SECURE VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMUNICATION SYSTEM
First Claim
1. The vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system comprising:
- a V2V transmitter configured to operate in a transmitting vehicle;
non-volatile secure memory in the V2V transmitter;
wherein the V2V transmitter is configured to accept as input a subject vehicle position and the subject vehicle heading;
wherein the V2V transmitter broadcasts V2V messages comprising;
(i) the subject vehicle position;
(ii) the subject vehicle heading;
(iii) subject vehicle speed;
wherein the non-volatile secure memory is configured to generate and stored encrypted data;
wherein the stored encrypted data comprises;
(i) data signed with a public key infrastructure (PKI) private key substantially unique to the V2V transmitter; and
(ii) data encrypted with a PKI public key associated to a safety institution.
3 Assignments
0 Petitions
Accused Products
Abstract
Device, system and method, in a vehicle communication system, of securely storing safety-related messages. Embodiments include both digital signing and digital encryption such that (i) stored message validity is assured; and (ii) only qualified or pre-selected recipients are able to decrypt the message. Embodiments include storing environmental information geographically related to a safety event. Embodiments include a plurality of vehicles within wireless communication range receiving a network warning message and then securely storing related information in response to the warning message. Embodiments include measuring time-of-transit of messages and using this measured time to triangulate position of a transmit source. This information may be transmitted or stored. Embodiments include forwarding of network warning messages. Algorithms are described to identify spoofed messages.
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Citations
14 Claims
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1. The vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system comprising:
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a V2V transmitter configured to operate in a transmitting vehicle; non-volatile secure memory in the V2V transmitter; wherein the V2V transmitter is configured to accept as input a subject vehicle position and the subject vehicle heading; wherein the V2V transmitter broadcasts V2V messages comprising;
(i) the subject vehicle position;
(ii) the subject vehicle heading;
(iii) subject vehicle speed;wherein the non-volatile secure memory is configured to generate and stored encrypted data; wherein the stored encrypted data comprises;
(i) data signed with a public key infrastructure (PKI) private key substantially unique to the V2V transmitter; and
(ii) data encrypted with a PKI public key associated to a safety institution. - View Dependent Claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)
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13. A vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) transceiver comprising:
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non-volatile secure memory in the V2V transceiver; wherein the V2V transceiver is configured to accept as input a subject vehicle position and the subject vehicle heading; wherein the V2V transceiver broadcasts V2V messages comprising;
(i) the subject vehicle position;
(ii) the subject vehicle heading;
(iii) subject vehicle speed;wherein the non-volatile secure memory is configured to generate and stored encrypted data; wherein the stored encrypted data comprises;
(i) data signed with a public key infrastructure (PKI) private key substantially unique to the V2V transceiver; and
(ii) data encrypted with a PKI public key associated to a safety institution;a V2V compliance module configured to compare received V2V messages to one or more rules in a set of V2V compliance rules; wherein the V2V transceiver broadcasts a network warning message when the V2V compliance module receives a message not in compliance with at least one rule in the set of V2V compliance rules.
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14. A method of identifying spoofed messages in a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system comprising:
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receiving a V2V receive message by a V2V transceiver, wherein the receive message is substantially in a receive message time slot, and wherein the receive message comprises a subject vehicle location; measuring the delay between the start of the received message time slot and the start of the received message received in that time slot, the “
message delay;
”comparing the message delay with an expected wireless transit delay due to the physical distance between the subject vehicle location and the location of the V2V transceiver; transmitting a network spoofing warning message, by the V2V transceiver, when the message delay differs from the expected wireless transit delay by more than a message delay warning threshold.
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Specification