KEY MANAGEMENT IN MACHINE TYPE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

• US 20150229620A1
• Filed: 09/12/2013
• Published: 08/13/2015
• Est. Priority Date: 09/13/2012
• Status: Abandoned Application

• Current Assignee: NEC Corporation
• Original Assignee: NEC Corporation
• Inventors: Zhang, Xiaowei, Prasad, Anand Raghawa
• Application Number:
  US14/426,942
• Publication Number:
  US 20150229620A1
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2463/061 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords H04L9/0861
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/06 for supporting key management in a packet data network cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key management H04L9/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/062 for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key distribution involving a central third party H04L9/0819
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0836 using tree structure or hierarchical structure
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0431 Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/10 Integrity
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/70 Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]

Abstract

A MTC device (10) and a MTC interworking function, MTC-IWF, (20) form a communication system and conduct communication with each other. In this communication system, a root key (K_iwf) is securely shared between the MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20). The MTC device (10) and the MTC-IWF (20) use the root key (K_iwf) to respectively derive temporary keys (K_di (K_di_conf, K_di_int)) for protecting the communication. The temporary keys provide integrity protection and confidentiality. The root key can be derived by the HSS or MME/SGSN/MSC and provided to the MTC-IWF. The root key can also be derived by the MTC-IWF based on received key derivation material. The described system is useful for the security of small data transmission in MTC system.

Claims

1. A communication system comprising:

a UE (User Equipment); and

MTC-IWF Machine-Type-Communication Inter-Working Function) that conducts communication with the UE,

wherein a first key is securely shared between the UE and the MTC-IWF, and

wherein the UE and the MTC-IWF respectively derive second keys from the first key for protecting the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

2. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the second keys include an integrity key for at least one of integrity cheek of a message transferred between the UE and the MTC-IWF, and integrity protection of the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

3. The communication system according to claim 2, wherein the UE performs at least one of integrity check of the message and integrity protection of the communication by use of the integrity key, and performs MTC-IWF authorization in accordance with a result of the integrity check.

4. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the second keys include a confidentiality key for encrypting and decrypting a message transferred between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

5. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the communication is conducted through a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached.

6. The communication system according to claim 1,

wherein the sharing of first key is performed in such a manner that:

the MTC-IWF receives a first key derived by a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached; and

the UE derives a first key by the UE itself, or receives the derived first key from the different network entity after NAS and/or AS security context is established between the UE and the different network entity.

7. The communication system according to claim 1,

wherein the sharing of first key is performed in such a manner that:

the MTC-IWF receives materials from a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached, and derives a first key by use of the materials; and

the UE derives a first key by the UE itself.

10. The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the sharing of first key is performed in such a manner that the MTC-IWF and the UE share as common value, and derive a first key by use of the common value independently.

8-9. -9. (canceled)

11. A MTC-IWF Machine-Type-Communication Inter-Working Function) comprising:

a communication unit that conducts communication with a UE (User Equipment);

a sharing unit that securely shares a first key with the UE; and

a derivation unit that derives second keys, from the first key, for protecting the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

12. The MTC-IWF according to claim 11, wherein the derivation unit is configured to derive, as one of the second keys, an integrity key for at least one of integrity check of a message received from the UE, and integrity protection of the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

13. The MTC-IWF according to claim 11, wherein the derivation unit is configured to derive, as one of the second keys, a confidentiality key for encrypting a message to be transmitted to the UE and for decrypting a message received from the UE.

15. The MTC-IWF according to claim 11, wherein the sharing unit is configured to receive a first key derived by a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached.

16. The MTC-IWF according to claim 11, wherein the sharing unit is configured to:

receive materials from a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached; and

derive a first key by use of the materials.

14. (canceled)

17. (canceled)

18. A UE (User Equipment) comprising:

a communication unit that conducts communication with a MTC-IWF Machine-Type-Communication Inter-Working Function);

a sharing unit that securely shares a first key with the MTC-IWF; and

a derivation unit that derives second keys, from the first key, for protecting the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

19. The UE according to claim 18, wherein the derivation unit is configured to derive, one of the second keys, an integrity key for at least one of and integrity check of a message received from the MTC-IWF, and integrity protection of the communication between the UE and the MTC-IWF.

20. The UE according to claim 19, further comprising:

an authorization unit of at least one of integrity check of the message and integrity protection of the communication by use of the integrity key, and that authorizes the MTC-IWF in accordance with as result of the check.

21. The UE according to claim 18, wherein the derivation unit is configured to derive, one of the second keys, a confidentiality key for encrypting a message to be transmitted to the MTC-IWF and for decrypting a message received from the MTC-IWF.

23. The UE according to claim 18, wherein the sharing unit is configured to receive a first key derived by a different network entity placed within a core network to which the UE attached, after NAS and/or AS security context is established between the UE and the different network entity.

22. (canceled)

24-31. -31. (canceled)

32. A method of controlling operations in a network entity placed within a core network to which a UE (User Equipment) attached, the method comprising:

deriving a first key; and

sending the first key to a MTC-IWF (Machine-Type Communication Inter-Working Function) that conducts communication with the UE.

33. The method according to claim 32, further comprising:

sending the first key to the UE after NAS (Non-Access Stratum) and/or AS (Access Stratum) security context is established between the UE and the network entity.

34. (canceled)