ENHANCED SECURE PROVISIONING FOR HOTSPOTS

• US 20180020353A1
• Filed: 07/14/2017
• Published: 01/18/2018
• Est. Priority Date: 07/15/2016
• Status: Active Grant

• Current Assignee: Avago Technologies International Sales Pte Limited (Broadcom, Inc.)
• Original Assignee: Avago Technologies General IP PTE Limited (Broadcom, Inc.)
• Inventors: BHANDARU, Nehru, DERHAM, Thomas
• Granted Patent: US 10,645,577 B2
• Time in Patent Office: Days
• CPC Class Codes: G09C 5/00 Ciphering apparatus or methods not provided for in the preceding groups, e.g. involving the concealment or deformation of graphic data such as designs, written or printed messages
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/30 Compression, e.g. Merkle-Damgard construction
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 2209/80 Wireless network architectures or network communication protocols for wireless network security H04W12/00
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/061 for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for key agreement H04L9/0838
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0807 using tickets, e.g. Kerberos cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for entity authentication using tickets or tokens H04L9/3213
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/0876 based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 63/10 for controlling access to devices or network resources
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/0844 with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04L 9/088 Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms network architectures or network communication protocols for using time-dependent keys in a packet data network H04L63/068
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/041 Key generation or derivation
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/0433 Key management protocols
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 12/069 using certificates or pre-shared keys
• CPC Class Codes: H04W 48/08 Access restriction or access information delivery, e.g. discovery data delivery signalling during connection H04W76/00

Abstract

A ticket-based shared secret authentication is provided. A client device receives a ticket, and performs an authentication with an access point using the ticket. The access point deploys a first public key-private key pair to an intermediate device. The intermediate device and access point share a master secret to protect information in the ticket. The access point receives an association request from the client device that includes a nonce public key and a signature using a second public key-private key pair provided by the intermediate device. The access point authenticates the client device using the nonce public key. The access point sends an association response to the client device based on the authentication and a signature using the first public key-private key pair. The access point initiates an association with the client device to permit the client device to connect to a network associated with the access point.

Claims

1. A method comprising:

deploying, by an access point, a master secret and a first public key-private key pair to an intermediate device accessible to a client device, the first public key-private key pair comprising a first public key and a first private key;

receiving an uplink request from the client device, the uplink request comprising a second public key of a second public key-private key pair provided by the intermediate device;

authenticating the client device using the second public key from the received uplink request;

sending a downlink response to the device based on the client device being authenticated; and

initiating, in response to the downlink response being sent, an association with the client device to permit the client device to connect to a network associated with the access point.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the uplink request comprises a concatenation of an encrypted second public key, a device ephemeral public key and a random challenge, wherein the second public key is hashed from a second private key of the second public key-private key pair.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the uplink request comprises a device signature of the concatenation using the second private key.

4. The method of claim 3, further comprising:

decoding the second public key and an expiration time from the encrypted second public key using the master secret.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein authenticating the client device comprises:

verifying the device signature using the decoded second public key, the verified device signature indicating that the intermediate device that provided a ticket to the client device is genuine.

6. The method of claim 1, further comprising:

generating an access point ephemeral public key-private key pair.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein the association response comprises a concatenation of an ephemeral public key from the access point ephemeral public key-private key pair and an access point signature.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein the access point signature is computed over a concatenation of the ephemeral public key and a random challenge from the uplink request, the access point signature being encoded using the first private key.

9. The method of claim 6, further comprising:

deriving a pairwise master key using one or more ephemeral keys of the access point ephemeral public key-private key pair; and

performing a handshake with the client device using the derived pairwise master key.

10. The method of claim 2, wherein the encrypted second public key is provided by the intermediate device to the client device.

11. The method of claim 1, wherein the uplink request comprises an association request and the downlink response comprises an association response.

12. The method of claim 1, wherein the uplink request comprises an authentication request and the downlink response comprises an authentication response.

13. An access point comprising:

one or more processors; and

a memory comprising instructions stored thereon that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform operations, the operations comprising;

generating a master secret and a first public key-private key pair, the first public key-private key pair comprising an access point private key;

deploying the master secret and the first public key-private key pair to an intermediate device accessible to a client device;

receiving an association request from the client device, the association request including an encrypted nonce public key and a device signature;

decrypting the encrypted nonce public key using the master secret;

verifying the device signature using the decrypted nonce public key;

generating an access point ephemeral public key-private key pair;

encrypting an access point signature with an access point private key;

providing an access point ephemeral public key of the access point ephemeral public key-private key pair and the encrypted access point signature to the client device; and

initiating an association with the client device using one or more ephemeral keys exchanged with the client device.

14. The access point of claim 13, wherein the association request comprises a concatenation of the encrypted nonce public key, a device ephemeral public key and a random challenge, wherein the association request comprises a device signature of the concatenation using a nonce private key associated with the client device, and wherein the operations further comprise:

decoding a nonce public key and an expiration time from the encrypted nonce public key using the master secret.

15. The access point of claim 14, wherein authenticating the client device comprises:

verifying the device signature using the decoded nonce public key, the verified device signature indicating that the intermediate device that provided a ticket to the client device is genuine.

16. The access point of claim 13, wherein the operations further comprise:

generating an access point ephemeral public key-private key pair.

17. The access point of claim 16, wherein the operations further comprise:

deriving a pairwise master key using one or more ephemeral keys of the access point ephemeral public key-private key pair; and

performing a handshake with the client device using the derived pairwise master key.

18. The access point of claim 13, wherein the access point signature is computed over a concatenation of the access point ephemeral public key and a random challenge associated with the client device.

19. The access point of claim 13, wherein the associating comprises:

permitting the client device to connect to a network associated with the access point.

20. A method comprising:

receiving, by a device, a ticket from an intermediate device, the ticket comprising a nonce private key, an encrypted nonce public key, an access point public key, and an expiration time associated with the ticket;

generating, by the device, a device ephemeral public key-private key pair;

generating, by the device, a random challenge;

encrypting, by the device, a device signature using the nonce private key;

providing, by the device to an access point, the encrypted nonce public key, a device ephemeral public key of the device ephemeral public key-private key pair, the random challenge, and the encrypted device signature;

receiving an access point signature from the access point;

verifying the access point signature using the access point public key; and

obtaining access to a network associated with the access point by an association with the access point.

21. The method of claim 20, wherein receiving the ticket comprises:

receiving a two-dimensional barcode readable by the device to provide the nonce private key, the encrypted nonce public key, and the access point public key to the device.

22. The method of claim 20, wherein the encrypted nonce public key is encrypted with a master key provided by the access point to the intermediate device.