CERTIFIED-BASED CONTROL UNIT-KEY FOB PAIRING

• US 20140025950A1
• Filed: 07/15/2013
• Published: 01/23/2014
• Est. Priority Date: 07/17/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Original Assignee: Texas Instruments, Inc.
• Inventors: HO, Jin-Meng, PEETERS, Eric
• Granted Patent: US 9,654,968 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 713/168
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/23 using reflectors
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/25 using filters
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/27 using semi-transparent optical elements
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/31 Virtual images
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/334 Projection means
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/349 Adjustment of brightness
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2360/77 Instrument locations other than the dashboard
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2370/1529 Head-up displays
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2370/23 using reflectors
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2370/25 using filters
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 2370/334 Projection means
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/00 Instruments specially adapted for vehicles; Arrangement of instruments in or on vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/213 Virtual instruments
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/23 Head-up displays [HUD] optical aspects of head-up displays G02B27/01
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 35/60 Instruments characterised by their location or relative disposition in or on vehicles arrangements of lighting devices on dashboards B60Q3/10
• CPC Class Codes: B60K 37/02 Arrangement of instruments arrangement of lighting devices for dashboards B60Q3/10
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 2325/108 Encryption
• CPC Class Codes: B60R 25/24 using electronic identifiers containing a code not memorised by the user
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 2027/0118 comprising devices for improving the contrast of the display / brillance control visibility
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 26/0833 the reflecting element being a micromechanical device, e.g. a MEMS mirror, DMD G02B26/0825 takes precedence; micromechanical devices in general B81B
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/01 : Head-up displays
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 27/0101 : characterised by optical features G02B27/0172 takes precedence
• CPC Class Codes: G02B 5/30 : Polarising elements light-modulating devices with active elements G02F1/00
• CPC Class Codes: G06K 7/10227 : loading programming parameters or programs into the interrogator, e.g. for configuring the interrogator
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 2009/00769 : with data transmission performed by wireless means
• CPC Class Codes: G07C 9/00309 : operated with bidirectional data transmission between data carrier and locks
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4012 : Beam combining, e.g. by the use of fibres, gratings, polarisers, prisms
• CPC Class Codes: H01S 5/4093 : Red, green and blue [RGB] generated directly by laser action or by a combination of laser action with nonlinear frequency conversion
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/24 : Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 : Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/805 : Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/84 : Vehicles
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0428 : wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 : for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0822 : using key encryption key
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0838 : Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these network architectures or network communication protocols for key exchange in a packet data network H04L63/061
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 : with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0897 : involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3013 : involving the discrete logarithm problem, e.g. ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3066 : involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3268 : using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3271 : using challenge-response
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3129 : scanning a light beam on the display screen scanning a light beam on a screen in displays other than projection devices G09G3/02; scanning systems in general G02B26/10; projectors using laser light sources in general H04N9/3161
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3155 : for controlling the light source light source control per se H05B35/00 – H05B47/00; control of an illumination source for displays in general G09G3/3406
• CPC Class Codes: H04N 9/3167 : for polarizing the light beam polarizing optical systems per se G02B27/28
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/04 : Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/50 : Secure pairing of devices
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/11 : by determining the brightness or colour temperature of ambient light
• CPC Class Codes: H05B 47/14 : by determining electrical parameters of the light source
• CPC Class Codes: Y02B 20/40 : Control techniques providing energy savings, e.g. smart controller or presence detection

Abstract

A key fob-control unit pairing device that includes a transceiver to transmit and receive signals, a memory to store a certificate of authenticity (CertVD) associated with the pairing device and a public key (PKVM), and a processor coupled to said transceiver and memory. The processor is to receive a public key (PKKF) from a key fob and associated with the key fob and a certificate of authenticity (CertKF) associated with the key fob, verify the CertKF with the PKVM, and transmit an encrypted PKKF to a control unit.

Claims

1. A key fob-control unit pairing device, comprising:

a transceiver to transmit and receive signals;

a memory to store a certificate of authenticity (CertVD) associated with the pairing device and a public key (PKVM); and

a processor coupled to said transceiver and memory and to;

receive a public key (PKKF) from a key fob and associated with the key fob and a certificate of authenticity (CertKF) associated with the key fob;

verify the CertKF with the PKVM; and

transmit an encrypted PKKF to a control unit.

2. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor is to verify that the CertKF is not on a certificate revocation list.

3. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor, via the transceiver, is to transmit the CertVD of the pairing device to the control unit.

4. The device of claim 1, wherein the processor and the control unit is to co-execute a key agreement protocol to generate a common secret encryption key that is shared between the processor and the control unit.

5. The device of claim 4, wherein the processor is to encrypt the PKKF with the common secret encryption key.

6. The device of claim 4, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) encryption.

7. The device of claim 4, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve cryptography (ECC).

8. The device of claim 1, wherein PKVM and the CertVM are associated with a certificate authority.

9. The device of claim 8, wherein the certificate authority is a vehicle manufacturer.

10. A key fob, comprising:

a transceiver to receive and send signals;

a memory to store a public key (PKKF) and a certificate of authenticity (CertKF) associated with the key fob; and

a processor coupled to said transceiver and memory to;

transmit the PKKF and the CertKF to a pairing device;

execute a public key agreement protocol to generate a common secret encryption key; and

receive, from a control unit, an operation key encrypted with the common secret encryption key.

11. The key fob of claim 10, wherein the public key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) encryption.

12. The device of claim 10, wherein the key agreement protocol is based on elliptical curve cryptography (ECC).

13. The key fob of claim 10, wherein the processor is to decrypt the operation key with the common secret encryption key.

14. The key fob of claim 10, wherein the CertKF is signed by a certificate authority.

15. The key fob of claim 14, wherein the certificate authority is a vehicle manufacturer.

16. A method to pair a key fob and a control unit of a vehicle, comprising:

reading, by a pairing device, a public encryption key (PKKF) and a certificate of authenticity (CertKF) from a key fob;

verifying, by the pairing device, the CertKF using a public encryption key of a vehicle manufacturer (PKVM);

transmitting, by the pairing device, a certificate of authenticity (CertVD) to a control unit;

verifying, by the control unit, the CertVD using the PKVM;

executing, by the pairing device and the control unit, a public key agreement to generate an encryption key DHKey1;

encrypting, by the pairing device, the PKKF using the DHKey1;

transmitting, by the pairing device, the encrypted PKKF to the control unit;

executing, by the control unit and the key fob, a public key agreement to generate an encryption key DHKey2;

encrypting, by the control unit, an operational key using the DHKey2; and

transmitting, by the control unit, the encrypted operational key to the key fob.

17. The method of claim 16, further comprising:

generating the PK_KF for the key fob and inserting the PK_KF into a storage device of the key fob;

generating the PKVM and a secret (SKVM) encryption key pair for the vehicle manufacturer and storing them in a vehicle manufacturer storage device; and

generating a public (PKVD) encryption key for a vehicle dealer and storing them in a vehicle dealer storage device.

18. The method of claim 16, further comprising:

generating a certificate of authenticity for the PKKF (CertKF) and PKVD (CertVD) by signing the respective public keys with the SKVM;

inserting the PKVM into a control unit storage device, into the key fob storage device, and into a storage device of the pairing device; and

inserting the CertKF into the key fob storage device and the CertVD into the pairing device storage device.

19. The method of claim 16, further comprising:

verifying, by the pairing device, that the CertKF is not on a certificate revocation list (CRL).

20. The method of claim 16, further comprising:

verifying, by the control unit, that the CertVD is not on a CRL.