AUTHENTICATED SESSION ESTABLISHMENT

• US 20170070491A1
• Filed: 11/18/2016
• Published: 03/09/2017
• Est. Priority Date: 06/25/2013
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Google LLC (Alphabet Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Google Inc. (Alphabet Inc.)
• Inventors: Logue, Jay D.
• Granted Patent: US 9,948,622 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• US Class Current: 1/1
• CPC Class Codes: G06F 8/65 Updates security arrangements therefor G06F21/57
• CPC Class Codes: G08B 21/0415 detecting absence of activity per se
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/28 characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks] wireless communication networks H04W ; arrangements for dividing the transmission path H04W40/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2803 Home automation networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2814 Exchanging control software or macros for controlling appliance services in a home automation network arrangements for maintenance or administration involving configuration of the network and network elements H04L41/08
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/2823 Reporting information sensed by appliance or service execution status of appliance services in a home automation network device-related reporting H04L43/065; arrangements in telecontrol or telemetry systems for selectively calling a substation from a main station, in which substation desired apparatus is selected for applying a control signal thereto or for obtaining measured values therefrom H04Q9/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 12/56 Packet switching systems
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2101/604 Address structures or formats
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2101/659 Internet protocol version 6 [IPv6] addresses
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/00 Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks routing or path finding in wireless networks H04W40/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 45/74 Address processing for routing
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 49/254 Centralised controller, i.e. arbitration or scheduling
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 51/00 User-to-user messaging in packet-switching networks, transmitted according to store-and-forward or real-time protocols, e.g. e-mail
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/00 Network arrangements, protocols or services for addressing or naming
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 61/5038 for local use, e.g. in LAN or USB networks, or in a controller area network [CAN]
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0823 using certificates cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication involving certificates H04L9/3263
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/083 using passwords cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using a predetermined code H04L9/3226
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/10 in which an application is distributed across nodes in the network software deployment G06F8/60; multiprogramming arrangements G06F9/46
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/12 specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/34 : involving the movement of software or configuration parameters network booting or remote initial program loading [RIPL] G06F9/4416
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/52 : specially adapted for the location of the user terminal
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 67/535 : Tracking the activity of the user network monitoring arrangements H04L43/00; recording of computer activity G06F11/34
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 69/165 : Combined use of TCP and UDP protocols; selection criteria therefor
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 69/22 : Parsing or analysis of headers
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0861 : Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/14 : using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/30 : Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/32 : including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3247 : involving digital signatures
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3263 : involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements network architectures or network communication protocols for supporting authentication of entities using certificates in a packet data network H04L63/0823
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/3265 : using certificate chains, trees or paths; Hierarchical trust model
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0471 : Key exchange
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 : using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 24/04 : Arrangements for maintaining operational condition
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 24/10 : Scheduling measurement reports ; Arrangements for measurement reports
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 4/029 : Location-based management or tracking services
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 40/246 : Connectivity information discovery
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/0212 : managed by the network, e.g. network or access point is master and terminal is slave
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 52/383 : power control in peer-to-peer links
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 60/00 : Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 72/53 : based on regulatory allocation policies
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/10 : Connection setup
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 76/14 : Direct-mode setup
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 80/045 : involving different protocol versions, e.g. MIPv4 and MIPv6
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/12 : WLAN [Wireless Local Area Networks]
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 84/18 : Self-organising networks, e.g. ad-hoc networks or sensor networks
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/02 : Terminal devices
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/04 : adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 88/06 : adapted for operation in multiple networks or having at least two operational modes, e.g. multi-mode terminals
• CPC Class Codes: Y02D 30/70 : in wireless communication networks
• CPC Class Codes: Y04S 40/18 : Network protocols supporting networked applications, e.g. including control of end-device applications over a network
• CPC Class Codes: Y04S 40/20 : Information technology specific aspects, e.g. CAD, simulation, modelling, system security

Abstract

Methods, devices, and machine-readable media are provided to provide secure communications between entities. As provided in this disclosure, this may include receiving a request to begin a new communication session, determining one or more desired parameters of the session, and determining whether the desired parameters of the message match proposed parameters provided by the entity requesting the new communication session. When the one or more proposed parameters match the one or more desired parameters, a secure communication session is established between the entities, using shared password information.

Claims

1. A method for establishing a secure communications session between an initiator electronic device and a responder electronic device, comprising:

providing to the responder electronic device, from the initiator electronic device, a request to begin a secure communication session, the request comprising;

initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at the responder electronic device;

a list of available parameters of the initiator electronic device; and

one or more proposed parameters from the list of available parameters;

and

establishing a initiator electronic device side of the secure communications session only when the one or more proposed parameters match one or more prioritized parameters.

