement or the random subset to the authority as not modifiable code or data.

13. The method according to claim 12, wherein sending the raw measurement data or the random subset comprises sending raw measurement data to the raw measurement data or the random as ROM code.

14. The method according to claim 1, wherein the raw measurement data and the first measurement results are signed in a signature unit before being transmitted to the authority.

15. A smart meter comprising:

a sensor unit, which is configured to measure one or more parameters of interest and to provide raw measurement data that represents the parameters of interest; and

a metrology unit, which is configured;

to receive the raw measurement data from the sensor unit;

to transmit a defined fraction of raw measurement data of a defined time interval in a random manner via a communication channel;

to process raw measurement data of the defined time interval, obtaining first measurement results; and

to transmit the first measurement results via the communication channel;

wherein the smart meter is configured to be coupled to an authority via the communication channel so that the authority can obtain second measurement results from the raw measurement data and compare the second measurement results with the first measurement results.

16. The smart meter according to claim 15, wherein the authority is configured to:

receive the first measurement results;

receive and process the defined fraction of raw measurement data of the defined time interval, obtaining second measurement results; and

compare the first and second measurement results.

17. A system to detect tampering of data, the system comprising:

a smart meter comprising a sensor unit and a metrology unit; and

an authority coupled to the smart meter via a communication channel;

wherein the sensor unit is configured to measure one or more parameters of interest and to provide raw measurement data that represents the parameters of interest; and

wherein the metrology unit is configured to;

receive the raw measurement data from the sensor unit;

transmit a defined fraction of raw measurement data of a defined time interval in a random manner via the communication channel;

process raw measurement data of the defined time interval to obtain first measurement results; and

transmit the first measurement results via the communication channel;

wherein the authority is configured to;

receive and process the defined fraction of raw measurement data of the defined time interval to obtain second measurement results;

receive the first measurement results; and

compare the first and second measurement results.

18. The system according to claim 17, wherein the smart meter has a unique identification number to match the smart meter with an account of a customer.

19. The system according to claim 17, wherein the sensor unit is configured to measure parameters of interest of an electricity line, a water line, a gas line or a heating line.

20. The system according to claim 19, wherein the authority is an electricity supplier, a water supplier, a gas supplier or a heating supplier.

21. The system according to claim 19, wherein the authority is a central authority that is independent of any electricity, water, gas or heating suppliers.

22. The system according to claim 17, wherein the smart meter comprises a nonvolatile memory area, the nonvolatile memory area being readable only by the authority or after identification.

23. The system according to claim 22, wherein raw data, fractions of raw data or intermediate processing results are stored in the nonvolatile memory area.