SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURE RELEASE OF SECRET INFORMATION OVER A NETWORK

• US 20160254913A1
• Filed: 05/09/2016
• Published: 09/01/2016
• Est. Priority Date: 04/02/2012
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Cloudera Incorporated
• Original Assignee: Cloudera Incorporated
• Inventors: Kirkland, Dustin C., Garcia, Eduardo
• Granted Patent: US 9,819,491 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0442 wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for public-key encryption H04L9/30
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0825 using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/083 involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/321 involving a third party or a trusted authority

Abstract

Embodiments of the present disclosure include systems and methods for secure release of secret information over a network. The server can be configured to receive a request from a client to access the deposit of secret information, send an authorization request to at least one designated trustee in the set of designated trustees for the deposit of secret information, receive responses over the network from one or more of the designated trustees in the set of designated trustees and apply a trustee policy to the responses from the one or more designated trustees in the set of trustees to determine if the request is authorized. If the request is authorized, the server can send the secret information to the client. If the request is not authorized, the server denies access by the client to the secret information.

Claims

1. A method for a computer system to securely manage secret information over a network, the system having a server being communicatively coupled to one or more trustees, the method being performed by the server and comprising:

receiving a secret payload from a depositing client, wherein the secret payload is encrypted by a client public key and can only be decrypted with a client private key, which is not possessed by either the server or the trustees;

receiving, from the depositing client, companion information associated with and specific to the secret payload, wherein the companion information is encrypted by a server public key and can only be decrypted with a server private key, which is possessed by the server, and wherein the companion information includes rules for accessing the secret payload, the rules identifying a list of trustees and a trustee policy that specifies a manner necessary for the list of trustees to approve access requests to the secret payload;

storing the secret payload along with the companion information;

receiving, from a requesting client, an access request to access the secret payload, the access request being encrypted by the server public key and including a seed that was randomly generated by the server and assigned to the requesting client in a preceding transaction;

decrypting the access request using the server private key;

verifying a validity of the access request based on the seed;

after the access request is verified, sending an authorization request regarding the access request to each trustee in the list of trustees;

receiving responses to the authorization requests from the list of trustees;

applying the trustee policy to the received responses to determine whether to disseminate the secret payload; and

selectively disseminating the secret payload to the requesting client based on a result of applying the trustee policy.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the seed is valid for a single transaction only.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein the companion information further includes a list of authorized requesting clients.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein the requesting client is the depositing client.

5. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

causing the depositing client to delete a local copy of the secret payload.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

causing the requesting client to limit a storage of the disseminated secret payload to a volatile memory.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein the authorization requests sent to the list of trustees are each encrypted with a trustee public key that corresponds to a respective trustee.

8. The method of claim 1, wherein the responses from the list of trustees are encrypted with the server public key.

9. The method of claim 1, wherein the disseminated secret payload is encrypted with the client public key.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein each secret payload has a unique companion information.

11. A computer system to securely manage secret information over a network, the system having a server being communicatively coupled to one or more trustees, wherein the server is configured to perform a method comprising:

receiving a secret payload from a depositing client, wherein the secret payload is encrypted by a client public key and can only be decrypted with a client private key, which is not possessed by either the server or the trustees;

receiving, from the depositing client, companion information associated with and specific to the secret payload, wherein the companion information is encrypted by a server public key and can only be decrypted with a server private key, which is possessed by the server, and wherein the companion information includes rules for accessing the secret payload, the rules identifying a list of trustees and a trustee policy that specifies a manner necessary for the list of trustees to approve access requests to the secret payload;

storing the secret payload along with the companion information;

receiving, from a requesting client, an access request to access the secret payload, the access request being encrypted by the server public key and including a seed that was randomly generated by the server and assigned to the requesting client in a preceding transaction;

decrypting the access request using the server private key;

verifying a validity of the access request based on the seed;

after the access request is verified, sending an authorization request regarding the access request to each trustee in the list of trustees;

receiving responses to the authorization requests from the list of trustees;

applying the trustee policy to the received responses to determine whether to disseminate the secret payload; and

selectively disseminating the secret payload to the requesting client based on a result of applying the trustee policy.

12. The system of claim 11, wherein the seed is valid for a single transaction only.

13. The system of claim 11, wherein the companion information further includes a list of authorized requesting clients.

14. The system of claim 11, wherein the requesting client is the depositing client.

15. The system of claim 11, the method performed by the server further comprising:

causing the depositing client to delete a local copy of the secret payload.

16. The system of claim 11, the method performed by the server further comprising:

causing the requesting client to limit a storage of the disseminated secret payload to a volatile memory.

17. The system of claim 11, wherein the authorization requests sent to the list of trustees are each encrypted with a trustee public key that corresponds to a respective trustee.

18. The system of claim 11, wherein the responses from the list of trustees are encrypted with the server public key.

19. The system of claim 11, wherein the disseminated secret payload is encrypted with the client public key.

20. The system of claim 11, wherein each secret payload has a unique companion information.