2. The method of claim 1, comprising:

establishing the initiator electronic device side of the secure communications session, by;

receiving, at the initiator electronic device, at least one begin session response, the begin session response comprising responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at the initiator electronic device

3. The method of claim 2, comprising:

deriving, via the initiator electronic device, a master key for decrypting encrypted messages using the responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein the prioritized parameters are determined by the responder electronic device based upon the one or more proposed parameters.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein:

the responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data comprises Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) information; and

the responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data comprises;

a gx3 field, configured to hold a J-PAKE g^x3 value;

a gx4 field, configured to hold a J-PAKE g^x4value;

a zkp-x3-gr field, configured to hold a J-PAKE g^r value associated with a zero-knowledge proof of x3;

a zkp-x3-b field, configured to hold a J-PAKE b value associated with the zero-knowledge proof of x3;

a zkp-x4-gr field, configured to hold a J-PAKE g^r value associated with a zero-knowledge proof of x4;

a zkp-x4-b field, configured to hold a J-PAKE value associated with the zero-knowledge proof of x4;

a B field, configured to hold a J-PAKE B value equal to;

g^{(x1+x2+x3)*x4*s)};

a zkp-x4s-gr field, configured to hold a J-PAKE g^r value associated with the zero-knowledge proof of x4*a secret defined by the password;

a zkp-x4s-b field, configured to hold a J-PAKE b value associated with the zero-knowledge proof of x4*the secret;

or any combination thereof.

6. The method of claim 5, comprising:

receiving, in a first begin session response, the gx3 field, the gx4 field, the zkp-x3-gr field, the zkp-x3-b field, the zkp-x4-gr field, and the zkp-x4-b field; and

receiving in a second begin session response, the B field, the zkp-x4s-gr field, and the zkp-x4s-b field.

7. The method of claim 1, comprising:

providing a password source in a password source sub-field of the request.

8. The method of claim 2, wherein at least a portion of a responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data is derived from the password.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the password source comprises:

a Wi-Fi network password, a pairing code obtained from product packaging, or both.

10. The method of claim 1, wherein the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data comprises Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) information.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the request comprises a control header, the control header comprising an unsigned integer bit field for providing local and peer nodes.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the request comprises:

a gx1 field, configured to store a J-PAKE g^x1 value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

a gx2 field, configured to store a J-PAKE g^x2 value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

a zkp-x1-gr field, configured to store a J-PAKE g^r value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

a zkp-x1-b field, configured to store a J-PAKE b value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

a zkp-x2-gr field, configured to store a J-PAKE g^r value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

a zkp-x2-b field, configured to store a J-PAKE b value of the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data;

or

any combination thereof.

13. A tangible, non-transitory machine-readable medium comprising instructions to:

generate a request to begin a secure communication session, the request comprising;

initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at a responder electronic device;

a list of available parameters of an initiator electronic device; and

one or more proposed parameters from the list of available parameters;

and

provide the request to a responder electronic device;

wherein a secure communications session is established only when the one or more proposed parameters match one or more prioritized parameters.

14. The machine-readable medium of claim 13, comprising instructions to:

in response to the begin session request, receive at least one begin session response, the at least one begin session response comprising responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at the initiator electronic device.

15. The machine-readable medium of claim 14, comprising instructions to:

derive a master key, one or more master key derivations, or any combination thereof, based at least in part upon the responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data.

16. The machine-readable medium of claim 14, wherein the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data, the responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data, or both comprises Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) information.

17. The machine-readable medium of claim 16, comprising:

in response to the at least one begin session response, generating and providing at least one initiator response corresponding to the at least one begin session response, the at least one initiator response comprising;

a control header;

an explicit confirmation field, configured to store an indication of whether or not an initiator electronic device wants to perform an explicitly confirmation of a derived session key;

an A field, configured to store a J-PAKE A value that is equal to g^{(x1+x3+x4)*x2*s)};

a zkp-x2s-gr field, configured to store a J-PAKE gr value associated with a zero-knowledge proof of x2*s, where s is a secret password;

a zkp-x2s-b field, configured to store a J-PAKE b value associated with the zero-knowledge proof of x2*s;

a double hash-k field, configured to store a double hash of the derived session key;

or

a combination thereof.

18. An electronic device comprising:

a processor configured to;

generate a request to begin a secure communication session, the request comprising;

initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at the responder electronic device;

a list of available parameters of an initiator electronic device; and

one or more proposed parameters from the list of available parameters; and

provide the request to a responder electronic device; and

provide the request to a responder electronic device to request establishment of a secure communications session with a responder electronic device;

wherein a secure communications session is established only when the one or more proposed parameters match one or more prioritized parameters.

19. The electronic device of claim 18, wherein the initiator password-authenticated key agreement protocol data comprises Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling (J-PAKE) information and the processor is configured to:

in response to the begin session request, receive at least one begin session response, the at least one begin session response comprising J-PAKE responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data for security key establishment via password authentication at the initiator electronic device; and

derive a master key, master key derivations, or both, based at least in part upon the J-PAKE responder password-authenticated key agreement protocol data.

20. The electronic device of claim 19, wherein the processor is configured to:

in response to the at least one begin session response, generating and providing at least one initiator response corresponding to the at least one begin session response, the at least one initiator response comprising J-PAKE data that enables the responder electronic device to derive the master key, the master key derivations, or both, based at least in part upon the J-PAKE data.