DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND METHODS FOR ACCESSINGCONTENT FROM AN INTELLIGENT STORAG

• US 20130268771A1
• Filed: 04/30/2012
• Published: 10/10/2013
• Est. Priority Date: 04/10/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan Chase & Co)
• Original Assignee: Western Digital Technologies Incorporated (Western Digital Corporation)
• Inventors: BLANKENBECKLER, David L., YBARRA, Danny, HESSELINK, Lambertus
• Granted Patent: US 8,831,217 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/189
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/1014 to tokens
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/602 Providing cryptographic facilities or services
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 21/71 to assure secure computing or processing of information
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 2221/2107 File encryption
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00115 wherein the record carrier stores a unique medium identifier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00123 the record carrier being identified by recognising some of its unique characteristics, e.g. a unique defect pattern serving as a physical signature of the record carrier
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00137 involving measures which result in a restriction to contents recorded on or reproduced from a record carrier to authorised users
• CPC Class Codes: G11B 20/00246 wherein the key is obtained from a local device, e.g. device key initially stored by the player or by the recorder
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/603 Digital right managament [DRM]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/006 involving public key infrastructure [PKI] trust models network architecture or network communication protocol for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0866 involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0894 Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority

Abstract

The present invention relates to accessing content stored on a storage device and protecting the content with a digital rights management (DRM) scheme. The storage device may be a disk drive, or network attached storage. The storage device can perform cryptographic operations and provide a hardware root of trust. The DRM employs a binding key, a content key, and an access key. The binding key binds the content to the storage device and is based on a key concealed on the storage device. The binding key itself is not stored anywhere on the storage device. The content key is a key assigned to the content. The access key is determined based on a cryptographic combination of the content key and binding key. In one embodiment, the content is encrypted based on the access key and stored in encrypted form in the storage device.

Claims

1. A storage device configured to provide content to a player system for rendering of the content, said storage device comprising:

a storage medium comprising a user area that is accessible by the player system and a non-user area that is not accessible by the player system; and

a controller comprising a cryptographic module providing a hardware root of trust and a secured memory, wherein the controller is configured to authenticate the player system, establish a secured communication channel with the player system based on the authentication, provide, to the player system, a first cryptographic key, wherein the first cryptographic key is unique to the storage device, provide, to the player system, a second cryptographic key that is associated with the content, and provide, to the player system, the content in encrypted form from the user area of the storage medium, wherein the content is accessible based on a cryptographic combination of the first cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key.

2. The storage device of claim 1, wherein the first cryptographic key is based on a key that is concealed in the storage device.

3. The storage device of claim 1, wherein the cryptographic module stores the concealed key in a one-time-programmable, non-volatile memory in the secured memory.

4. The storage device of claim 1, wherein the controller is configured to provide the first cryptographic key as an ephemeral key.

5. A player system configured to play encrypted content, said system comprising:

a first interface configured to communicate with a storage device storing encrypted content; and

a processor configured to authenticate the storage device, establish a secured communication channel with the storage device via the first interface, receive, from the storage device, a binding cryptographic key that is unique to the storage device, receive, from the storage device, a second cryptographic key that is associated with the content, determine an access key for the content based on a cryptographic combination of the binding cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key, receive, from the storage device, the encrypted content; and

decrypt the content based on the access key.

6. The player system of claim 5, wherein the binding cryptographic key is based on a key that is concealed in the storage device.

7. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to authenticate the storage device based on a public key infrastructure.

8. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to mutually authenticate with the storage device based on a public key infrastructure.

9. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to receive an ephemeral binding cryptographic key based on a request sent to the storage device.

10. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to receive a temporary binding cryptographic key based on a request sent to the storage device.

11. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to determine an ephemeral access key based on the cryptographic combination of the binding cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key.

12. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to obtain a digital certificate for the content.

13. The player system of claim 5, wherein the processor is configured to determine authorization for access to the content based on the digital certificate and the authentication of the storage device.

14. A method of accessing encrypted content from a storage device, said method comprising:

receiving, from the storage device, a binding cryptographic key that binds the content to the storage device;

receiving, from the storage device, a second cryptographic key that is associated with the content;

determining an access key for the content based on a cryptographic combination of the binding cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key;

receiving, from the storage device, the encrypted content; and

decrypting the content based on the access key.

15. The method of claim 14, wherein receiving the binding cryptographic key is based on a key that is concealed in the storage device.

16. The method of claim 14, wherein the binding cryptographic key is unique to a class of storage devices.

17. The method of claim 14, wherein authenticating the storage device comprises mutually authenticating with the storage device based on a public key infrastructure.

18. The method of claim 14, wherein receiving the binding cryptographic key comprises receiving an ephemeral binding cryptographic key based on a request sent to the storage device.

19. The method of claim 14, wherein receiving the binding cryptographic key comprises receiving a binding cryptographic key that was generated based on defect information unique to the storage device and a concealed key stored in a secured memory in the storage.

20. The method of claim 14, wherein determining the access key comprises determining an ephemeral access key based on the cryptographic combination of the binding cryptographic key and the second cryptographic key.